Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BANGKOK1415
2009-06-12 07:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

ASEAN SYG SURIN DISCUSSES ASSK TRIAL AND OTHER

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM TH BM 
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FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7271
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 7131
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1619
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 5648
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 5566
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI PRIORITY 6661
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 001415 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM TH BM
SUBJECT: ASEAN SYG SURIN DISCUSSES ASSK TRIAL AND OTHER
BURMA ISSUES

REF: BANGKOK 1219

BANGKOK 00001415 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Robert D. Griffiths, reason, 1.4
(b, d)

Summary and Comment
-------------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 001415 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM TH BM SUBJECT: ASEAN SYG SURIN DISCUSSES ASSK TRIAL AND OTHER BURMA ISSUES REF: BANGKOK 1219 BANGKOK 00001415 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Robert D. Griffiths, reason, 1.4 (b, d) Summary and Comment -------------- ¶1. (C) Embassy Rangoon Charge d'Affaires Dinger met in Bangkok with ASEAN Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan June 10. Surin sees the ASEAN Charter as already building political will in the region. He praised ASEAN Ministers for spending an hour at the recent ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting (AEMM) in Phnom Penh decrying Burma's critical response to the ASEAN Chair's Statement that urged the GOB to release Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) (reftel). Surin sees the GOB's recent offensive against Karen (KNU) forces near the Burma-Thai border as intended to signal displeasure about the Thai Chairman's Statement. Surin urged the U.S. to keep on encouraging positive Thai action. When Charge Dinger asked about the possibility of an emergency ASEAN Ministerial interaction if ASSK were to be convicted, Surin said doing proper spade work would be essential. Surin suggested the sudden slowdown of ASSK's trial might reflect divisions within the GOB given the strength of international reaction, maybe even from China. Surin worries that Burma may have nuclear aspirations, and he is watching Russian and Indian attitudes toward the Burmese. He expressed concern over weakened Tripartite Core Group (TCG) authority to facilitate post-cyclone assistance in Burma, particularly over issuance of visas. ¶2. (C) Comment: Surin appears eager for ASEAN to take a principled approach on Burma, but he recognizes the difficulties involved. Later in the day at an informal donor session hosted by ASEAN's Humanitarian Task Force, the Charge joined other donors in building a case for Surin to call on ASEAN leaders to press the GOB's senior generals to stand by past promises to facilitate international efforts to address Burma's crying humanitarian needs. End Comment. ASEAN Charter and Expanding Roles -------------- ¶3. (C) Over a private breakfast in Bangkok on June 10, Embassy Rangoon Charge d'Affaires Dinger engaged ASEAN SYG Surin regarding a range issues related to Burma. The Charge noted Secretary Clinton's appreciation for ASEAN leaders' willingness to speak out on the arrest and trial of ASSK. Surin stated that the ASEAN Charter is already hav
ing a positive effect on most member states. Thailand's Chairman's Statement regarding the ASSK issue last month (reftel) was particularly significant because it was addressing an issue with obvious political dimensions. Surin suggested that in the past, ASEAN's Chair would not have been willing to issue such a bold statement. However, this time ASEAN felt the pressure of the world and wanted to live up to the Charter's principles. Surin confirmed that senior officials from all the ASEAN governments accepted the Chairman's Statement language. ASEAN Ministers United on Burma in Phnom Penh -------------- ¶4. (C) At the ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting (AEMM) in Phnom Penh last week, Surin was heartened that ASEAN Ministers insisted on spending an hour discussing their displeasure that the GOB had publicly rejected the Chairman's Statement. The Ministers, except for the Burmese, were united in believing that, once a Chairman's Statement is agreed, it would violate ASEAN principles to reject or condemn it publicly. Surin said most Ministers thought it sufficient to agree on that among themselves; but Singapore chose to go public, demonstrating support for the Thai Chair's action by issuing its own statement. Surin urged the U.S. and other powers to keep on encouraging Thailand