SENATOR WEBB FOCUSES ON BURMA WITH PM AND FM;

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BANGKOK 002045

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS, NSC FOR WALTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PTER TH BM RS
SUBJECT: SENATOR WEBB FOCUSES ON BURMA WITH PM AND FM;
AMBASSADOR RAISES VIKTOR BOUT CASE

REF: BANGKOK 1998

BANGKOK 00002045 001.2 OF 005


Classified By: AMBASSADOR ERIC G. JOHN, REASON: 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) Summary. During the course of August 17 meetings with
Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva and Foreign Minister Kasit
Pirmoya, Senator Jim Webb (D-VA) shared the details of his
recent visit to Burma and outlined his thoughts on breaking
the impasse with the regime. Both Kasit and Vejjajiva noted
Thailand's commitment to keeping pressure on Burma, as well
as working with fellow ASEAN members to try and secure Aung
San Suu Kyi's release. Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya
advocated a compromise between the regime, Aung San Suu Kyi
and the National League for Democracy that would allow Burma
to move forward in developing a multi-party political system.
Senator Webb responded to questions about the efficacy of
sanctions in both meetings, and told FM Kasit that additional
Chinese pressure on the regime would prove more useful than
any new sanctions.


2. (C) In both meetings, Webb vowed to use his upcoming
appointments with Cambodian and Vietnamese leaders to push
for more responsible action by ASEAN on Burma. In the
meeting with PM Abhisit, he praised Thailand's own activism
on Burma within ASEAN, and Abhisit noted that he hoped to
generate a collective ASEAN statement calling for ASSK's
release. PM Abhisit also discussed plans for a possible
U.S.-ASEAN Summit. The Ambassador underscored the importance
of ensuring Russian arms trafficker Viktor Bout is not
released on bail and asked the Prime Minister to issue a
statement refuting the lower court's decision to deny the
extradition. End Summary.

SUCCESSFUL ENGAGEMENT IN BURMA
--------------


3. (C) Senator Webb and the Ambassador called on Foreign
Minister Kasit Piromya August 17. Senator Webb reviewed his
August 14 - 16 visit to Burma and discussed his objectives
for the trip. First, the Senator had sought the release of
Amcit John Yettaw on humanitarian grounds. Secondly, he had
hoped to meet with Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) in order to
discuss prospects for full participation in the 2010
election. Finally, he wanted to convince the Burmese regime
that lifting ASSK's house arrest would enhance the legitimacy
of the 2010 elections. Senator Webb said that he attempted
to appeal to the regime's self-interest in his meetings with
Burmese leaders by impressing upon them that the
international community would judge the regime by how it
treated ASSK. While the Burmese leadership had remained
silent on lifting the house arrest for ASSK, at least the
regime had not expressly rejected the proposal.

NLD PARTICIPATION IN 2010 ELECTIONS?
--------------


4. (C) Senator Webb noted that in separate meetings with
members of the National League for Democracy (NLD) and ASSK,
he had asked what conditions would need to be in place in
order to trigger their participation in planned 2010 Burmese
elections. The NLD had demurred while ASSK told the Senator
that she would not answer the question on her own,
characterizing it as an NLD party decision.


5. (C) FM Kasit sought to separate the NLD's participation in
the election from ASSK's. The Foreign Minister envisioned a
compromise in which ASSK and other political prisoners were
released. Under such a scenario, ASSK would then be allowed
to speak and campaign publicly for the NLD, vote in the
election, but would not be qualified to run for Prime
Minister. The NLD must be given the opportunity to
participate in the election, Kasit said. By following
through on this proposal, Burma would be given the chance to

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gradually adapt to democracy and phase out the military
junta.


6. (C) Senator Webb agreed with the notion that the NLD must
be given the chance to participate in the election, as well
as the need for the party to seize such an opportunity.
Senator Webb stated that the NLD had been inflexible to this
point, but would need to accept what was possible and not
hold on to unrealistic expectations. Searching for a
compromise solution would be the best way to test the
regime's intentions, the Senator said. While an election
under the current constitution would keep the military regime
in power, at least the political environment would be
multi-party, more than could be said for Vietnam and China.


7. (C) FM Kasit noted that both sides would need to
compromise in order for Burma to progress. Any hard-line
policy that compelled the military regime to give up power
without first providing for immunity from future prosecution
would surely fail. The Ambassador suggested to the Foreign
Minister that the Thai government seek to continue these
discussions with Embassy Bangkok as the USG conducted a
review of its Burma policy. Kasit agreed to do so.

