THAILAND: FM KASIT EXPLAINS ASEAN AND ARF RESULTS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 001842 SIPDIS STATE FOR D, P, AND EAP, NSC FOR BADER E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV ARF TH BM KN SUBJECT: THAILAND: FM KASIT EXPLAINS ASEAN AND ARF RESULTS, INCLUDING ON NORTH KOREA AND BURMA BANGKOK 00001842 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: DCM James F. Entwistle, reason 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Thai FM Kasit invited the diplomatic corps to an ASEAN Ministerial and ASEAN Regional Forum readout session July 30. His comments covered ASEAN aspirations going forward as a "community of peoples," global challenges facing the region, and security challenges, specifically North Korea and Burma. Skirting around the language in the ARF Chair's statement on the Korean Peninsula, Kasit indicated that ASEAN had worked hard to convince the DPRK to remain engaged in ARF as a nonconfrontational body, and that the ASEAN Ministerial Communique issued July 20, prior to the start of ARF, remained the sense of the region (it condemned the recent North Korean tests and called on full implementation of UNSCR 1874, see para 6). On Burma, Kasit said that ASEAN members had consistently stressed to the Burmese FM in recent months the need to move forward positively on prisoner releases, including Aung Sang Suu Kyi (ASSK),and national reconciliation. Kasit concluded his comments by highlighting U.S. accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and expressing deep appreciation for the presence of the Secretary in Phuket, stating: "she was the star." ¶2. (C) Comment: Kasit told DCM afterwards that he would welcome a call from Deputy Secretary Steinberg (we had alerted his staff to a possible D call earlier in the day). MFA ASEAN Department staff were clearly nervous before the briefing about whether we would publicly raise ARF Chair statement language on the DPRK during the question and answer segment, aware of the concerns registered previously informally by us, and formally by the Japanese and South Koreans. MFA PermSec Virasakdi Futrakul, ASEAN Dept DDG Manasvi Srisodapol, and ASEAN Counselor Suriya Chindawongse, the three key Thai officials for ASEAN/ARF substantive matters, all engaged DCM and PolCouns on the sidelines regarding the Thai rationale for the statement's content. They underscored ASEAN's concern that the DPRK might walk out of the ARF meetings and withdraw from ARF altogether if directly attacked. ¶3. (C) Comment, continued: We made clear our disappointment with the ARF Chair language on substance and procedure, and the Thai decision to change the language we had submitted and include the North Korean rhetoric without consulting with us or seeking judicious editing. Virasak, Manasvi, and Suriya asserted that both the Chinese and the Russians came to them separately after the U.S. del had forwarded language discussed by the five parties to the Thai and said that they did not want to associate publicly with the U.S. provided language. Suriya confirmed what we had suspected: PermSec Virasak played a personal role in determining the language in the final statement. End Summary and Comment. North Korea - different messages in AMM, ARF statements -------------- -------------- ¶4. (SBU) In the briefing to the dip corps, FM Kasit described his Phuket meeting with the DPRK head of delegation, Ambassador Pak Kun-gwang. Kasit said he had described the ARF as a forum where the DPRK could speak its mind, use ASEAN as a bridge to the rest of the world. No one would attack the DPRK; everyone wished to see the DPRK to return to Six Party Talks, to become a full member of the international community, and embrace the sense of change sweeping the world. Pak had shared a "dialectical" view of history since World War II from his country's point of view. Kasit had replied that the world was changing: President Obama brought new policies world wide; China and India were rapidly transforming, and the ASEAN Charter gave Southeast Asia promise for a different future. Kasit said he urged the North Koreans to leave the Cold War mentality behind and embrace 'a climate of change" and the U.S. willingness to reach out for dialogue. ARF's intent was to facilitate all countries working together for peace and security. ¶5. (SBU) Note: There was a stark difference in the language on UNSCR 1874/DPRK issued in Phuket in the July 20 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) Joint Communique and the July 23 ARF Chair statement. Kasit made clear that: "What we said BANGKOK 00001842 002.2 OF 003 about the Korean Peninsula in the 42nd AMM Communique remains the sense of the region." (see para 6). ¶6. (U) Begin Korean Peninsula text from the 42 AMM Joint Communique (paras 60-62): - We recalled the statement by our leaders in June 2009 in which they reiterated the condemnation of the recent underground nuclear test and missile launches undertaken by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK),which