SCENESETTER FOR CODEL MARSHALL VISIT TO MALI

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BAMAKO 000566 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT PASS TO LTC FRANK SOBCHAK, USSOCOM E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: OREP PREL PGOV MASS ML SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL MARSHALL VISIT TO MALI BAMAKO 00000566 001.4 OF 003 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: We warmly welcome CODEL Marshall's upcoming visit to Mali. The CODEL?s visit will provide an important opportunity to highlight U.S. support for a moderate, majority Muslim democracy that stands as an example for West Africa and beyond. Mali is a strong opponent of terrorism and a key member of the Trans- Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP). Mali has made considerable progress since its 1991-1992 transition to democracy. Nonetheless, Mali faces serious socioeconomic and security challenges. Mali's health, education and economic indicators remain among the lowest in the world. U.S. assistance plays a crucial role in helping Mali to address these challenges by ensuring that Mali's political successes translate into tangible improvements for Mali's estimated 13 million people. ¶2. (SBU) Mali?s security challenges are multi-faceted and involve a dormant Tuareg rebellion and a growing terrorist threat from Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Although currently at low ebb, periodic fighting earlier this year between one Tuareg rebel/criminal group and the Malian military in the northern region of Kidal endangered the implementation of a peace agreement, known as the Algiers Accords, signed by the Malian government and Tuareg rebels in July 2006. Northern Mali also serves as an unwilling safe-haven for the Islamic extremist group AQIM which has held multiple Western and Malian military hostages ? although none at present ? and has assassinated one hostage and a Malian military officer. ¶3. (SBU) In late-June and early-July, Malian military forces engaged in battle members of AQIM with some success. U.S. military assistance, including training and provision of non-lethal material through the TSCTP and other programs, significantly assists the Malian Armed Forces to become more professional and to improve their capacity to defend themselves and to begin to take the fight to AQIM in the harsh desert environment of Northern Mali. U.S. security cooperation is a key component to helping Mali meet its security needs and provide the stability it requires to prosper both politically and economically. End Summary. -------------- Malian Democracy and International Engagement -------------- ; ¶4. (U) As a moderate majority Muslim multi-ethnic democracy with over 17 years of democratic experience, Mali serves as an example for west Africa and beyond. President Amadou Toumani Toure, who is known to Malians as "ATT," was re-elected to a second and final five year term as President in a free and fair election in 2007 with more than 70 percent of the vote. ¶5. (U) Mali is a responsible and engaged international partner. It has a strong human rights record and is one of the few members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference to be rated as "free" by Freedom House. Mali is also a leader in sub-Saharan Africa in terms of press freedoms. In addition to serving as the 2007 Chair of the Community of Democracies, Mali is active in the United Nations and other international organizations and has participated in several international peacekeeping operations. Mali is also a solid partner in the fight against terrorism and an active participant in TSCTP. ¶6. (SBU) Unfortunately, Mali's political progress has not been matched by improved social and economic indicators. Mali ranked 173 out of 177 countries on the United Nation's 2007 Human Development Index. Mali's poor ranking is due in large part to literacy rates, health indicators and a per capita GNP that ranks among the lowest in the world. These factors, along with periodic Tuareg unrest and the continued presence of al Qaeda- aligned terrorist elements in the country's sparsely populated northern regions, constitute serious threats to Malian democracy and regional stability. The United States plays a significant role in helping Mali to meet these challenges and reinforce almost two decades of democratic progress. -------------- U.S. Assistance to Mali -------------- ¶7. (U) The November 2006 signing of a Millennium Challenge Account compact with Mali made the United BAMAKO 00000566 002.4 OF 003 States the largest bilateral donor to Mali. It also cemented strong U.S.-Mali relations and better positioned Mali as a force for stability in a politically fragile region. The USD 461 million compact entered into force in September 2007 and includes a USD 234 million irrigation project north of Segou and a USD 183 million airport renovation project. USAID/Mali has an annual budget of approximately USD 97 million, which is focused on the health, agriculture, education sectors. Mali is host to one of the largest Peace Corps programs in Africa, with currently 115 peace corps volunteers and a further 65 trainees awaiting swearing-in. The PCVs work on health, sanitation, water conservation and economic development. ¶8. (SBU) Mali is an important ally in the fight against terrorism and a key member of the Trans-Sahara Counter- Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP). TSCTP programming in Mali can be divided into programs focused on counter-terrorism and counter-extremism. Important counter- terrorism programs include bilateral training exercises like Joint Combined Exercise Training (JCET) events. Counter-extremism activities include a broad range of Department of Defense supported humanitarian assistance, USAID development programs and public diplomacy outreach. The Department of Defense's Humanitarian Assistance Program has contributed over USD 3 million to Mali since 1999 to build wells, construct schools and renovate health clinics. Mali is an active participant in our small DOD International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. ¶9. (SBU) Malians practice a predominately open and tolerant form of Islam and are therefore unreceptive to extremist messages. Our TSCTP counter-extremism programs and our public diplomacy outreach are designed to promote moderate messages and ensure that Malians remain unreceptive to extremist ideologies. TSCTP