URGING ASEAN ACTION ON BURMA
--------------


8. (C) Turning to ASEAN, FM Kasit told Senator Webb that he
had sent a circular to his ASEAN colleagues requesting a
collective appeal to the Burmese regime to grant amnesty to
ASSK. Only four other ASEAN nations agreed with Thailand --
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore -- while
the remaining ASEAN nations resisted pushing the regime.
(Note: In an end-of-day meeting, the PM stated that only Laos
was opposed to such a statement. See paragraph 21. End
Note.)


9. (C) On the subject of Senator Webb's upcoming August 18
meeting with Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, Kasit asked
the Senator to press the Cambodian leader to act responsibly
with regard to Burma. Hun Sen needed to work together with
Thailand and the U.S. rather than resorting to a Cold War
obstructionist mentality, the Foreign Minister said. Kasit
also asked the Senator to raise Burma with Vietnamese
leaders. Vietnam would need to begin to act constructively
on this issue, especially as it prepares to assume the ASEAN
Chairmanship next year. Vietnam and other Southeast Asian
nations that were reluctant to press Burma also needed to
understand that ASEAN could not continue to take the path of
least resistance, a course of action that would mean ASEAN
would not have a future.

PUSHING CHINA FOR ACTION MORE EFFECTIVE THAN SANCTIONS
-------------- --------------


10. (C) FM Kasit expressed his hope that the ASSK verdict
would not prompt further U.S. sanctions. Senator Webb said
he doubted there were areas where more sanctions could be
imposed. Instead, he thought it would be more effective to
press China to act more responsibly towards Burma. Sanctions
by the U.S. and the European Union had given China the
opportunity to increase its economic presence in Burma and
had resulted in greater Chinese political influence there.
Western sanctions had also cut Burma off from contact with
diverse viewpoints and cultures, much to the detriment of the
society and the people. Senator Webb told Kasit that he saw
a similar dynamic play out during his time working on Vietnam
issues. Western economic engagement there had benefited the
Vietnamese people and exposed them to varying ways of
thinking.


11. (C) FM Kasit recommended that Thailand and the U.S. work
together to push China to pressure the junta to release

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political prisoners and hold inclusive elections. Senator
Webb agreed with Kasit and noted that China needed to accept
the responsibility that comes with ambitions of world
leadership.

NEXT STEPS
--------------


12. (C) FM Kasit noted that the ASEAN Foreign Ministers
supported his planned visit Burma. He mentioned he would
meet with the Burmese Ambassador to Thailand later in the
evening to secure such a visit. Kasit added that he would
also participate in a meeting with Prime Minister Abhisit
Vejjajiva, Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban, Thai
military leaders, and a limited number of other Ministers
later that day to review Thai policy on Burma.


13. (C) At the close of the meeting, FM Kasit asked Senator
Webb how he would proceed upon his return to Washington.
Senator Webb said that he had discussed his Burma trip with
Secretary Clinton on August 16 and added that he looked
forward to further consultations with the Secretary in
Washington.

ABHISIT ON POLITICS AND THE ECONOMY
--------------


14. (C) During a late afternoon August 17 meeting with
Senator Webb and the Ambassador, Prime Minister Abhisit
Vejjajiva commented on the strength of U.S-Thai relations
before noting his country's economic struggles. He
emphasized his dedication to getting Thailand back on solid
economic footing, a job that was currently complicated by
political instability. Abhisit expressed optimism that his
commitment to the political reconciliation process would
payoff in the long-run.

WEBB RECAPS FOR ABHISIT
--------------


15. (C) Turning to Burma, Senator Webb contrasted his
impressions of his recently completed visit there with a trip
he took to Vietnam in 1991. In many ways Rangoon was further
along developmentally speaking than Saigon was in 1991. With
respect to Vietnam, it was obvious that the end of the
sanctions regime there had initiated a sea change in how the
Vietnamese viewed the world and their place in it.


16. (C) In response to PM Abhisit's question about his
meeting with ASSK, Webb reiterated the readout he previewed
earlier for FM Kasit, noting that neither ASSK nor the party
seemed ready to commit to elections. If pressed to hazard a
guess, Webb said that he thought that ASSK would probably not
participate. On the subject of sanctions, Webb noted that
they have both a political and an economic impact. Webb
reported that when he shared his thoughts on sanctions with
ASSK, she said -- perhaps factoring in the likelihood of
unfriendly eavesdroppers -- that she did not necessarily
oppose all sanctions.


