CLOSING CEREMONY OF JCET TRAINING OF MALIAN ARMY

S E C R E T BAMAKO 000815 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2019 TAGS: MARR ML PREL PTER SUBJECT: CLOSING CEREMONY OF JCET TRAINING OF MALIAN ARMY ETIA 4 IN GAO REF: BAMAKO 813 Classified By: Ambassador Gillian A. Milovanovic, for reasons 1.4 (b) ( d). ¶1. (S) On December 11 the DCM and DATT participated in the graduation ceremony of a Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) exercise of the Malian Army Echelon Tactique Interarme (ETIA) 4, in Gao. ETIA 4 is based in Timbuktu. The 10th Army Special Forces Group out of Fort Carson, Colorado, and led by Captain XXXXXXXXXXXX and Master Sergeant XXXXXXXXXXXX, conducted the JCET. Overall, XXXXXXXXXXXX said the approximately 160 men learned a lot over the five week training exercise. The exercise was shorter than planned in the wake of a hostage taking incident in Mali which led to a change in THREATCON and the US military-ordered temporary suspension of training while the JCET team was temporarily restricted to its quarters. ¶2. (S) The Governor of Gao region, Colonel XXXXXXXXXXXX, presided over the JCET graduation and thanked the U.S. Government for its commitment to helping Mali defend itself. Noting that he had served as military commander of the Timbuktu region during the time of the Tuareg rebellion, he exhorted ETIA 4 to apply what it had learned in the course of the training. A product of numerous IMET training opportunities in the United States and recently returned from a five year tour in Addis Ababa as Mali,s military attach, XXXXXXXXXXXX displayed an unfortunate lack of respect for the common soldiers who are being asked to lead the fight against AQIM. He distractedly waved on the many troops who stood at attention before him after receiving their graduation certificates, leaving the DATT to return their salutes. ¶3. (S) When the DCM asked him about the security situation in Gao, XXXXXXXXXXXX said he viewed the kidnapping of French citizen Pierre Cammatte as a worrisome escalation, as AQIM had until now refrained from taking hostages on Malian soil. Nevertheless, he minimized the risk, saying that although many had left, there were still quite a few French and other European nationals working in Gao Region. He did not reiterate his September 23 request to the Ambassador for more development assistance. ¶4. (S) After the ceremony XXXXXXXXXXXX called over one, rather unimpressive soldier, an older, rail thin man with a scraggly beard and bloodshot eyes who had been lounging against a motorbike in a dirty T-shirt inside of a warehouse. He explained that in spite of appearances, this was one of the ETIA's best men, noting that he had been one of the few survivors of a July 4 ambush of a Malian Army patrol by Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (see IIR 6 958 0087 09). When asked how the training had gone, the soldier said if he had known at the time of the ambush what he had learned over the course of the JCET, it never would have happened. He cited in particular learning why and how to establish a mobile patrol post, digging and manning foxholes which afford 360 degree, round-the-clock protection from potential assailants. The soldier said the Salafists would never confront the Army head-on, and if the Army engaged, they would flee, but if there is not proper security, they will creep back and murder you in the most cruel, unimaginable ways. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that the ETIA had done simulation exercises to defend, for example, the recovery of a broken down vehicle. ¶5. (S) The commander of ETIA 4, a major, also spoke highly of the training. He noted that he had already reached the end of his six month rotation, but had been extended so as to be able to lead participation in the JCET. He said he does not want to leave his men, and spoke about the logic of having a longer tour so as to develop skills over time and to build on training rather than starting from the beginning each time there is an opportunity for a JCET or other training. Nevertheless, it was evident from the preponderant number of black African faces in the ranks that most of ETIA 4 was not from the North, and service in the North will clearly be a significant hardship on them and their families, most of whom live in the South. ¶6. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that each soldier had expended some 1,000 rounds of ammunition during the course of the training. Although a U.S. Special Forces soldier might expend that much in a day of training, he noted that a number of the Malian soldiers said it was probably more than they had used in their entire careers. He said the JCET had revealed, and made an effort to correct, some simple lacunae. For example, when the survivors of the July 4 ambush were asked why they had left behind so many vehicles to be captured by AQIM, they said the drivers had been killed and no one else in the unit knew how to drive. When asked why they had not used a heavy machine gun, they answered that the gunner who knew how to operate the weapon had also been killed, and he was the only one who knew what to do. Although it detracted from their initial training objective, the U.S. trainers taught everyone in the ETIA to drive and to fire and maintain all of their weapons systems. ¶7. (S) When asked from a non-scientific perspective to rate ETIA 4 with other comparable army units, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that, based on conversations with the Officer in Charge of the September 2009 training of ETIA 1 (Bamako 538),he believes that ETIA 4's capabilities are better overall. On a scale of 1 to 10 compared to other forces in Africa and the Middle East, including Iraqi Army regulars, ETIA 4 ranks about 6 out of 10. This compares to Algerian Army regulars that he ranked about 7 or 8. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that, with maintenance of the skills they had learned during the JCET and additional, follow-up training, ETIA 4 could easily improve. ¶8. (S) The JCET moved on December 7-8 to Amakouladji, a town approximately 35 kilometers north of Gao on the road to Bourem. There, they conducted a live fire exercise with rocket-propelled grenades and mortars at a firing range XXXXXXXXXXXX said was safe and well-suited to simulate geographic conditions in the North. In the town itself, they distributed supplies to some 240 grateful primary school students and vaccinated 250 farm animals. XXXXXXXXXXXX and several of his men said they had seen no/no evidence of AQIM surveillance or activity during the course of the five week JCET. ¶9. (S) Although the JCET was an overall success, it was not without problems. The 14 Landcruisers designated for ETIA 4, that were part of the 37 the Ambassador handed over to the Minister of Defense on October 20, did not show up in Gao until the last week of the training. While the vehicles, five equipped with Harris HF radios, are with the unit now, and will move with the ETIA 4 back to Timbuktu, the hand held radios that should also have been part of the ETIA 4 vehicle allocation had not yet arrived. Only about two thirds of the 160-strong unit were wearing the boots and desert fatigues provided by the United States, but additional boots and other equipment arrived on the CASA 212 flight from Bamako the day of the ceremony. XXXXXXXXXXXX also said that the Gao base commander had initially tried to keep him out of a warehouse which stored replacement gun barrels and other parts. He was told that the materiel was being held in reserve, but he overcame the base commander's objections and succeeded in procuring what was needed to replace broken or missing equipment held by the ETIA. XXXXXXXXXXXX was asked to make that part of his report, as the Ambassador had raised the problem with President Amadou Toumani Toure in September (Bamako 619). MILOVANOVIC