Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BANGKOK1004
2009-04-21 09:45:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

THAI PRIME MINISTER ABHISIT AIMS FOR

Tags:  PREL PGOV KJUS KDEM ASEC TH 
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RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 9623
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RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 001004 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV KJUS KDEM ASEC TH
SUBJECT: THAI PRIME MINISTER ABHISIT AIMS FOR
RECONCILIATION, BUT STATE OF EMERGENCY REMAINS FOR NOW

REF: A. BANGKOK 983 (ABHISIT BRIEFS AMBASSADORS)

B. BANGKOK 982 (SONDHI SHOT)

C. BANGKOK 974 (BANGKOK CALM)

D. 08 BANGKOK 3167 (THAKSIN CONVICTED)

E. 05 BANGKOK 4653 (EMERGENCY DECREE)

BANGKOK 00001004 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason: 1.4 (b and d).

SUMMARY AND COMMENT
-------------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 001004 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV KJUS KDEM ASEC TH SUBJECT: THAI PRIME MINISTER ABHISIT AIMS FOR RECONCILIATION, BUT STATE OF EMERGENCY REMAINS FOR NOW REF: A. BANGKOK 983 (ABHISIT BRIEFS AMBASSADORS) ¶B. BANGKOK 982 (SONDHI SHOT) ¶C. BANGKOK 974 (BANGKOK CALM) ¶D. 08 BANGKOK 3167 (THAKSIN CONVICTED) ¶E. 05 BANGKOK 4653 (EMERGENCY DECREE) BANGKOK 00001004 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason: 1.4 (b and d). SUMMARY AND COMMENT -------------- ¶1. (C) The Ambassador recommended to a top MFA official on April 21 that the RTG lift the state of emergency (SOE) in Bangkok as soon as possible. RTG officials tell us that they understand our view and are eager to rescind the SOE, but they are concerned about a continuing possibility of destabilizing acts. Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva has publicly stressed his desire for reconciliation, and a joint House/Senate session on this topic will convene on April 22-23. A leading politician associated with the Puea Thai opposition party told us that Puea Thai will use the session to advocate a limited constitutional amendment in the near term, followed by a new legislative election and further constitutional amendment. An official close to Abhisit told us the (ruling) Democrat Party agreed in principle with the idea of constitutional reform, with modalities not yet determined; he worried the upcoming legislative session could degenerate into mud-slinging and unsubstantiated allegations of human rights violations in the recent dispersal of anti-government protests. ¶2. (C) Comment: Given the recent serious unrest and upcoming parliamentary session, we believe the RTG has valid reasons for leaving the state of emergency in place at the moment, but it needs to be clear about its intentions to lift it going forward, if it hopes to use the travel of FM Kasit and Finance Minister Korn to the U.S. and U.K. this week to drum up support for Thailand as a country recovering from unrest and still suitable for foreign investment. Maintaining the state of emergency is not cost-free for Thailand; we will continue to advocate with RTG officials that the PM rescind the state of emergency as soon as conditions allow, even though this would mean decreasing the government's security posture. We are encouraged by Abhisit's efforts to achieve reconciliation, and we believe he is sincere in professing his openness to constitutional ame
ndment. Efforts toward political reform may help lessen tension and attract support from disenfranchised politicians, but we do not see constitutional reform as a cure-all that will immediately render the anti-government "redshirts" irrelevant. End Summary and Comment. BACKGROUND ON THE STATE OF EMERGENCY -------------- ¶3. (U) Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva declared a state of emergency in Bangkok and the surrounding provinces of Phathumthani, Ayutthaya, Nakhon Pathom, Nonthaburi, and Samut Prakan on April 12, in response to disorderly demonstrations by United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) "redshirt" protestors (ref C). He declared this state of emergency in accordance with Thai law (the 2005 Emergency Decree on Public Administration in Emergency Situations -- ref E) and gave Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban, a civilian politician, overall responsibility for security. Suthep relied more on the Army than on police to restore order; the law specifically authorizes the deployment of Army soldiers in a state of emergency. When he declared the state of emergency, Abhisit did not specify how long it would last, but he has repeatedly said he wants to lift the state of emergency as quickly as possible. The law specifies that states of emergency last no more than three months, unless extended. Abhisit had declared a state of emergency in Pattaya on April 11, after UDD demonstrators disrupted the ASEAN Summit; he rescinded it the following day, after the departure of foreign leaders. AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES STATE OF EMERGENCY -------------- ¶4. (C) The Ambassador called MFA Permanent Secretary BANGKOK 00001004 002.2 OF 003 Virasakdi Futrakul on April 21 to raise concerns that extended application of the state of emergency (SOE) in Bangkok would make it difficult for FM Kasit and Finance Minister Korn in their upcoming meetings in the U.S. and U.K. over the next week to refurbish Thailand's image and advocate Thailand as a reliable investment destination. Virasakdi replied that Abhisit had initially intended for the SOE to be in effect for only a few days, to bring the situation back to normal. However, the April 17 attempted assassination of People's Alliance for Democracy leader Sondhi Limthongkul (ref B) complicated matters and required that the RTG retain the SOE. Virasakdi also cited Abhisit's comments last week (ref C) that it would not make sense to lift the SOE, only to re-impose it nearly immediately -- that would prove even more embarrassing. ¶5. (C) The Ambassador indicated he understood