17. (C) Prime Minister Abhisit expressed his concern that
illegitimate elections would reverse several years of gradual
progress with the regime, representing a major setback.
Abhisit mirrored Kasit's concerns about the NLD's unrealistic
expectations moving forward, and wondered aloud how
minorities would respond to any potential reconciliation
efforts.


18. (C) As for the regime itself, Webb reported that he had
met with all six top leaders and impressed upon them the
importance of holding legitimate elections. Furthermore,
Webb had warned them that the regime would be judged by the
international community by how it treated ASSK. He advised

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them to take a credible step like releasing ASSK in order to
rehabilitate Burma's image internationally. By releasing her
and bringing in a neutral third party such as Thailand to
referee reconciliation efforts, the regime would have a
workable formula in place to move the country in the right
direction.

NEXT STEPS
--------------


19. (C) On the subject of the upcoming Burmese elections,
Abhisit asked Senator Webb what he thought would happen if
ASSK and the NLD were invited to participate in upcoming
elections but the rules stayed the same. Emphasizing that he
could only speak for himself personally, Webb said he thought
it would hinge largely on the regime's ability to shape
outside impressions of the process. Webb emphasized that
finding ways to secure gradual "victories" in this process
would be key, and lay the foundation for a multi-party
system. After all, Webb noted, one should not forget that
Vietnam and China still do not have multi-party electoral
systems.


20. (C) Noting that his own planned trip to Burma had been
cancelled in anticipation of the ASSK verdict, PM Abhisit
mentioned that FM Kasit would be traveling to Burma soon. He
said Kasit would be charged with sounding out the regime and
would seek an appointment with ASSK. Given the fact that the
UN Secretary General had been denied an audience with ASSK,
he could not predict whether the request would be granted.


21. (C) On the subject of ASEAN's engagement on Burma, PM
Abhisit pointed out that Thailand had secured an ASEAN
collective statement on the ASSK verdict. He added that
Thailand was currently working on issuing an ASEAN statement
requesting ASSK's amnesty, but noted that one holdout
remained: Laos. He vowed to work to convince Laos to sign
off on the statement, adding that Vietnam and Cambodia had
eventually come around after some initial reluctance.
Senator Webb promised he would make Burma a focal point of
his upcoming trips to Cambodia and Vietnam.

U.S.-ASEAN SUMMIT
--------------


22. (C) Turning to his recent trip to the Philippines, PM
Abhisit noted that President Arroyo was delighted with the
results of her recent visit to Washington, and had expressed
enthusiasm to Abhisit for a U.S.-ASEAN Summit either in
Manila or the U.S. PM Abhisit told Senator Webb and the
Ambassador that while he appreciated President Arroyo's
enthusiasm, he had advised her that it might be more
realistic to build such a Summit on to the margins of the
upcoming APEC meeting in Singapore. When Abhisit related
Arroyo's concerns that events in Burma might preclude U.S.
involvement in such a meeting, the Ambassador assured him
that Secretary Clinton had made it very clear to FM Kasit in
Phuket last month that she wants to continue to deepen
engagement with ASEAN.

VIKTOR BOUT
--------------


23. (C) Turning to a Thai criminal court's recent decision to
deny the U.S. request to extradite notorious arms trafficker
Viktor Bout, the Ambassador expressed disappointment with the
verdict and the flawed legal analysis used in the judgment.
The Ambassador asked PM Abhisit to work to ensure Viktor Bout
is denied bail, pointing out that he is a profound flight
risk. The Ambassador further called upon the Royal Thai
Government to issue a statement disagreeing with the lower
court's decision and refuting the court's characterization of
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) as a

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political organization, noting that such statements are
common place in the U.S. system. The Ambassador further
underscored the fact that FARC is a terrorist organization,
before noting the impact such a damaging legal precedent
could have in a country waging its own battle with insurgents.


24. (C) Prime Minister Abhisit took the Ambassador's points
and said that he too had been surprised and disappointed with
the decision. He vowed to continue to direct the Office of
the Attorney General's office to work to ensure that Bout is
denied bail, and noted that he was aware of Attorney General
Holder's August 17 discussion with the Thai AG. Furthermore,
he promised his administration would work hard with U.S.
authorities to overturn the verdict. He asked the Ambassador
for any and all facts that might help to turn the case around
on appeal and vowed that his administration would continue to
collaborate to the full extent possible. Although courts in
Thailand are independent, Abhisit promised to do everything
he could to help with the case.


25. (U) Senator Webb did not clear this cable.
JOHN