SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: ACADEMICS AND NGOS REFUTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 001276 SIPDIS NSC FOR PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2019 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL PTER TH SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: ACADEMICS AND NGOS REFUTE CLAIMS ABOUT SECURITY GAINS, ASSESS CHALLENGES AHEAD REF: A. BANGKOK 1167 (LOCAL OFFICIAL VIEWS) ¶B. BANGKOK 1061 (TARGETED KILLINGS) ¶C. BANGKOK 618 ( GRISLY INCIDENTS) ¶D. BANGKOK 396 (THAI SECURITY FORCES RAID OFFICE OF OUTSPOKEN HUMAN RIGHTS GROUP IN THE DEEP SOUTH) BANGKOK 00001276 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: DCM JAMES F. ENTWISTLE, REASON 1.4 (B) AND (D) 1.(C) Summary: Contacts in the NGO and academic communities in the deep South recently reiterated many of the themes we have heard on previous trips: a drop in the number of violent incidents does not mean the situation is getting better; the populace does not trust the government and military; a desire for separatism is not driving people to join or support the insurgency. Our contacts generally agreed that the starting point for resolving issues driving the violence would be genuine community empowerment, even if the word "autonomy" remains a non-starter for the RTG. Meanwhile, human rights NGOs feel threatened by scrutiny of and occasional harassment by the security forces, while some are targeted by insurgents as well. An unlikely interlocutor, Salafist Imam Lutfi Japakiya of Yala Islamic University (YIU),professed complete loyalty to the Thai state as long as he was allowed to teach Islam, and claimed to us that YIU was first and foremost about building peace in the community. ¶2. (C) Comment: By all statistical accounts, there is less violence in the South than there was a year ago. Perception, however, is reality. The majority of the people we spoke with do not feel any safer. There continues to be daily violence; heavy-handed security force tactics, though possibly changing, are still cited along with a lack of justice for past transgressions, as one of the primary reasons the local population does not trust the RTG. PM Abhisit has said the right things -- that he intends to move away from the current military centric approaches to the South and concentrate on delivering justice. However, national POLITICAL instability in Bangkok has meant that the PM and his team have had little attention to devote to the issue, to use leverage against the military's dominant role, or to pursue possible talks with the separatists. Absent renewed focus on the south, the status quo seems likely to �0A;prevail. This is the third in a series of recent updates on the situation in the deep south; Ref A covered local government and security official assessments of the situation, and ref B dealt with the problem of targeted killings. End Summary and Comment. Conversations with the Doctor (Srisomphop)... -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Dr. Srisomphop Chitphirmsi, director of Deep South Watch and professor at Prince of Songkhla University, shared his assessment with us that, based on the drop in number of violent attacks per month through 2008, the government has made some progress in controlling the insurgency. He did not, however, believe this progress would continue; he had not seen any evidence that the insurgents were reducing their efforts. Srisomphop did not believe the military would be able to quell the violence unless it changed its tactics to gain the local population's trust. He said the next few months could provide an opportunity to make the necessary changes, as the 15th development division takes over responsibility for operations from rotating out of region commands. (Note: In an update of his violence statistics released in mid-April, Srisomphop noted that the number of violent attacks had gradually increased again between January and April; in March, there were over 100 violent incidents. End note.) ¶4. (C) Srisomphop suggested the solution to the southern conflict may lie in the creation of a special administrative zone in the deep South to allow southerners some modicum of self-government. He said the military, which is struggling with deep issues of mistrust in the South, remains a significant impediment to any concept of autonomy for two BANGKOK 00001276 002.2 OF 004 reasons. The first is practical -- they stand to lose resources and power. The second is more complex -- a special administrative zone would look too much like autonomy, which the army believes is a real danger to the integrity of the state. The irony, said Srisomphop, is that not even the separatists think separation is realistic. Regardless, Srisomphop said, the academic community in the South had little ability to influence the military's approach to the conflict; he claimed the military never consulted academics on the issue. ¶5. (SBU) Srisomphop described the insurgent movement as a loosely coordinated composite of separate groups currently looking for ways to "empower" themselves. He said they have gotten better at coordinating among themselves, but there were not strong connections between them; seeing a common enemy in the Thai state bound them together in attacks against the state, security forces, and collaborators, but they did not yet have a common voice. Srisomphop believed their demands could be met within the framework of the constitution and the unitary state. (Note: The perpetrators of the violence in the south have never taken responsibility for any specific incidents of violence, nor have they ever made any clear demands. We have no information regarding what Srisomphop was basing his comments on. End note.) ¶6. (SBU) University demographics in the deep south had changed since the insurgency was reenergized five years ago, Srisomphop noted. Five years ago, the religious split of PSU students was 50-50 Buddhist-Muslim. Now, he said, some 70 to 80 percent are Muslim, and about 80 percent of them come from the private religious schools that operate on a parallel system with the public education system. He said the government subsidizes these schools with 10,000 baht ($345) per student. Srisomphop said the religious teachers in these schools often propagate extremist views, and are very hard to control. ...The Imam (Lutfi)... -------------- ¶7. (SBU) A courtesy call on Yala Islamic University rector Ismail Lutfi Japakiya, the most prominent Wahabist/Salafist in southern Thailand, was friendly but formal; Japakiya was the only interlocutor who asked to speak Malay to us rather than Thai or English. Lutfi told us that he appreciated the opportunity to meet with embassy officials and engage in a dialogue that he felt was all too rare. He acknowledged that many foreigners had misconceptions about YIU and that dialogue could clear the air. Lutfi set out to assure us that YIU promoted the peaceful tenants of Islam, and he respected the other monotheistic religions, Christianity and Judaism (note: he didn't mention Buddhism). He assessed that he has a good working relationship