ENGAGEMENT ON LAO HMONG ISSUE YIELDS CONTINUED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 001485 SIPDIS NSC FOR PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PREF TH LA SUBJECT: ENGAGEMENT ON LAO HMONG ISSUE YIELDS CONTINUED DIALOGUE BUT LITTLE PROGRESS REF: A. BANGKOK 1340 (AMB JOHN RAISES HMONG WITH RTARF) ¶B. BANGKOK 1305 (AMB JOHN RAISES HMONG WITH DPM) ¶C. BANGKOK 1225 (NGO PULLS OUT OF PETCHABUN) ¶D. BANGKOK 1223 (AMB JOHN RAISES HMONG WITH FM) ¶E. BANGKOK 1028 (RTG DIALOGUE ON NONG KHAI HMONG) ¶F. BANGKOK 888 (AMB JOHN RAISES HMONG WITH FM) ¶G. BANGKOK 822 (SUMMARY OF HMONG SITUATION) ¶H. BANGKOK 650 (AMBS RAISE HMONG WITH RTG) BANGKOK 00001485 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: A/DCM ROBERT D. GRIFFITHS, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: U.S. Ambassador to Laos, Ravic Huso, met with Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) International Organizations Deputy Director General Ittiporn Boonpracong, and Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF) Border Division Chief LTG Niphat Thonglek on June 11 and 12 to discuss the ongoing custody of Lao Hmong in Thailand. The RTG position has not changed substantially regarding continued repatriations but both the MFA and the RTARF offered assurances that returns would be "voluntary" and expressed their interest in discussing "out of the box" options for dealing with those Hmong whom the Thai have identified as being at risk should they return to Laos. Separately, the office of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) described its focus on the smaller group of detained Hmong at Nong Khai (Ref G),and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) indicated it anticipated an increasing role in repatriations from Petchabun. Finally, Ambassador David Lipman, Head of the Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand, Burma, Laos and Cambodia, briefed Ambassador Huso on EU support of a proposed project that would involve independent monitoring of Hmong who return to Laos. ¶2. (C) Comment: The RTG remains intent on returning as many Hmong as possible to Laos and is prepared to use both inducements and pressure to achieve this goal. However, Thai officials recognize the damage that would result to Thailand's image and international relations should they use overt force to compel returns. The Thai also recognize that not all the Hmong will "volunteer" to return and, in fact, have identified an unspecified number who they believe would be at risk should they return. The Thai are interested in more discussions with the U.S. on the options for addressing the protection needs of this population. End Summary and Comment. RTG INTERLOCUTORS STAY THE COURSE -------------- ¶3. (C) Ambassador Huso engaged LTG Niphat Thonglek on Hmong issues over lunch on June 11, 2009. Niphat had recently returned from a trip to Laos with the RTARF Chief of Defense Forces (Ref A) and said that the main issues discussed were border demarcation and the Hmong situation. Referring to accusations from Doctors Without Borders (MSF) and others that the Thai had used arbitrary arrests as a tactic to isolate the Huay Nam Khao (HNK) camp leaders and pressure them to agree to return to Laos or face incarceration, Niphat instead characterized these individuals as genuinely "bad boys." He complained that the MSF decision to pull out of the camp was "political" and that the alleged interference by the Thai Army in their activities was trumped up. He extended an impromptu invitation to Ambassador Huso to visit HNK to see the refugees himself, a suggestion that was politely but firmly declined. (Note: Embassy had also declined Niphat's earlier invitations to witness border repatriation ceremonies out of concern that our presence might be misinterpreted as U.S. support for repatriation. End Note.) When asked, Niphat insisted that all further repatriations would be on a voluntary basis. Ambassador Huso pressed him to define "voluntary" and Niphat replied that the RTARF would not use physical force or compulsion but would use inducements and psychological pressure to encourage returns to Laos. (Note: Although Niphat may hold this position, we remain concerned that the RTARF is committed to closing HNK by the end of this fiscal year and may be prepared to use physical coercion, see Ref C.) BANGKOK 00001485 002.2 OF 003 ¶4. (C) Niphat demonstrated a clear willingness to engage in "end game" discussions about the disposition of a residual group at HNK whom the RTG had determined have demonstrated a connection to U.S.