this reasoning, but stressed that Kasit and Korn's public case in Washington would be made more easily were there a clear plan in place for the SOE's recision in the near future. If the RTG did not trust the police to maintain law and order after its non-performance in Pattaya and Bangkok, that raised a question about whether the need for military involvement was open-ended. The USG would not want to embarrass the RTG by calling publicly for the SOE to be lifted, but if there were no forward progress soon, we likely would consider such a step. REINFORCED WITH OTHER OFFICIALS -------------- ¶6. (C) Separately, we spoke with Isra Sunthornvut, Deputy Secretary General to the Prime Minister, and Panitan Wattanayagorn, government spokesman, to explain our concerns. Isra said the general mood at Government House was that the SOE could not last much longer. Citing the quick recision of the SOE in Pattaya, Isra stressed that Abhisit had planned to lift the SOE on April 17 but changed his view after Sondhi's shooting. Isra predicted that the SOE would be in effect "not much longer," but he cautioned that the RTG could not move hastily because of intelligence indicating UDD activists planned to undertake new provocative activities (NFI) after the RTG's recision of the SOE. (Note: According to media reports, UDD figures intend to hold a gathering of several thousand people in the nearby province of Samut Sakhon, not covered by the SOE, on Saturday, April 25, the start of a planned 10 provincial rallies leading up to a hoped-for return to Bangkok. End Note.) AIMING FOR POLITICAL RECONCILIATION, BUT ON WHOSE TERMS? -------------- -------------- ¶7. (SBU) After the government restored order in Bangkok, Abhisit spoke publicly about his desire for reconciliation. Accordingly, he has invited political parties to provide suggestions for constitutional amendment, in order to remedy flaws in the current system. Abhisit also has worked with the legislature to convene a joint House/Senate session on April 22-23, focused on the recent crisis. ¶8. (C) We spoke on April 21 with former Foreign Minister Somphong Amornwiwat, who, although disenfranchised by the December 2008 Constitutional Court ruling against the former People's Power Party and its executives, remains informally involved with the Puea Thai party (the main opposition party). Somphong told us that Puea Thai would emphasize in the coming parliamentary session that the recent strife in Bangkok was attributable to flaws in the 2007 constitution. ¶9. (C) Somphong said Puea Thai would advocate a speedy amendment of a handful of elements of the 2007 constitution; legislators could quickly draw up proposals, and a committee (NFI) could then be established to consider fully the proposed changes. Somphong envisioned a limited amendment taking place within a few months, followed by a legislative election, and then the new legislature would carry out a more comprehensive constitutional amendment process. (Note: The limited amendment likely would address one of the concerns Abhisit raised with the diplomatic corps, when he said constitutional amendment would have to precede elections -- ref A. End Note.) It would be too time-consuming to attempt BANGKOK 00001004 003.2 OF 003 a broad amendment of the constitution prior to a new election, Somphong stated. He said Puea Thai would advocate, among other moves (NFI),the restoration of political rights to disenfranchised politicians such as himself. Puea Thai agreed with Abhisit, however, that former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra ought not to receive full amnesty, because of his criminal conviction in October (ref D). Somphong said Puea Thai's overall position on the way forward was acceptable to at least one leading Democrat in the legislature with whom Puea Thai had shared its views. ¶10. (C) When we discussed with Isra, Deputy Secretary General to the Prime Minister, the Puea Thai position as characterized by Somphong, Isra readily admitted that the Democrats were in favor of constitutional reform of some sort. The difficulty for the Democrats lay in finding a truly independent body that might help to legitimize an amendment process. The Democrats had not yet determined their preferred time frame of the amendment process, as well as other modalities, but they did favor amending the constitution before holding elections. ¶11. (C) Isra was unsure how the upcoming legislative session would proceed. He worried that, like the recent no-confidence debate, it could degenerate into aggressive mud-slinging by Puea Thai MPs. Isra anticipated that Puea Thai might try to focus on alleged RTG killings/disappearances of anti-government protestors. (Note: After the protests, credible human rights advocates told us that the anti-government side has failed to provide evidence of human rights abuses in the restoration of order in Bangkok. Even an anti-government figure who claimed that the government was covering up the fate of some victims admitted to us that he could not identify by name the alleged victims. According to press reports, on April 15, the bodies of two men believed to have participated in anti-government protests, Chaiyaporn Kanthang and Nattapong Pongdee, turned up in Bangkok's main river. The duo, who worked as security guards and supposedly had been seen drinking the night prior by a coworker, were bound, gagged, and died of head injuries, according to press reports, but there was no evidence the authorities were involved in these deaths.) ¶12. (C) Isra told us that the government perceived that Puea Thai and the UDD/redshirt demonstrators were acting in cahoots. (Note: One of the core UDD co-leaders is a Puea Thai MP, and many Puea Thai MPs have participated in UDD protests. End Note.) Nevertheless, even if the parliamentary session were to proceed smoothly, the government would remain concerned by the "media war" simultaneously conducted by Thaksin and fugitive UDD co-leader Jakrapob Penkair, Isra said. JOHN

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