THAILAND SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY CLINTON'S JULY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 001662 SIPDIS FROM THE AMBASSADOR STATE FOR THE SECRETARY ALSO FOR EAP A/S CAMPBELL, NSC FOR BADER E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV TH SUBJECT: THAILAND SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY CLINTON'S JULY 21-23 VISIT BANGKOK 00001662 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Madam Secretary: You will arrive July 21 in a Kingdom of Thailand divided politically and focused inward, uncertain about the country's future after revered but ailing 81 year old King Bhumibol eventually passes. Despite a deep and broad alliance partnership that continues to deliver significant benefits quietly to both sides, the immediate priorities of the U.S. and Thailand overlap less than in years past; yours will be the first Secretary of State visit to Thailand in four years, since July 2005. The meetings with PM Abhisit in Bangkok and FM Kasit in Phuket offer an opportunity to thank the Thai for our productive alliance partnership, for Thai facilitation of shared military, law enforcement, and intelligence efforts, as well as groundbreaking health/research collaboration and long-standing refugee support, and to express our support for Thailand's democracy to meet its current challenges and emerge strengthened. Temporary Calm in a Troubled Kingdom -------------- ¶2. (C) The past year has been a turbulent ONE in Thailand. Court decisions forced two Prime Ministers from office, and twice the normal patterns of political life took a back seat to disruptive protests in the streets. The yellow-shirted People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) occupied Government House from August to December 2008, shutting down Bangkok's airports for eight days in late November, to protest governments affiliated with ex-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. The red-shirted United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD),followers of Thaksin, disrupted a regional Asian Summit and sparked riots in Bangkok in mid-April after Thaksin, now a fugitive abroad in the wake of an abuse of power conviction, called for a revolution to bring him home. While both yellow and red try to lay exclusive claim to the mantle of democracy, neither is truly democratic in intent or tactics. ¶3. (C) The current PM, Abhisit Vejjajiva, is a photogenic, eloquent 44-year old Oxford graduate who generally has progressive instincts and says the right things about basic freedoms, social inequities, policy towards Burma, and how to address the troubled deep south, afflicted by a grinding ethno-nationalist Muslim-Malay separatist insurgency. Whether Abhisit can deliver change is another matter. He is beset with a fractious coalition, with partners more interested in self-enrichment than good governance, as well as a resurgent post-2006 coup military not interested in political compromises in the deep south or reducing its profile, at least as long as uncertainty over a looming royal succession crisis remains to be resolved. ¶4. (C) While Thailand in 2009 has been more stable than in 2008, mid-April red riots aside, it is the calm in the eye of a storm. Few observers believe that the deep political and social divides can be bridged until after King Bhumibol passes and Thailand's tectonic plates shift. Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn neither commands the respect nor displays the charisma of his beloved father, who greatly expanded the prestige and influence of the monarchy during his 62 year reign. Some question whether Vajiralongkorn will be crowned King, as Bhumibol desires. Nearly everyone expects the monarchy to shrink and change in function after succession. How much will change is open to question, with many institutions, figures, and political forces positioning for influence, not only over redefining the institution of monarchy but, equally fundamentally, what it means to be Thai. It is a heady time for observers of the Thai scene, a frightening ONE for normal Thai. Engaging a long-term ally and friend strategically -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Both major parties in Thai politics -- the ruling Democrats and the opposition, Thaksin-affiliated Puea Thai BANGKOK 00001662 002.2 OF 003 (For Thai) party -- are favorable towards the U.S.; in fact, there are no radical, non-middle of the road parties represented in the Thai parliament. On the domestic political front, you should emphasize our hope that all sides will work out differences within the democratic framework and without resort to violence, as well as our support for long-time friend Thailand to work through its current difficulties and emerge as a more participatory democracy. ¶6. (C) If there is ONE area of policy difference between Thai parties affecting U.S. interests, it may well be certain elements of foreign policy. PM Abhisit and FM Kasit have stated that Thailand's foreign policy should reflect that it is a democracy, rather than being reduced to mere commercial interests of cabinet members, as