DASD HUDDLESTON MEETS ATT: THE WAY FORWARD AGAINST

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAMAKO 000435 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2024 TAGS: PREL PTER ML SUBJECT: DASD HUDDLESTON MEETS ATT: THE WAY FORWARD AGAINST AQIM Classified By: DCM Mary Beth Leonard, Embassy Bamako, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for Africa Ambassador Vicki Huddleston and Ambassador Milovanovic called on President Amadou Toumani Toure (ATT) June 29 to discuss the state of Mali,s recent efforts against AQIM and avenues of U.S.-Malian cooperation in support of northern security. ATT described a north in which Tuareg unrest has been quelled, and the shock felt by Arab and Tuareg communities at the brutal murder of a Malian military officer by AQIM elements in his Timbuktu home had opened a window of popular enmity against AQIM,s presence. Mali is firmly committed to reinforcing that sentiment with a military offensive against AQIM, and by establishing a longer-term northern security presence, including its own intelligence capacity, to keep AQIM at bay and promote overall security. He believed neighboring nations were being swayed positively by Mali,s successes and would now play a more responsible role in cooperating with Mali in dealing with AQIM. He asked for U.S. support not only on military matters (vehicles, fuel tanks, means of surveillance, intelligence, construction of camps/outposts),but in supporting the GOM,s plea to UNDP to change its security rating for northern Mali, particularly Kidal, to allow development in that politically sensitive region to go forward. He also suggested that the only way for Mali to rid itself of the terrorist threat and other undesirable elements was to fill the security vacuum by establishing a security and governance presence in the north. Challenged by Huddleston with U.S. concerns about the security of information shared with the GOM, ATT acknowledged his awareness of the issue. He said he realizes Mali,s intelligence services need to be professionalized and become more secure; meanwhile he has created a four-person intelligence cell at the Presidency to handle the most strategic and sensitive intelligence matters. He asked that the Ambassador provide only him with critical intelligence and assured her of his 24-hour a day availability. He cautioned that AQIM was aware of the security vulnerabilities posed by extensive use of Thuraya and GPS systems, and probably exploited these with misinformation in those channels. End summary. -------------- -------------- Domestic Issues in the North on Track; Development Awaited -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) ATT updated Ambassador Huddleston on a wide variety of developments since her service as U.S. ambassador here in 2003-2005, on topics including the cotton sector, constitutional reform, revision of the family code, anti-corruption, municipal elections, and the census. Turning to the north, he recounted the military advantage Mali had finally gained over Bahanga that dramatically turned the tide of the Tuareg rebellion. ATT added that the previously warring chiefs had come to Bamako to speak to him, and that the reintegration and reconciliation processes with Tuaregs were proceeding well. He was pleased by the state of peace and security in the Kidal region, where even the rate of carjackings has fallen. There are new concerns about drug trafficking, and Mali needed to implement better surveillance against it. But with over 250 former rebels reintegrated, and an evident sentiment for peace among Tuaregs, what is needed now is development. He said that his Territorial Administration Minister had just traveled to Kidal to speak to the major chiefs about development and particularly the reinsertion of youth. If youth are not productively welcomed into the Malian fold, they will seek alternatives in banditry, narcotics, or terrorism. This crucial need for development had led ATT to send Foreign Affairs Minister Ouane to New York to plead with the UN Secretary General for a revision of the UNDP security rating for Kidal that prevented that organization,s programs from operating there. "We need to convince the UN that Mali is not a red zone." He asked for U.S. support for that position, noting that "if UNDP expected to wait for a perfect security situation, there would never be any development in Kidal." -------------- Getting a Leg up on AQIM -------------- ¶3. (S/NF) ATT admitted that Bahanga,s rebellion had distracted the GOM,s attention for two years, and that period had allowed the Salafists (AQIM) to entrench themselves in Mali,s north, where they moved about certain zones between stocks of food, fuel, and arms. He recalled that for three years he had been trying unsuccessfully to BAMAKO 00000435 002 OF 004 organize a regional conference on Sahelian