KIDAL TUAREGS DISCUSS THEIR ROLE IN CHANGING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAMAKO 000567

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/26/2019
TAGS: PGOV PTER PINS ML
SUBJECT: KIDAL TUAREGS DISCUSS THEIR ROLE IN CHANGING
NORTHERN MALI ENVIRONMENT

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Classified By: PolCouns Peter Newman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: On August 4, EmbOffs met with Kidal Iforas
Tuareg leaders Ahmada ag Bibi, Deputy of Abeibara and head of
the Tuareg alliance, Democratic Alliance for Change (ADC);
Alghabass ag Intallah, Deputy of Kidal; and Presidential
Advisor Acherif Ag Mohamed. The three presented themselves
as the spokespersons for Kidal's Tuareg community and
delivered two clear messages: Kidal Tuaregs have no
affinities with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),and
they are prepared to pursue AQIM if asked by the Malian
government. Ag Bibi said AQIM leaders Abu Zaid and Moctar
Belmoctar had joined forces while they were being pursued by
the Malian army, and some AQIM forces are circulating in the
Adrar Tirharhar mountains of Kidal province. End summary.

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We Are Not AQIM
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2. (C) Promptly after exchanging initial greetings with the
Embassy during a meeting on August 4, Ahmada ag Bibi, Deputy
of Abeibara and leader of the Democratic Alliance for Change;
Alghabass ag Intallah, Deputy of Kidal; and Acherif Ag
Mohamed, a personal advisor to President Amadou Toumani Toure
(ATT),stated emphatically that Mali's Tuareg community had
no ideological or commercial connections with Al Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Ag Bibi seemed intent on dispelling
what he feared might be the perceptions of the Malian
government and the international community that there were
affinities between the two groups.


3. (C) Ag Intallah described the long history of Tuareg
traditions, with a livelihood based on nomadic cattle
raising, and said Tuaregs asked only the relative autonomy
from the Malian government to continue to pursue these
activities in peace. The presence of AQIM in Kidal
threatened to disturb this. Ag Intallah reiterated that
Tuareg communities also continue to await the Malian
government's fulfillment of its terms of the Algiers Accords,
namely, the reinsertion of Tuareg fighters, who previously
deserted, into the Malian military, the socioeconomic
reinsertion of disenfranchised youths into the national
economy, and a commitment to undertake development projects
in the north. He clearly understood that were they perceived
to be entangled with Al Qaeda, the Kidal Tuaregs would have
no chance of seeing those commitments fulfilled.

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We Are Ready to Pursue AQIM
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4. (C) At several points throughout the meeting, Ag Intallah
and Ag Bibi said they were ready to pursue AQIM and that they
were the only ones capable of doing this successfully. Ag
Bibi unfolded a map of Mali and pointed out the general
section of Kidal where he claimed AQIM elements were
operating. Pursued by Malian forces, he claimed Abu Zaid and
Belmoctar had joined forces and were in hiding in the Adrar
Tirharhar mountains halfway between the towns of Kidal and
Tessalit. Ag Bibi said local communities were not taking an
active part in hiding AQIM elements, but were simply "looking
the other way." (A separate discussion with an Embassy
PolFSN seemed to confirm this description of the situation.
The FSN, who recently returned from a family visit in Kidal,
commented that AQIM members were freely circulating in the
Kidal region. They were not interacting frequently with the
local population and did not enter towns but made their
presence known in the smaller villages and mountainous areas
in the hinterlands of Kidal.) In spite of their knowledge of
AQIM movements in Kidal and their fighting capabilities, Ag
Intallah and Ag Bibi emphasized that the responsibility to
remove AQIM from Mali rests with the Malian government.
(This tracks with the position taken by GOM representatives
at a recent meeting with Malian Arabs and Tuaregs in Northern
Mali - see Septel). They would not act without the
cooperation of the Malian government.


5. (C) Asked about the current posture of the Tuareg
populations in the North, Ag Bibi said Tuareg leaders were in
a holding pattern while they discerned the reaction of the
Malian government to AQIM. All three leaders, including Ag
Mohamed, said it would be difficult for the government to
fully pursue AQIM, as there were a number of powerful and

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well-connected individuals who were profiting from Al Qaeda's
smuggling activities. In spite of this, Ag Bibi believed
Malian President Amadou Toumani Toure would be impelled by
domestic pressures as well as by the international community
to seek to root out AQIM presence in the north.

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Comment: Angling for Autonomy?
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6. (C) The Tuareg leaders clearly believe it is the Malian
government's responsibilty to rid Northern Mali of AQIM.
Nonetheless, they appear to be willing to engage AQIM in
concert with the Malian military in return for both relative
autonomy over their affairs and fulfillment of the Algiers
Accords provisions on economic assistance. Ag Intallah
voiced extreme skepticism regarding military integration and
economic assistance; he specifically noted that the Kidal
Tuaregs engaged AQIM on behalf of the Malian government in
2006, and did not receive anything in return. He seemed to
believe that Kidal Tuaregs would never see anything but the
"repressive functions" of the Malian state. The Kidal
leaders may have been hoping to use the meeting not only to
reaffirm to the Embassy their opposition to AQIM, but also to
encourage the USG to pressure the Malian government to use
Tuaregs to go after AQIM. They might also want to assist out
of concern that if they do not, the Berabiche Arab community
might get the upper-hand in Northern Mali's turf war for
control of "toll collection" from traffickers. Either way
(or perhaps both),we remain convinced the USG policy, and
the Embassy's, is correct: listen to a broad range of
people, support implementation of the Algiers Accords, foster
increased professionalism and capacity of the Malian Armed
Forcs, and stress the need to strengthen and preserve ali's
unitary multi-ethnic democracy as the figh against
insecurity and AQIM is pursued. End coment.

MILOVANOVIC