constitute clear violations of the Six-Party Agreement and relevant UN Security Council resolutions, including UNSC Resolution 1874. - We urged the DPRK to fully comply with its obligations and relevant UNSC resolutions. We also urged all concerned parties to return to the Six-Party Talks process as soon as possible and fully implement their commitments made in previous rounds of the Six-Party Talks, which remains the main mechanism for achieving peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula. - We believed that the ASEAN Regional Forum, which includes ASEAN and all participants of the Six-Party Talks, can play a positive and proactive role in promoting peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula. We encouraged all concerned parties to actively pursue this objective. End AMM text excerpt. ¶7. (U) Begin text from the ARF Chair Statement (paras 7-8) - The Ministers of several countries condemned the recent nuclear test and missile launches by the DPRK. They strongly urged all member countries of the United Nations to commit themselves to fully implement the provisions of UNSCR 1874 (2009) according to which these recent activities violated the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. They regarded these activities as adversely affecting peace and stability in the region and beyond as well as the non-proliferation regime. They expressed their strong conviction that peace and stability of each relevant State can and should be safeguarded through political and diplomatic means. In this connection, they supported the dialogue and cooperation among all the concerned parties, including the early resumption of the Six-Party Talks to address the issue of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and humanitarian concerns of the international community. They also emphasized the importance of the full implementation of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005. They expected that all concerned parties would exercise self-restraint and refrain from any moves that could aggravate the situation in Northeast Asia. - The DPRK did not recognize and totally rejected the UNSC Resolution 1874 which has been adopted at the instigation of the United States. The DPRK briefed the Meeting of the fact that the ongoing aggravated situation on the Korean Peninsula is the product of the hostile policy of the United States against her, and stated that the Six-Party Talks have already come to an end, with the strong emphasis on the unique and specific security environment on the Korean Peninsula which lies in its continued division and presence of US military troops for over half a century to date in South Korea, since this factor is vital to consider and address the question of the Korean Peninsula. End ARF text excerpt. ¶8. (C) PermSec Virasak told DCM that that the language the U.S. had submitted on the morning of July 23 must not have been fully coordinated with the five parties, because both the Chinese and Russian delegations subsequently came to the Thai and stated they could not be associated with the language proposed. Counselor Suriya claimed, but offered no details, that an unnamed member of the US del had acknowledged later on July 23 to Thai officials that there was not consensus on language among the five parties. Virasak said this lack of five party consensus was the reason BANGKOK 00001842 003.2 OF 003 for the use of "several" in para 7. Virasak claimed that the Thai were pressured to accept the DPRK language because: - ASEAN members had made clear to the Thai they were wary of isolating the DPRK; - The DPRK delegation threatened to walk out and never return if their language was not accepted; and - The Chinese had pressured the Thai to accept the DPRK language. Burma -------------- ¶9. (SBU) On Burma, Kasit stressed that ASEAN countries had repeatedly stated their views in recent months on the steps necessary for Burma to move forward, namely release of all political prisoners including ASSK and a move to a genuine national dialogue. This message had been conveyed in US-ASEAN meetings, ASEM meetings in Hanoi, ASEAN-EU meetings in Phnom Penh, the ASEAN Summit in Hua Hin, and again in Phuket. "The Burmese leadership should know what must be done, and what must be avoided." The Burmese had in the end accepted mention of ASSK in the ASEAN Communique, Kasit stressed, a sign of their willingness to acknowledge the region's consensus opinion. 10 (SBU) The Burmese FM had asked ASEAN countries to give the country "some time" to show progress, Kasit said. With an eye towards 2010 elections, he commented, ASEAN was willing to wait some months for "credible changes" to commence, while worried as well about the expected July 31 verdict in ASSK's trial. "This is the reason PM Abhisit will not be traveling to Burma tomorrow." The lack of progress and change affected not only the 40 million residents of Burma, but the displaced persons, refugees, and exiles around the world, he concluded. JOHN