they claim pro-Thaksin governments did; Thailand's Burma policy has shifted noticeably since Abhisit/Kasit came to office last December. Both Abhisit and Kasit are eager to avoid transactional diplomacy and engage you strategically, building on your meeting with Kasit in Washington in April and commitment to reanimating our Strategic Dialogue. ¶7. (C) The North Korea challenge via implementation of UNSCR 1874 and Burma policy in the wake of UN SYG Ban's visit, Aung San Suu Kyi's trial, and recent fighting which led to the greatest cross-border refugee flows into Thailand in a decade are key foreign policy issues to raise with Abhisit and Kasit, particularly given Thailand's current role as ASEAN Chair. The rise of China, and the perceived absence of a focused U.S. presence in the region in recent years, is another strategic issue worth addressing; Thailand does not seek to choose between the U.S. and China, prefers to have good relations with both, and wishes the U.S. to be engaged in the region. ¶8. (C) There are several bilateral concerns worth raising. On refugees, Thailand continues to host more than 140,000 Burmese and facilitate resettlement of more than 17,000 refugees to the U.S. this year, for which we are grateful, but it has been much less helpful on a small group of Lao Hmong, which has drawn Congressional attention. Thai authorities facilitated the arrest of notorious Russian arms trafficker Viktor Bout in March 2008; we await the results of the extradition hearing August 11. U.S. firms still receive preferred national treatment in a number of sectors, bolstering a strong trade and investment relationship, but Thai officials need to do more to strengthen the investment climate, particularly on Customs reform and intellectual property rights enforcement. Enduring value from the relationship -------------- ¶9. (C) Regional operational platform: The U.S. mission in Thailand is ONE of the largest and most diverse in the world - with over 2000 employees representing nearly 40 different departments and agencies - for good reason: we can accomplish a tremendous amount in Thailand, not only bilaterally but as a regional platform, often in ways that would be almost impossible to replicate elsewhere. That operational success occurs routinely, without fanfare or headlines, and perhaps is undervalued as a result; it would also be fair to say that we probably derive more from the relationship at present than the Thai do. More than half of the mission's employees work regionally, not bilaterally, and Bangkok's role as a regional operational, assistance, financial/IT support, and training hub for the USG will continue to expand in the coming years. ¶10. (SBU) Health/disease research: With approximately 400 Mission staff working on HEALTH issues, the Embassy hosts ONE of the USG's largest efforts to fight the world's most dangerous diseases: malaria; TB; dengue; HIV/AIDS; and pandemic influenza. CDC, USAID, USDA/APHIS, and the Armed Forces Research Institute of Medical Sciences (AFRIMS) collaborate with Thai counterparts on basic research and trial vaccines, and are platforms for assistance throughout the region. The sophistication of the Thai scientific and BANGKOK 00001662 003.2 OF 003 public HEALTH community makes collaboration as useful to the USG as it is to the Thais. A number of important breakthroughs, such as in the prevention of HIV/AIDS transmission from mothers to children, were developed here, and several phase III, double blind trials for potential HIV vaccines are currently ongoing. ¶11. (C) Mil-Mil ties: As ONE of five U.S. treaty allies in Asia and straddling a major force projection air/sea corridor, Thailand is crucial to U.S. security interests well beyond Southeast Asia. Our bilateral military relationship provides distinctive force projection opportunities from Thai military facilities amid vital sea and air lanes that support combat and humanitarian assistance missions, the opportunity to conduct live fire training exercises, both bilateral and multilateral, that are impossible to match elsewhere in Asia. We access the Utapao Naval Air Field alone a 1000 times a year; had the North Korean ship Kang Nam 1 continued on to Burma rather than turning around, we would have staged P-3s to Utapao to track it. Preserving such unfettered, unquestioned access requires engagement and remains a mission and USG priority. ¶12. (SBU) Law enforcement: 40 years of law enforcement cooperation initially focused on counter-narcotics efforts has expanded to all aspects of transnational crime, defending U.S. interests and securing extraditions of both U.S. citizens and third country nationals, and building capacity in the Thai criminal justice system. Eighteen federal and local law enforcement agencies are currently represented in the Embassy. The U.S. and Thailand co-host the International Law Enforcement Academy, a regional platform to promote law enforcement professionalism. The extradition case of Russian arms trafficker Viktor Bout, wanted in New York on charges of conspiring to provide arms to terrorists, is our current law enforcement top priority. JOHN