by expressing appreciation when it acts courageously. Burma Attack on KNU Really a Signal to Thailand -------------- -- ¶5. (C) Surin raised reports in recent days of a Burma Army offensive against Karen National Union (KNU) forces along the BANGKOK 00001415 002.2 OF 003 Burma-Thai border. When the Charge noted that a rainy-season offensive is unusual timing, and weather is likely to make territorial gains very difficult, Surin proposed that the GOB intent is not to displace the KNU but to punish the Thai Government for issuing the ASEAN Chairman's Statement. Surin said historically both the Thai and Burmese governments have pulsed against each other, surging from one side when sensing weakness from the other. At the moment, it appears the Burmese sense domestic political uncertainty in Thailand, encouraging the Burmese Army attack to push Karen refugees into becoming burdens of Thailand. Burmese on DPRK Nukes; Questions about Russia and India -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Surin noted that when the AEMM discussed the DPRK's recent nuclear test, the Burmese delegation head, Deputy Foreign Minister Maung Myint, objected to discussion of the issue and complained about the language in the AEMM statement condemning the test. Surin surmised that the Burmese, in objecting, were considering their own nuclear-development interests. The Charge noted the obvious warming that has occurred between Burma and the DPRK. Surin is aware of reports that Russia is engaged in nuclear cooperation with Burma, including the training of Burmese students in nuclear science. He is suspicious of Russia's motives. Surin is curious if the recent Indian election might encourage the governing Congress party to take a more productive approach to Burma. The Charge noted that India's policy regarding Burma seems driven by concerns about China and desires for commercial advantage, neither of which have changed. ASSK Trial -------------- ¶7. (C) Surin assessed that the GOB delay of ASSK's trial might indicate divisions within the Burmese government, given international reactions that suggest the potential for worldwide condemnation if ASSK is convicted. Surin believes China has become annoyed with the Burmese regime's intransigence, and the Burmese would surely be concerned about jeopardizing that relationship. Potential Emergency ASEAN Ministerial Discussions re ASSK? -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) The Charge observed that international actors must be prepared to respond if, as most expect, the ASSK trial results in a negative outcome. He noted that one possible regional response could be some form of an emergency ASEAN Ministerial discussion, as took place after Cyclone Nargis last year. In reply, Surin simply noted that if Washington and others in the international community would want to encourage such a course, it would be important to "do the spade work" in advance. He observed that ASEAN governments are quite sensitive to international pressure. TCG --- ¶9. (C) Surin and the Charge discussed problems in recent months with the Tripartite Core Group (TCG) which ASEAN, the UN, and the GOB set up shortly after Cyclone Nargis to facilitate relief and recovery efforts. Surin is proud that initially the TCG was a real success. PM Thein Sein had promised GOB cooperation and TCG Chair Kyaw Thu was an effective leader. However, since March, the GOB has been asserting more control, bogging the TCG down, making it less efficient. That has been particularly obvious as regards the issuance of visas, which has now reverted to the lengthy, pre-cyclone bureaucratic process. Even ASEAN Volunteers, a source of pride for Surin, have been unable to get visas in recent months, turning that program into a mostly Burmese-volunteer operation, not at all the intention. The GOB justifies the visa-processing reversion by arguing that the emergency phase is over. Surin believes it important that the TCG regain its original strength. In private and later in an ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force donor meeting, the Charge strongly encouraged Surin to energize ASEAN leaders to press the GOB to return to a facilitation mode, given that for many in post-Nargis Burma the need for humanitarian aid remains intense. BANGKOK 00001415 003.2 OF 003 A Rohingya Angle? -------------- ¶10. (C) Surin expressed interest in having a revitalized TCG take on facilitation of an assistance role in Northern Rakhine State, home of Burma's Rohingya population. He would like to hope that over time assistance could further expand both geographically and substantively beyond the post-cyclone relief operations in the Delta. All that said, Surin realizes the GOB may find expansion a hard sell, at least for now. ¶11. (U) Charge d'Affaires Dinger has cleared this cable. GRIFFITHS

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