THAI MFA NOT SUSPICIOUS OF GROWING CHINESE POWER

C O N F I D E N T I A L BANGKOK 001190

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D COPY TEXT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2019
TAGS: PARM PM PREL TH CH
SUBJECT: THAI MFA NOT SUSPICIOUS OF GROWING CHINESE POWER
AND INFLUENCE - BUT SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES HAVE IMPACT

REF: STATE 28316

Classified By: Political Counselor George P. Kent,
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. According to the Thai MFA Director of
Chinese Affairs, Thailand agreed that increased transparency
of Chinese military intentions would help regional stability,
but Thailand had no reason to be concerned with growing
Chinese military power and accepted as natural China's
growing influence in Southeast Asia. Due to an absence any
territorial disputes to hold back relations, Thailand and
China had grown closer in recent years. Despite closer ties
in all areas including between the two nations' militaries,
however, the RTG was reluctant to expand rapidly joint
exercises; the aggressive Chinese diplomatic response to the
Philippines' filing under the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS) and a sense of ASEAN solidarity did affect Thai
thinking in this regard. End Summary.


2. (C) Comment. MFA Director of Chinese Affairs Nathapol
Khantahiran was pleasant but direct in describing the growing
role for China in Southeast Asia and a decline in the United
States' stature and influence in the region. His comments in
this regard are reminiscent of the bracing evaluation 2008
Capstone participants heard at the Thai National Defense
University. In contrast, other Thai interlocutors,
particularly in the military, have tended to be less open in
discussing with U.S. officials Thailand's growing relations
with China. This reluctance may be attributed to a desire
not to discuss directly what could be considered a sensitive
issue with a close ally. His comments regarding an NSC
decision to defer a large scale maritime exercise with China
at a time when China is using aggressive diplomacy against
fellow ASEAN countries regarding claims in the South China
Sea, specifically mentioning ASEAN solidarity, are
intriguing, particularly given recent the joint
Malaysian-Vietnamese UNCLOS filing. End comment.

CHINESE MILITARY GROWTH NOT WORRISOME FOR THAI
-------------- -


3. (C) We met May 6 with MFA Director of Chinese Affairs
Nathapol Khantahiran to discuss reftel Defense Department
report on China. Nathapol acknowledged the fast growth in
the military power of China but stated that the Thai
government had no reason to be suspicious of Chinese military
intentions and faced no territorial disputes (such as the
South China Sea). As the Chinese economy depended on natural
resources from Africa and Asia, its military growth reflected
the need to maintain secure sea transportation routes to
Africa, primarily the Malacca Strait and the Sunda and Lombok
Straits in Indonesia. As such, the RTG was not suspicious.


4. (C) With China's growing military strength, the Thai
government was watching with great interest how the Chinese
government would apply its greater capabilities, particularly
in relation to piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the overlapping
territorial claims in the South China Sea.

CHINESE-THAI RELATIONSHIP DEVELOPING RAPIDLY
--------------


5. (C) The overall Thai-Chinese relationship had developed
rapidly since official relations had been established in

1975. In contrast to many other ASEAN nations, territorial
disputes did not negatively impact Thailand's relations with
China, Nathapol said. China had made many positive actions
in Asia since establishing diplomatic relations with Thailand
and other countries in the 1970s. As such, Chinese influence
in the region had significantly grown. In contrast, Nathapol
claimed that the U.S. government had since the end of the
Cold War lagged in engaging Southeast Asia. For example, the
focus of U.S. military engagement had shifted to other
regions, while China had made significant strides in gaining
influence. Nathapol said both U.S. "soft" and "hard" power
had diminished and specifically described losses in economic,
political, and cultural power.


6. (C) Despite Thailand and China not having territorial

disputes, Nathapol raised the South China Sea as a potential
area of concern for Thailand. PTT, the Thai state-owned oil
and gas company, had received a concession from the
Philippine government in the South China Sea. It was
unclear how disputes regarding overlapping claims there would
affect the concession and Chinese-Thai relations.

CHINESE-THAI MILITARY ENGAGEMENT GROWING
--------------


7. (C) Nathapol said that ASEAN as whole had turned down a
Chinese proposal to conduct joint training but that
Thai-Chinese military engagement was expanding. Thailand and
China had conducted their first joint exercise in 2005 with a
humanitarian exercise focused on naval search and rescue
techniques. This exercise commemorated the thirtieth
anniversary of the establishment of Thai-Chinese relations.
In recent years, the mil-mil relationship had expanded via a
joint counter-terrorism exercise called "Strike" held in
Guangzhou, China in 2007 with approximately twenty Thai
special forces troops, Nathapol said. The exercise was
repeated in 2008 when China sent special forces troops to
Chiang Mai, Thailand to practice counter-terrorism
operations. Nathapol said the Thai contingent in 2008 was of
similar scale to that in 2007.


8. (C) Reiterating comments we had heard from military
sources, Nathapol said the Chinese military was pressing for
larger scale exercises with the Thai that would expand beyond
special forces. One Chinese proposal had been to conduct a
joint Marine exercise along Thailand's eastern seaboard in
May this year. The Thai government, however, was unsure of
the appropriate path to take in regard to this proposal. The
Thai National Security Council on May 1 convened a meeting to
determine the RTG response to the Chinese initiative. The
aggressive Chinese diplomatic response to the Philippines'
UNCLOS declaration weighed on the minds of the Thai
officials, Nathapol noted, and there was concern of a
negative reaction from other ASEAN members were Thailand to
proceed with a large-scale maritime exercise at the same time
fellow ASEAN members were pressured by China over maritime
claims. Nathapol told us it was likely that the RTG would go
slow in expanding the mil-mil relationship and would postpone
the Marine exercise to 2010. Thailand would also limit the
scale of the event.


9. (C) Nathapol told us that Thailand was reluctant to
increase quickly the scale of its military relationship with
China because the RTG did not want to be seen as out in front
of other ASEAN nations in expanding relations with China.

CHINA MAIN ACTOR FOR REGION IN FINANCIAL CRISIS
-------------- --


10. (C) Turning to economics, Nathapol described China as the
"main actor" in leading efforts to try to buffer Asia from
the effects of the current economic downturn. We replied
that the drop in Chinese imports, including from Thailand,
over the past six months had disproven this early hope. As
it turned out, Thailand's exports to China dropped in concert
with lower exports to the U.S., in part because many Thai
exports are intermediate goods intended for re-export to the
U.S. Nathapol said Beijing would definitely approach Asian
nations for support on issues of concern to China, as the
Chinese would certainly want something back for their efforts
now to deal with the crisis. Nathapol acknowledged this
could lead to difficulty for the Thai government, possibly
concerning the question of Taiwan, but exclaimed, "What can
Thailand do?"


11. (C) In recognition of the importance that China played in
the region, Nathapol said that Prime Minister Abhisit
Vejjajiva planned to visit Hong Kong in May and hoped to make
an official visit to Beijing at the end of June.
JOHN