programs are administered jointly by the State Department, USAID and the Department of Defense. USAID/Mali considers the northern region of Mali an important area and has undertaken activities there in a concerted effort since 1999; as budgets have increased in the past two years USAID/Mali has ensured that a portion of the funding for each program has been dedicated to activities in Northern Mali. In the past ten years, USAID/Mali activities in the north have included: support to 35 rural health centers, the construction and reinforcement of 17 community radio stations, the establishment of six community telecenters offering internet access, the conduct of conflict-mitigation activities, support to rice and horticultural commodities, the expansion of access to financial services. The provision of scholarships and mentoring to 6,500 girls under the Ambassador's Girls Scholarship Fund was very successful, but funding is no longer available. USAID/Mali continues with the creation of teacher training and radio-based instruction for children of nomadic populations. USAID/Mali also receives additional funds from TSCTP and the majority of these resources have been earmarked for activities in the north that aim to expand economic opportunities for youth, the Trickle-Up program for emerging entrepreneurs, construct additional community radio stations, build capacity for local government, and support the secular education component of madersas (religious schools) throughout the country. ¶10. (U) On the Public Affairs side, we have used cultural preservation grants to help Mali honor its Islamic heritage by protecting ancient Islamic manuscripts in Djenne and Timbuktu and helping to preserve an ancient mosque in Gao. We are also approaching the two year anniversary of the only American Corner in Mali. Located in Gao, it has allowed us to quadruple our outreach to key contacts in the region and to further promote mutual understanding between Malians and Americans. -------------- Security Challenges -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Security concerns in northern Mali constitute a significant challenge for the Malian government. Mali has BAMAKO 00000566 003.4 OF 003 weathered two Tuareg rebellions (one in 1963 and a second during the 1990s) since independence. In May 2006 Tuareg rebels attacked two Malian military outposts in northern Mali and rekindled fears of another prolonged rebellion. President Toure resisted calls from some Malian political leaders to force a military confrontation with the rebels and instead opted for dialogue mediated by Mali's northern neighbor, Algeria. In July 2006 Mali and the Tuareg rebels signed a peace agreement, known as the Algiers Accords, which pledged to provide increased development and infrastructure support to Mali's three northern regions. In 2007 a dissident group of Tuareg rebels/criminals led by Ibrahim Bahanga resumed attacks against Malian military posts and convoys. Bahanga held several dozen Malian soldiers hostage for nearly six months until Libya helped negotiate their release in March 2008. In January 2009, Bahanga lost the support of the other main rebel group ? the Alliance for Development and Change (ADC). Subsequently, Malian military units, supported by militia elements, chased Bahanga out of Northern Mali into exile in Libya. Unfortunately, this was only achieved after the Malian Army lost more than 20 soldiers who had insufficient means to defend themselves against Bahanga's attack. ¶12. (SBU) Although Tuareg unrest is generally confined to the region of Kidal, rebels in the past have orchestrated early morning attacks against military outposts in the regions of Gao and Segou. Algerian-brokered discussions aimed at uniting disparate Tuareg rebel factions and facilitating a return to the Algiers Accords framework continues presently. President Toure remains committed to a negotiated settlement with Tuareg rebel leaders. Key aspects of the Algiers Accords not yet implemented include the creation of special military units composed of Northern and Southern Malians, the reintegration into the army of former Tuareg deserters, and a boost to economic development in the north. ¶13. (SBU) In addition to the periodic Tuareg friction, Mali's sparsely populated and vast northern regions also serve as a haven for smugglers, bandits and terrorist elements. The Malian government is unable to fully secure these zones due to their size and remote nature, and due to the Malian military?s lack of both materiel and desert training. Algerian Islamic extremists, formerly known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) but now called al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM),continue, to Mali's embarrassment and anger, to use northern Mali as a safe haven. AQIM held, at one point, up to six Western hostages. After protracted negotiations and a ransom payment, all but one British hostage were freed. The British hostage was murdered after a deadline for ransom payment was broken. Shortly thereafter, an AQIM supporter assassinated Malian Army Colonel Lamana ould Bou in his home in Timbuktu. Subsequently, the Malian government decided to take the fight to AQIM in Northern Mali despite its evident disadvantage. Special Malian military units, supplemented by some irregular elements, engaged AQIM in battle in late-June and early-July 2009. Initial success later turned to a set-back when Malian troops were ambushed several kilometers outside of Timbuktu. A recent AFRICOM assessment identified critical shortfalls with Malian logistics capabilities, including transport, communications, and intelligence. Improving these capabilities is a current interagency focus. -------------- Comment: U.S. Support for Mali -------------- ¶14. (SBU) Your visit to Mali will give you firsthand knowledge of the importance of U.S. security cooperation to Mali?s stability and prosperity. Mali's status as a leader in democracy, human rights and tolerance make U.S. engagement with Mali, and support for Mali's security and development even more critical. We remain convinced the U.S. policy, and the Embassy?s, is correct: listen to a broad range of people, support implementation of the Algiers Accords, foster increased professionalism and capacity of the Malian Armed Forces, and stress the need to strengthen and preserve Mali?s unitary multiethnic democracy as the fight against AQIM is pursued. End comment. MILOVANOVIC