KIDAL TUAREGS DISCUSS THEIR ROLE IN CHANGING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAMAKO 000567 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/26/2019 TAGS: PGOV PTER PINS ML SUBJECT: KIDAL TUAREGS DISCUSS THEIR ROLE IN CHANGING NORTHERN MALI ENVIRONMENT BAMAKO 00000567 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: PolCouns Peter Newman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: On August 4, EmbOffs met with Kidal Iforas Tuareg leaders Ahmada ag Bibi, Deputy of Abeibara and head of the Tuareg alliance, Democratic Alliance for Change (ADC); Alghabass ag Intallah, Deputy of Kidal; and Presidential Advisor Acherif Ag Mohamed. The three presented themselves as the spokespersons for Kidal's Tuareg community and delivered two clear messages: Kidal Tuaregs have no affinities with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),and they are prepared to pursue AQIM if asked by the Malian government. Ag Bibi said AQIM leaders Abu Zaid and Moctar Belmoctar had joined forces while they were being pursued by the Malian army, and some AQIM forces are circulating in the Adrar Tirharhar mountains of Kidal province. End summary. -------------- We Are Not AQIM -------------- ¶2. (C) Promptly after exchanging initial greetings with the Embassy during a meeting on August 4, Ahmada ag Bibi, Deputy of Abeibara and leader of the Democratic Alliance for Change; Alghabass ag Intallah, Deputy of Kidal; and Acherif Ag Mohamed, a personal advisor to President Amadou Toumani Toure (ATT),stated emphatically that Mali's Tuareg community had no ideological or commercial connections with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Ag Bibi seemed intent on dispelling what he feared might be the perceptions of the Malian government and the international community that there were affinities between the two groups. ¶3. (C) Ag Intallah described the long history of Tuareg traditions, with a livelihood based on nomadic cattle raising, and said Tuaregs asked only the relative autonomy from the Malian government to continue to pursue these activities in peace. The presence of AQIM in Kidal threatened to disturb this. Ag Intallah reiterated that Tuareg communities also continue to await the Malian government's fulfillment of its terms of the Algiers Accords, namely, the reinsertion of Tuareg fighters, who previously deserted, into the Malian military, the socioeconomic reinsertion of disenfranchised youths into the national economy, and a commitment to undertake development projects in the north. He clearly understood that were they perceived to be entangled with Al Qaeda, the Kidal Tuaregs would have no chance of seeing those commitments fulfilled. -------------- We Are Ready to Pursue AQIM -------------- ¶4. (C) At several points throughout the meeting, Ag Intallah and Ag Bibi said they were ready to pursue AQIM and that they were the only ones capable of doing this successfully. Ag Bibi unfolded a map of Mali and pointed out the general section of Kidal where he claimed AQIM elements were operating. Pursued by Malian forces, he claimed Abu Zaid and Belmoctar had joined forces and were in hiding in the Adrar Tirharhar mountains halfway between the towns of Kidal and Tessalit. Ag Bibi said local communities were not taking an active part in hiding AQIM elements, but were simply "looking the other way." (A separate discussion with an Embassy PolFSN seemed to confirm this description of the situation. The FSN, who recently returned from a family visit in Kidal, commented that AQIM members were freely circulating in the Kidal region. They were not interacting frequently with the local population and did not enter towns but made their presence known in the smaller villages and mountainous areas in the hinterlands of Kidal.) In spite of their knowledge of AQIM movements in Kidal and their fighting capabilities, Ag Intallah and Ag Bibi emphasized that the responsibility to remove AQIM from Mali rests with the Malian government. (This tracks with the position taken by GOM representatives at a recent meeting with Malian Arabs and Tuaregs in Northern Mali - see Septel). They would not act without the cooperation of the Malian government. ¶5. (C) Asked about the current posture of the Tuareg populations in the North, Ag Bibi said Tuareg leaders were in a holding pattern while they discerned the reaction of the Malian government to AQIM. All three leaders, including Ag Mohamed, said it would be difficult for the government to fully pursue AQIM, as there were a number of powerful and BAMAKO 00000567 002.2 OF 002 well-connected individuals who were profiting from Al Qaeda's smuggling activities. In spite of this, Ag Bibi believed Malian President Amadou Toumani Toure would be impelled by domestic pressures as well as by the international community to seek to root out AQIM presence in the north. -------------- Comment: Angling for Autonomy? -------------- ¶6. (C) The Tuareg leaders clearly believe it is the Malian government's responsibilty to rid Northern Mali of AQIM. Nonetheless, they appear to be willing to engage AQIM in concert with the Malian military in return for both relative autonomy over their affairs and fulfillment of the Algiers Accords provisions on economic assistance. Ag Intallah voiced extreme skepticism regarding military integration and economic assistance; he specifically noted that the Kidal Tuaregs engaged AQIM on behalf of the Malian government in 2006, and did not receive anything in return. He seemed to believe that Kidal Tuaregs would never see anything but the "repressive functions" of the Malian state. The Kidal leaders may have been hoping to use the meeting not only to reaffirm to the Embassy their opposition to AQIM, but also to encourage the USG to pressure the Malian government to use Tuaregs to go after AQIM. They might also want to assist out of concern that if they do not, the Berabiche Arab community might get the upper-hand in Northern Mali's turf war for control of "toll collection" from traffickers. Either way (or perhaps both),we remain convinced the USG policy, and the Embassy's, is correct: listen to a broad range of people, support implementation of the Algiers Accords, foster increased professionalism and capacity of the Malian Armed Forcs, and stress the need to strengthen and preserve ali's unitary multi-ethnic democracy as the figh against insecurity and AQIM is pursued. End coment. MILOVANOVIC