-trained forces pre-1975 and who may have continued their resistance afterwards. These individuals and their families, Niphat acknowledged, unlike the majority whom he characterized as economic migrants, may have a credible fear of persecution. Ambassador Huso reiterated the importance of transparency regarding the screening process that led to the identification of those with a reasonable fear of persecution. He stressed that it would be extremely helpful for the U.S. to have information regarding these persons. Also, the U.S. has historical and other sources of information that would assist in the identification of Hmong who would be at risk. Niphat acknowledged our longstanding request for access to the Thai lists but made no promises to deliver the information. ¶5. (C) In a separate meeting, MFA Deputy Director General Ittiporn Boompracong repeated prior comments on the need for "out of the box" solutions to the Lao Hmong problem (Ref D). He stressed that the RTG had an interest in keeping the Hmong issue from undermining the overall Thai-Lao bilateral relationship. He also expressed the Thai desire to address the humanitarian and refugee concerns of the international community. He defended the RTG screening process, saying that it was based on decades of Thai experience in dealing with refugee issues in cooperation with international partners. He did not, however, offer any assurances that the Thai would provide the details of the process and the decisions reached, although Ambassador Huso pressed him repeatedly to do so. Ambassador Huso urged him to take concrete measures to improve transparency regarding the degree to which the return process was truly voluntary. Ittiporn reiterated that MSF's withdrawal from HNK (Ref C) had prompted a very negative reaction within the RTG, resulting in the suspension of discussions with IOM to involve that agency in monitoring Hmong returnees from HNK to the border. He indicated that talks with IOM could resume in a "few weeks." ¶6. (C) Ambassador Huso strongly suggested to Ittiporn that the Thai should open immediately a discussion with the U.S. and other concerned parties regarding the Hmong who the Thai had identified as being at risk because of prior association with the U.S. during the war. A long-awaited and critical first step would be for the Thai to provide the U.S. with the names and interview results. With that information, the U.S. could review its own sources of information and would also have a clearer understanding of both the size and composition of the group. Ambassador Huso pointed out that providing the information would be very much in the Thai interest. Ittiporn raised the Lao proposal to allow Hmong who returned to Laos from HNK to resettle if third countries wished to take them as immigrants. Ambassador Huso pointed out that this proposal - even if it were confirmed - would be inconsistent with basic principles and norms concerning asylum-seekers. Even so, Ambassador Huso said the U.S. was always interested in an open discussion with the Thai. He stressed again that transparency on the part of the Thai would be key to a productive dialogue. IOM INCREASINGLY POSITIVE WHILE UNHCR DESPAIRS -------------- - ¶7. (SBU) Ambassador Huso followed up a positive recent discussion with IOM representatives in Laos in a meeting with RefCoord and IOM representatives in Bangkok. The outgoing IOM Regional Representative for Southeast Asia, Irena Vojackova, concurred with Ambassador Huso's assessment that the incremental progress IOM was making in establishing itself with anti-trafficking and migrant return programs in Laos could lead to a role in assisting and monitoring Hmong returnees from HNK. The IOM Rep affirmed that she intended to take a step-by-step approach to gain the confidence of the GOL. IOM, she said, intended to focus for now on the GOL BANGKOK 00001485 003.2 OF 003 half of the equation, until the dust had settled from the MSF pullout. (Ref C) ¶8. (C) In contrast, UNHCR Regional Representative Raymond Hall was focused almost entirely on the situation of the 158 Lao Hmong in Nong Khai who had received Person of Concern status from the UNHCR almost 3 years ago. He appeared to have concluded that UNHCR had no ability to influence the Thai regarding the HNK situation. He believed that the RTG was prioritizing its bilateral relationship with Laos above the humanitarian concerns of the international community. Also, it was impossible for UNHCR to operate effectively in HNK because of the lack of transparency. In discussion of Nong Khai, Hall said he was hopeful that the Hmong there would not be sent back, but thought the Thai would not release them locally or allow for third-country resettlement until the current high-level of attention and interest had died down. EU WEIGHS IN -------------- ¶9. (C) Ambassador Huso met EC Delegation Head Lipman, who shared details of his recent trip to a project funded by the EC near Pha Lak, the Lao village created to accept returnees from Petchabun who had no links to established communities or relatives to care for them. He indicated that the EU's information suggested that the returnees were receiving assistance as promised and land to farm, and that there had been no reports of ill-treatment. Ambassador Huso also discussed an NGO request for funding from the EU for a project aimed at bringing the Lao government into a confidential discussion with leaders of the Hmong diaspora who remained hostile to the GOL. The EU officials confirmed that they were in the final stages of funding the project. Ambassador Huso urged them to ensure that there was a clear commitment on the part of the NGO and the Lao government to include a "Phase 2" that involved confidence-building measures, specifically regular independent access to Hmong returnees as well as those Hmong who have surrendered to government authority over the last several years. Ambassador Lipman agreed that this would be critically important to the success of this initiative. ¶10. (U) This cable has been cleared by Ambassador Huso. JOHN