Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BANGKOK1494
2009-06-22 10:26:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

THAI MFA STILL NEBULOUS ON AHF RECALL DETAILS,

Tags:  KNNP MNUC PARM PGOV PREL TH 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5573
OO RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHBK #1494/01 1731026
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 221026Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7329
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 0364
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 7196
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 9774
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 5582
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1706
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0011
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY 0128
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 001494 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2010
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM PGOV PREL TH
SUBJECT: THAI MFA STILL NEBULOUS ON AHF RECALL DETAILS,
SEEK LESSONS LEARNED FROM SIMILAR CASES

REF: A. 08 SECSTATE 16173

B. BANGKOK 501

C. 08 BANGKOK 00949

BANGKOK 00001494 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: POL Counselor George P. Kent, reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 001494

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2010
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM PGOV PREL TH
SUBJECT: THAI MFA STILL NEBULOUS ON AHF RECALL DETAILS,
SEEK LESSONS LEARNED FROM SIMILAR CASES

REF: A. 08 SECSTATE 16173

B. BANGKOK 501

C. 08 BANGKOK 00949

BANGKOK 00001494 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: POL Counselor George P. Kent, reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This is an action request cable; see para 10.


2. (C) Summary: Thai officials are still unclear on the
details of when and how an interdicted shipment of anhydrous
hydrogen fluoride (AHF) might be returned to Thailand from
Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and told us June 16 that they
have determined, after consultation with United Nations
Security Council Sanctions Committee (Sanctions Committee)
experts that the shipment was not a violation of UNSCR 1737.
Thai MFA officials informed us that the Ministry of Industry
(MOI) has the lead, based on Thailand's Hazardous Substance
Control Act (HSA),and has been in contact with Waris
Unitrade (Waris) the shipping company which provided a false
end user statement to the Korean supplier. The officials did
not provide any timeline for when the cargo might be returned
to Thailand, but the officials speculated that Waris may
state that they do not have the funds to pay for the cargo
being recalled to Thailand.


3. (C) Comment: After 18 months, the MFA is still unclear on
what will be done to recall this cargo, which was shipped
from South Korea to the Thai port of Laem Chabang, then
onwards from Thailand to Iran via Dubai, before it was seized
by Emirati authorities on January 14, 2008 (Ref A). There
are several Thai agencies involved in trying to fashion a
solution, but these efforts have not born any fruit yet. It
seems as if the peculiar nature of this situation, Thai
domestic legal regulations, a general lack of motivation by
the other parties involved, and speculation regarding who
will pay for the cargo to be recalled, have allowed this
situation to remain unresolved. We will continue to push our
MFA interlocutors on this matter. End Summary and Comment.

SHIPMENT OF AHF NOT A VIOLATION OF UNSCR 1737?
-------------- -



4. (C) MFA Deputy Director of the Peace, Security, and
Disarmament Division Pattarat Hongthong told us June 16 that
in the view of the Royal Thai Government (RTG),the shipment
of the AHF does not violate UNSCR 1737 which, along with
UNSCR 1747 and 1803, governs the shipment of nuclear-related
items to Iran. The MFA sought clarification of this matter
from the UNSCR 1737 Sanctions Committee, which informed the
Thai that, pursuant to paragraph 4 of UNSCR 1737, if a
substance is not listed on the Sanctions Committee's list of
prohibited substances that cannot be exported to Iran, each
country would need to make their own determination as to
whether or not the substance can be exported to Iran. Since
AHF is not on this list, the Thais determined that UNSCR 1737
was not applicable. For the Thais, this determination
reduces the issue from an international to a domestic legal
concern. (Note: In our previous meeting with the MFA, they
explained that the MFA had no legal authority to compel Waris
to recall the cargo; see Ref B).

MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY TAKES THE LEAD
--------------


5. (C) Given this determination, the MFA requested the
National Security Council,s (NSC) assistance; the NSC
delegated authority from MFA to MOI to engage with Waris to
reach a solution based on the Thai HSA and Waris' failure to
obtain a license to ship the material. The HSA classifies
chemical substances into four categories. Per post,s
understanding of the HSA, depending on where AHF ranks in
these four categories, the penalties for failing to follow
proper procedure while producing, possessing, importing, or
exporting the chemical ranges from six months imprisonment
and/or a 50,000 baht fine to 10 years imprisonment and/or a 1
million baht fine.


BANGKOK 00001494 002.2 OF 002


NO RECENT CONTACT BETWEEN UAE AND RTG
--------------


6. (C) When asked about the most recent communications
between UAEG and RTG on this issue, Pattarat noted that the
UAE Embassy in Bangkok met MFA officials in June 2008, and
the Thai Consulate in UAE met with UAE officials subsequently
in 2008. There have not been any further UAE-Thai
discussions in 2009, Pattarat said.

A FEW MORE DETAILS ON WARIS
--------------


7. (C) Pattarat claimed that since this spring, Waris has
been cooperating on the effort to recall the shipment to
Thailand, with the most recent exchange between Waris and the
MOI in May. Regarding possible past questionable deals by
Waris, Pattarat stated that the MOI holds a positive profile
for Waris, though Waris did not get an export license from
the RTG to ship the AHF. MOI continues to investigate
whether this will require prosecution under the HSA.

QUESTIONS ON HOW TO GET THE AHF BACK...
--------------


8. (C) When asked about the possibility of the AHF being
declared abandoned, Pattarat said the MFA was not aware of
this option. Pattarat repeated that Waris is looking into
finding another buyer for the AHF. Pattarat believed that,
in the end, abandonment may end up being more costly than
just finding another buyer for the AHF, and it may take
longer to resolve the situation if abandonment were declared.

...THE COST, AND WHAT TO DO WITH THE AHF
--------------


9. (C) Note: Pattarat mentioned concerns about how much it
would cost to return the AHF to Thailand and who would bear
this cost several times in the conversation, worried that
Waris may take the position that the company does not have
the funds available to pay to return the cargo. Pattarat
noted that if Waris could not afford to pay to return the
cargo, and other means have to be worked out, the matter may
take longer to resolve. Pattarat also commented that once
the AHF is back in Thailand, properly disposing of the AHF
and who will cover that cost remains to be determined.
Looking towards the future, in light of UNSCR 1874 regarding
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Pattrat commented
that RTG will have to re-evaluate its operating procedures to
ensure that Thailand has the capacity to handle cases that
could arise from the resolution in an efficient manner.

ACTION REQUEST
--------------


10. (C) Pattrat asked if the State Department could share any
information on how other governments have handled situations
similar to this in the past.
JOHN