security in order to spark regional cooperation on security, but that since the murder of the British citizen and with Mali,s recent successes, he was more optimistic that regional cooperation may ensue; he said Mali had begun hearing from its neighbors about renewed willingness to participate in such a forum. In the near term, the unified military cooperation he had hoped for did not materialize, except on a limited basis with Niger. He expressed frustration with Algeria,s unwillingness to provide requested air cover and cooperation, and reiterated a previous charge that Mali hesitated to share information about military operations with Algeria because he believes their army to be compromised by AQIM. He did say Algeria and Mauritania had agreed to police their respective borders to better control AQIM movements chased by Malian military efforts. ATT said that an AQIM group was headed into Mauritania, where their relationship with Mauritanian populations is a big handicap for Mali,s efforts against them. (Comment: In a separate conversation with the Algerian Ambassador later in the day, DASD Huddleston was told that Algeria was willing to assist and to integrate into Malian military units. He acknowledged that the Salafist problem originates from and is directed at Algeria. End Comment.) ¶4. (S/NF) Summarizing the events surrounding Lt. COL Lamana,s murder in his home in Timbuktu, ATT called this a turning point that created a new dynamic of anger that turned Tuareg and Berabiche popular sentiment firmly against AQIM. Taking advantage of this development, ATT said they welcomed Tuareg reintegrated military in operations near Timetrine and Tessalit, armed Arab elements into ooperation with military units, and Berabiche fihters in a mix of regular military and civilian aditions. ATT described the results as "practicaly having cleaned AQIM out of the territory." He said AQIM is on the run dodging Malian military patrols, who have now lost their trace, but continue to look for them. In a marked departure from previous estimates of AQIM,s strength, ATT said they had learned that AQIM was not as numerous as previously believed. Malian military commanders in the field, he said, estimate the total AQIM force at perhaps 70 fighters, of whom they had killed 29. The group contained only a dozen or so Algerians; AQIM in northern Mali is now mostly comprised of Mauritanians, and in a disturbing trend showing the spread of AQIM influence, also includes a few Ghanaians. He did note that the weather ) onset of rains - is beginning to turn against military operations. (Comment: ATT was undoubtedly putting the best face possible on what he may see as a much larger and longer-term challenge.) -------------- What Mali Asks of Washington -------------- ¶5. (S/NF) In terms of next steps, ATT looked forward to the long-delayed regional Sahel conference, and noted that the current military offensive will not be a permanent solution unless Mali establishes an active presence in the north. He also understands that Mali,s actions, which Mali is honor-bound to take, could lead to reprisals against Mali,s population. He views Tessalit and Abeibeira as key locations, and spoke of reinforcing a camp and the rebuilding the runway at Tessalit. He hopes to establish a combat training center at Tessalit. His vision is to establish camps and outposts of 10-40 people that will be able to protect themselves and provide a zone into which the population can flee for protection. The outposts would reduce insecurity by serving as a base for patrols. In addition to these garrisons, intermediary posts will be staffed by the national guard, gendarmes, and customs officials. "The biggest mistake of the 1992 peace accords was demilitarization of the north; we abandoned our territory to the Salafists;" His point appeared to be that when the Salafists entered, the population - already without effective institutions or a security presence - was vulnerable. ATT responded to DASD Huddleston,s news that the U.S. military planners he had requested had arrived in Mali with thanks, and summarized his specific requests. He believed he could count on our political support in his efforts against terrorism and for development; he hoped for our seconding of his request to UNDP. In terms of military help, he seeks vehicles; logistic support in the form of items such as fuel storage tanks (but he specifically stated "not fuel,"); means of observation, particularly via air; intelligence support; and assistance in constructing his planned bases. ¶6. (S/NF) Interrupting his meeting to phone his Military Chief of Staff, ATT instructed General Poudiougou not to hand BAMAKO 00000435 003 OF 004 the United States an entire catalog of wishes, but to focus on priority requests: mobility, air assets, and construction of camps and posts. Training will remain important