RECOMMENDATION TO PRUDENTIALLY REVOKE THAI EX-PM

C O N F I D E N T I A L BANGKOK 001132

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2019
TAGS: CVIS PREL PGOV PINR TH
SUBJECT: RECOMMENDATION TO PRUDENTIALLY REVOKE THAI EX-PM
THAKSIN SHINAWATRA'S U.S. VISAS

REF: A. BANGKOK 1059 (REVOLUTIONARY RHETORIC)

B. BANGKOK 991 (WARRANTS AND REVOCATION)

C. 08 BANGKOK 3167 (THAKSIN CONVICTED)

Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason: 1.4 (b and d).

SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST
--------------


1. (C) Post recommends that the Department prudentially
revoke former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra's U.S.
non-immigrant visas. This recommendation is based on our
belief that Thaksin has possibly committed a crime involving
moral turpitude. The RTG has two arrest warrants outstanding
for Thaksin, one of which cites his inspiring unrest and
illegal acts in connection with mid-April riots by his
supporters in Pattaya and Bangkok. Irrespective of potential
Department action, Thaksin currently fails to meet the
requirements for entering the U.S. on his valid B1/B2 visa
because the RTG has revoked all of Thaksin's Thai passports.
The political dimensions of this issue favor prudential
revocation, as the RTG has made the restriction of Thaksin's
movements and actions abroad (as well as his extradition to
Thailand) a top priority in foreign affairs. End Summary and
Action Request.

THAKSIN'S VISAS AND PASSPORTS
--------------


2. (SBU) According to records accessible at post, Thaksin has
received the following unexpired U.S. non-immigrant visas
(NIVs):

- A B1/B2 NIV, valid until March 27, 2011, in Thai diplomatic
passport D203848.

- A B1/B2 NIV, valid until October 11, 2016, in Thai
diplomatic passport D213411. (The record for this visa
appears to indicate erroneously that this passport is an
ordinary passport.)

- An A1 NIV, valid until April 10, 2011, in Thai diplomatic
passport D213411.


3. (SBU) Ref B provided the text of a diplomatic note in
which the MFA informed us that two Thai passports not
indicated above had been revoked, and that Thaksin "no longer
holds any Thai passports as of 12th April 2009." Based on
the revocations, we believe Thaksin currently fails to
satisfy the 9 FAM 41.112 N6 requirement that, to receive
admittance into the U.S., he present both a valid visa and a
valid passport from the country of the nationality indicated
on the visa.


4. (C) As Ref B reported, Thaksin currently appears to hold a
Nicaraguan diplomatic passport. Embassy Podgorica has
informed us that the Government of Montenegro has confirmed
that Thaksin holds an ordinary Montenegrin passport.
Unsubstantiated rumor holds that Thaksin may also have a
Cambodian passport, and it is possible that he may have
passports from other countries as well.

THAKSIN'S LEGAL SITUATION
--------------


5. (SBU) Ref C reports Thaksin's October 2008 conviction
under a provision of Thailand's Counter Corruption Act. At
the time of the conviction, Thaksin was abroad, and he failed
to return to Thailand. Ref B contains the text of an arrest
warrant for Thaksin, as provided to the Embassy by the Thai
MFA, based on his failure to surrender to authorities to
serve his two-year sentence in connection with that
conviction.


6. (C) Ref B also contains the text of a second arrest
warrant for Thaksin, as provided to the Embassy by the Thai
MFA, alleging that Thaksin inspired unrest and illegal acts
in connection with mid-April violent demonstrations in
Pattaya and Bangkok. Ref A quotes Thaksin's public call for
a "revolution." While we do not have evidence that Thaksin
intended for his supporters to engage in violent acts, and
Thaksin has publicly denied orchestrating the mid-April
riots, we believe that Thaksin's rhetoric was inflammatory
and could reasonably be interpreted as a call for unruly
actions.


7. (C) The RTG appears to have prepared numerous other legal
cases against Thaksin, many involving alleged acts of
corruption during his term as Prime Minister. Thai law
precludes trial in absentia, however, so those cases have
stalled while Thaksin remains abroad.


8. (C) Given the above, post believes that there are grounds
for a prudential revocation of Thaksin's U.S. NIVs, based on
the possibility that Thaksin may/may have committed a crime
involving moral turpitude. Post has not at this time
developed a view regarding whether grounds would exist for a
finding of visa ineligibility in connection with a crime
involving moral turpitude, but we note that the standard for
a prudential revocation is lower than the standard for a
finding of ineligibility.

POLITICAL FACTORS
--------------


9. (C) We make the recommendation for a prudential revocation
having considered the political impact of such a decision, if
it were to become public knowledge. Currently, as
illustrated by the MFA's communications quoted in ref B and a
wide range of public and private statements by the Foreign
Minister and other top officials, the RTG has made it a top
priority in foreign affairs to press other governments not to
allow Thaksin's travel and/or use of foreign territory for
his political activities. Thailand has also explored the
possibility of Thaksin's extradition; for example, in light
of Thaksin's travel to the United Arab Emirates, the RTG
sought to discuss with the UAE on an expedited basis the
conclusion of a Thai-UAE extradition agreement. Ref B quoted
Thailand's request that Nicaragua prevent Thaksin from
destabilizing Thailand, assist Thailand in taking custody of
Thaksin, and conclude an extradition agreement with Thailand.
Thailand has sought Interpol's assistance in arresting
Thaksin while he remains abroad.


10. (C) We are confident that the current RTG administration
would welcome our revoking Thaksin's visa. We hope to avoid
a situation in which Thaksin manages to enter the U.S., which
would ensure that issues surrounding Thaksin's status would
dominate the U.S.-Thai relationship, at least in the short
term. We believe revoking Thaksin's visa, and conveying that
news to him, might help to deter him from trying to enter the
U.S.


11. (C) We do not rule out the possibility that at some
future date Thaksin may regain dominant influence over the
RTG. Because Thaksin might resent our revocation of his
visa, the U.S.-Thai relationship could suffer somewhat in
such a scenario. We note, however, that Thaksin has proven
flexible and pragmatic; he now appears to have established a
cooperative relationship with retired General Pallop
Pinmanee, whom Thaksin reportedly believed sought to
assassinate him toward the end of Thaksin's time in office.
We believe, therefore, that a prudential revocation,
justified in part by RTG arrest warrants, would not
inevitably cause serious damage to the U.S.-Thai relationship
in the event of a return to power by Thaksin or his allies.
JOHN