with the provincial authorities and the SBPAC; sitting across from a display of pictures from a 2008 visit by the Crown Prince to the college, he added: "as long as the Thai state doesn't interfere with my teaching of Islam, I will remain loyal to the Thai state." ¶8. (C) Lutfi asserted that conflict resolution in the deep South was fundamentally dependent on educational reform. He said YIU was actively engaged in efforts to build understanding between people, but lamented that they could not reach out to the militants because they did not know who they were. According to Lutfi, not all Muslims really understood Islam, and misrepresentation of Islam was making the conflict worse. He acknowledged the complexity of issues that are obstacles to reconciliation in the South: religion, history, and isolation. He said people in the South were trapped in a hundred years of history throughout which both the insurgents and the government propagated the ideas that were feeding the conflict. It would take "at least 20-30 years" to correct the misunderstandings and deal with the grievances that have built up over that period, he opined. ¶9. (C) Note: Although Lutfi spoke about peace and BANGKOK 00001276 003.2 OF 004 reconciliation in the South, in February, YIU hosted a seminar conducted by hard-line Islamic Scholar Rida Samadi. Rida, a Thai Muslim, has not become involved with issues surrounding the conflict in the South, but he has been a consistent source of inflammatory anti-US rhetoric.) ...A Former NRC Official (Ahmad Somboon)... -------------- ¶10. (SBU) According to Ahmad Somboon, former National Reconciliation Committee (NRC) member and President of the NGO Thai Center for Muslim Democratic Development, the general situation in the deep South continues to deteriorate. He did not believe statistics that suggest the situation is improving. Ahmad said that although the authorities in charge of resolving the conflict contend they are embarking on a new strategy, he had not seen any changes; there still was no room for the involvement of civil society in efforts to resolve the conflict, and security official did not like the NGOs operating in the South because of their allegations of human rights abuses. ¶11. (C) Ahmad explained to us that while separatism had little to do with why people were continuing to join the insurgency, the solution would be to give local government full authority under the constitution. Citizens in the deep South harbored bad feelings towards the government and became militant because of past misdeeds and abuses such as the campaign of mass arrests and the 2004 Tak Bai tragedy. ¶12. (C) After commenting on the case of an imam killed earlier in 2009 after having spent time in police custody (ref B),Ahmad asserted that suspected insurgents were not the only ones living in fear of being killed, and pointed to the four bodyguards who had accompanied him to the dinner with us, which was only 10km away from his residence. On the one hand, his willingness to criticize government policy had placed him on an Interior Ministry "black list" nearly a decade ago, according to friends within the government. On the other, suspected insurgents tried to kill him in late 2008, shooting his driver as he pulled up to his residence. Ahmad said insurgents viewed him as a prime target since he serves as head of his Tambon (sub-district) administrative organization, and has a history of cooperating with the government. ...harassed NGO (Working Group for Justice on Peace)... -------------- -------------- ¶13. (C) Working Group for Justice on Peace (WGJP),a human rights advocacy NGO that works primarily in the deep South, told us that they were currently working on seven cases of alleged misconduct by officials based on villager complaints. The most recent involved families of three villagers who were arrested; the police did not tell the families where they were being held. The four WGJP staff said people in the South needed justice, real democracy, and equality; if the government wanted to make any progress towards reconciliation, it needed to respect the rights of minority groups. (Note: Although the Criminal Procedure Code of Thailand stipulates that a suspect, upon arrest, be immediately permitted to contact a relative or a lawyer to inform them of their location and status, it is unclear how this statute applies to individuals taken into custody under the Emergency Decree. End note.) ¶14. (C) The WGJP recounted to us the February 8 search of their offices by security forces (ref D). The staff, all recent graduates of the local university, indicated that the military had started sending teams on campus to question student volunteers and search rooms. The WGJP staff suggested such intrusive campus searches may result from security officials' belief that students are involved in giving legal advice to people caught up in the insurgency. ...and "Peace Networkers" -------------- BANGKOK 00001276 004.2 OF 004 ¶15. (SBU) According to Zakee Pitakkumpol, director of the Institute for Peace Studies at Prince of Songkhla University in Hat Yai soon to be an International Visitor Program (IVP) participant, decreasing violence statistics give a misleading picture of the situation in the South. There continues to be a pervasive climate of fear in the South so powerful that everyone is afraid to speak out; "people are assassinated in broad daylight and no one says anything." (Note: Zakee was referring to the March 12 death of Laila Paitae Daoh, a prominent Muslim women's rights activist and peace advocate, see ref B. End note). ¶16. (SBU) Zakee asserted that much of the conflict centers on perceived injustice--both historic and current. People affected by it have come to believe that nonviolence is a failed strategy in confronting the government and therefore tend to support the militants. Because the RTG had not addressed the true issues driving the violence, it was easier for civil society to speak out against the government than the militants. He said it was incumbent upon the RTG to show how it was beneficial to Malay-Muslims to be Thai citizens. Currently, the government was failing to make the case. ¶17. (C) Zakee assessed that the NGO community was divided on what to do. Each organization was protecting its own turf, and there was no common strategy in his view. One complicating factor was the clash of ideology about Islam itself in the South, with tension between YIU,s "modern" approach and the more traditional conservative form of Islam practiced. Zakee said he was working with other educators in the South to build new networks of moderate, nationalist-minded students, which he called "Peace Networks," to promote trust between different groups of students affected by the conflict and to give them a voice and safe place for discourse on relevant issues. He said this was a risky endeavor because the government thought they were "on the wrong side." Regardless, Zakee said, academics and other activists must institutionalize the ability to stand-up and compete with the misinformation the insurgents are spreading. JOHN