U.S. contributions to Malian efforts. DASD Huddleston told him that while the U.S. could not meet these requests tomorrow, we want to help in these areas, and three lots of support including vehicles and arms would arrive within six months and over the next 18 months. -------------- --- "Understands our Concerns on Intelligence Leaks" -------------- --- ¶7. (S/NF) Turning to Mali,s request for intelligence support, Huddleston sought assurances that information we pass to Malian units would remain with them, and go no further. ATT joked that "there are traitors all around the world," but on a more serious note added he wanted the U.S. to realize he was aware of this concern and was taking steps to counter the problem. He distinguished between highly sensitive strategic intelligence and operational intelligence with a comparatively short effective life span. For the latter, which must be relayed among many people to be useful before it expires, leaks may be inevitable, but of limited impact given the nature of the information. There will also inevitably be cases of the local population seeing Malian military moving in a certain direction and informing on their movements, but he did not view these minor leaks as generally operationally threatening to Malian military operations. For strategic intelligence, ATT said his immediate solution to the leak issue was to establish a very small unit at the presidency consisting of himself, his Chief of Staff, and the Director of the External Security service. (Comment: ATT later said there were four people in his close-held intelligence cell; he did not mention the fourth individual, but it may be Presidency Secretary General Diango Cissoko, whom ATT instructed after the meeting to arrange requests for appointments from the Ambassador without the involvement of Presidential protocol on highly sensitive matters on her request. End Comment.) ATT acknowledged that his intelligence services need to be upgraded and be more secure. ¶8. (S/NF) Ultimately, though, solving the problem of leaks required two components. First, Mali was making a big push with local communities to convey that AQIM members do not represent harmless opportunities to make profit in trading; they are criminals and worse. ATT felt this was going well, and would be of assistance in plugging leaks based in observations from community sources. Second, the very long-term solution was for Mali to have its very own intelligence capacity. With its own ability to launch aerial surveillance and vehicular patrolling from bases in the remote north, Mali would itself be able to glean real-time intelligence for its own operations. ¶9. (S/NF) More generally on intelligence matters, ATT spoke of Tuareg and Arab informants who were passing information on AQIM, as well as AQIM,s awareness of the security vulnerabilities of satellite phones and GPS services. He suspected that AQIM engages in deliberate disinformation via these channels; "What these Arabs and Tuaregs are saying is lies...which needs to be carefully analyzed." On the topic of hostages, he said that it was dangerous to be in direct contact with AQIM; he believed that direct contact from the British had been the proximate cause of that hostage,s death. Once AQIM realizes that a given country won,t strike a deal, they turn to the families. ATT criticized the payment of ransoms by families, and said he would accept to trade a petty terrorist in the humanitarian cause of release, but not money. ¶10. (S/NF) ATT,s way forward includes the establishment of military units incorporating both reintegrated Tuareg rebels and armed Arab and Berabiche populations. He assured Huddleston that given Tuareg reconciliation and new enmity toward AQIM tactics, these measures did not risk fanning ethnic rivalries and infighting in the north. Solving the problem of AQIM over the longer term will require a Malian military presence with vehicles to pursue them based on indigenously generated intelligence, all buttressed by a wave of community propaganda to maintain the newly created web of intolerance between AQIM and local populations. Finally, Mali must regain control of its ungoverned spaces by providing security and development. ¶11. (S/NF) Comment: ATT,s responsiveness and activism in light of the concerns expressed about security weaknesses was encouraging. While his convictions about the small scale of BAMAKO 00000435 004 OF 004 the AQIM presence in northern Mali is surprising, his general outlines of how to deny territory and reinforce Mali against continued incursions are convincing. We look forward to the assessment of our visiting military planners on the contents of his operational plans, and to meeting some of his long-standing equipment requests to support him. End Comment. ¶12. (U) DASD Huddleston cleared this message prior to her departure. MILOVANOVIC