Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BANGKOK1494
2009-06-22 10:26:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

THAI MFA STILL NEBULOUS ON AHF RECALL DETAILS,

Tags:  KNNP MNUC PARM PGOV PREL TH 
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VZCZCXRO5573
OO RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHBK #1494/01 1731026
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 221026Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7329
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 0364
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 7196
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 9774
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 5582
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1706
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0011
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY 0128
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 001494 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2010
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM PGOV PREL TH
SUBJECT: THAI MFA STILL NEBULOUS ON AHF RECALL DETAILS,
SEEK LESSONS LEARNED FROM SIMILAR CASES

REF: A. 08 SECSTATE 16173

B. BANGKOK 501

C. 08 BANGKOK 00949

BANGKOK 00001494 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: POL Counselor George P. Kent, reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 001494 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2010 TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM PGOV PREL TH SUBJECT: THAI MFA STILL NEBULOUS ON AHF RECALL DETAILS, SEEK LESSONS LEARNED FROM SIMILAR CASES REF: A. 08 SECSTATE 16173 ¶B. BANGKOK 501 ¶C. 08 BANGKOK 00949 BANGKOK 00001494 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: POL Counselor George P. Kent, reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is an action request cable; see para 10. ¶2. (C) Summary: Thai officials are still unclear on the details of when and how an interdicted shipment of anhydrous hydrogen fluoride (AHF) might be returned to Thailand from Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and told us June 16 that they have determined, after consultation with United Nations Security Council Sanctions Committee (Sanctions Committee) experts that the shipment was not a violation of UNSCR 1737. Thai MFA officials informed us that the Ministry of Industry (MOI) has the lead, based on Thailand's Hazardous Substance Control Act (HSA),and has been in contact with Waris Unitrade (Waris) the shipping company which provided a false end user statement to the Korean supplier. The officials did not provide any timeline for when the cargo might be returned to Thailand, but the officials speculated that Waris may state that they do not have the funds to pay for the cargo being recalled to Thailand. ¶3. (C) Comment: After 18 months, the MFA is still unclear on what will be done to recall this cargo, which was shipped from South Korea to the Thai port of Laem Chabang, then onwards from Thailand to Iran via Dubai, before it was seized by Emirati authorities on January 14, 2008 (Ref A). There are several Thai agencies involved in trying to fashion a solution, but these efforts have not born any fruit yet. It seems as if the peculiar nature of this situation, Thai domestic legal regulations, a general lack of motivation by the other parties involved, and speculation regarding who will pay for the cargo to be recalled, have allowed this situation to remain unresolved. We will continue to push our MFA interlocutors on this matter. End Summary and Comment. SHIPMENT OF AHF NOT A VIOLATION OF UNSCR 1737? -------------- - ¶4. (C) MFA Deputy Director of the Peace, Security, and Disarmament Division Pattarat Hongthong told us June 16 that in the view of the Royal Thai Government (RTG),the shipment of the AHF does not violate UNSCR 1737 which, along with UNSCR 1747 and 1803, governs the shipment of nuclear-related it
ems to Iran. The MFA sought clarification of this matter from the UNSCR 1737 Sanctions Committee, which informed the Thai that, pursuant to paragraph 4 of UNSCR 1737, if a substance is not listed on the Sanctions Committee's list of prohibited substances that cannot be exported to Iran, each country would need to make their own determination as to whether or not the substance can be exported to Iran. Since AHF is not on this list, the Thais determined that UNSCR 1737 was not applicable. For the Thais, this determination reduces the issue from an international to a domestic legal concern. (Note: In our previous meeting with the MFA, they explained that the MFA had no legal authority to compel Waris to recall the cargo; see Ref B). MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY TAKES THE LEAD -------------- ¶5. (C) Given this determination, the MFA requested the National Security Council,s (NSC) assistance; the NSC delegated authority from MFA to MOI to engage with Waris to reach a solution based on the Thai HSA and Waris' failure to obtain a license to ship the material. The HSA classifies chemical substances into four categories. Per post,s understanding of the HSA, depending on where AHF ranks in these four categories, the penalties for failing to follow proper procedure while producing, possessing, importing, or exporting the chemical ranges from six months imprisonment and/or a 50,000 baht fine to 10 years imprisonment and/or a 1 million baht fine. BANGKOK 00001494 002.2 OF 002 NO RECENT CONTACT BETWEEN UAE AND RTG -------------- ¶6. (C) When asked about the most recent communications between UAEG and RTG on this issue, Pattarat noted that the UAE Embassy in Bangkok met MFA officials in June 2008, and the Thai Consulate in UAE met with UAE officials subsequently in 2008. There have not been any further UAE-Thai discussions in 2009, Pattarat said. A FEW MORE DETAILS ON WARIS -------------- ¶7. (C) Pattarat claimed that since this spring, Waris has been cooperating on the effort to recall the shipment to Thailand, with the most recent exchange between Waris and the MOI in May. Regarding possible past questionable deals by Waris, Pattarat stated that the MOI holds a positive profile for Waris, though Waris did not get an export license from the RTG to ship the AHF. MOI continues to investigate whether this will require prosecution under the HSA. QUESTIONS ON HOW TO GET THE AHF BACK... -------------- ¶8. (C) When asked about the possibility of the AHF being declared abandoned, Pattarat said the MFA was not aware of this option. Pattarat repeated that Waris is looking into finding another buyer for the AHF. Pattarat believed that, in the end, abandonment may end up being more costly than just finding another buyer for the AHF, and it may take longer to resolve the situation if abandonment were declared. ...THE COST, AND WHAT TO DO WITH THE AHF -------------- ¶9. (C) Note: Pattarat mentioned concerns about how much it would cost to return the AHF to Thailand and who would bear this cost several times in the conversation, worried that Waris may take the position that the company does not have the funds available to pay to return the cargo. Pattarat noted that if Waris could not afford to pay to return the cargo, and other means have to be worked out, the matter may take longer to resolve. Pattarat also commented that once the AHF is back in Thailand, properly disposing of the AHF and who will cover that cost remains to be determined. Looking towards the future, in light of UNSCR 1874 regarding the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Pattrat commented that RTG will have to re-evaluate its operating procedures to ensure that Thailand has the capacity to handle cases that could arise from the resolution in an efficient manner. ACTION REQUEST -------------- ¶10. (C) Pattrat asked if the State Department could share any information on how other governments have handled situations similar to this in the past. JOHN

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