RUNNING ON FUMES: MALI'S SOLDIERS EXPOSED IN THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAMAKO 000415

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2019
TAGS: PGOV PINS PINR PREL PTER ML
SUBJECT: RUNNING ON FUMES: MALI'S SOLDIERS EXPOSED IN THE
DESERT

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Mary Beth Leonard, Embassy Bamak
o,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1.(C) Summary: After a fierce firefight on June 15 with
elements of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in the area of
Tin-Adema, approximately 180 kilometers west-southwest of
Tessalit, the Malian military forces involved soon found
themselves immobilized in the desert for several days,
awaiting reinforcements and resupply. Although
reprovisioning has allowed limited patrols to be conducted in
the area of Timetrine, the pause in Mali's operation
testifies to the logistical limitations facing their
anti-AQIM efforts, and the critical nature of Mali's lack of
military support infrastructure in the country's desert
north. While the Malian forces literally sat out of gas in
the open desert, Embassy sources indicated that AQIM elements
were freely on the move in the border regions. The Malian
operation against AQIM is a major step for the Malian
government, and should be speedily supported morally and
materially. End Summary.

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Resolute but Hamstrung
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2.(C) On June 15, two company sized task forces of Malian
soldiers, accompanied by Arab Berabiche militiamen,
demonstrated the resolve of the Malian government to take on
the forces of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) by
pursuing and successfully engaging AQIM elements in the area
of Tin-Adema, approximately 180 kilometers west-southwest of
Tessalit. The Malian forces, numbering perhaps 100-200 men,
lacked sufficient diesel fuel and supplies to continue the
pursuit, however, and remained in the Tin-Adema area for at
least a week awaiting resupply. During that time, according
to some Embassy sources, AQIM elements began moving freely
across the desert. Although fuel and supplies eventually
arrived and the Malian forces have resumed limited patrols in
the area of Timetrine, opportunities were lost and it is
unclear how sustainable the renewed push is, given the
logistical difficulties involved in supplying a military
force in this isolated and harsh terrain, with the limited
transport available to the Malian government.

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Just two barebones bases, both in poor condition
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3.(C) The Malian military has only two major bases in the
region of Kidal. The nearest to the Malian troops in
Tin-Adema is four to six hours away in Tessalit, and that
facility is limited and in need of expansion and repair. The
Tessalit base consists of a degraded landing strip, a few
delapidated barracks and metallic and adobe structures. Its
defensive capabilities are virtually nonexistent, located in
open and exposed terrain with only a primitive perimeter
fence as a barrier to entry. While the Kidal base, 12-24
hours from Tin-Adema via an unpaved road and a dry river bed,
is a larger walled structure with a greater number of
barracks and facilities, both bases are isolated from
logistical supplies and reinforcements, which must arrive via
convoy from Gao, a two day trip over unpaved road.

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Exposed to 100 degree Sun and Sitting Ducks
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4.(C) Embassy sources believe that the Malian soldiers in
Tin-Adema and patrolling in the area of Timetrine are without
cover and are not quartered in any structure, although the
average high temperature in the region of Kidal during June
is 104 degrees Fahrenheit. Even troops posted to the desert
on three month tours habitually have no shelter or facilities
and rest under their trucks. The Algerians donated a
planeload of tents and sleeping bags to the Malian Army in
early May, but sent them to Bamako leaving it to the
transportation-poor Malian Army to get the material back up
north. It is doubtful that any of those supplies have been
successfully transported to Kidal yet. In addition to
exposure to the harsh desert conditions, Malian forces face
the clear possibility of life-threatening reprisal attacks
for which they have no cover or defense. The Embassy's DAO
reports that the Malian soldiers have laid anti-personnel
landmines around their positions as their only protection
against ambush.

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Unfamiliar with the North and ill-trained

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5.(C) Although Tuaregs and Arabs are represented in sizeable
numbers in the National Guard, the Malian Army is
overwhelmingly made up of soldiers from southern Mali. To
the best of the Embassy's knowledge, soldiers posted to duty
in the desert north are sent to either Gao, Kidal, or
Tessalit for three to six month tours without any training to
introduce them to fighting - or surviving - in the harsh
desert terrain. Indeed, during the recent rebellion of
Ibrahim Ag Bahanga, some Malian soldiers were placed on duty
in the north never even having fired a weapon, due to lack of
resources, notably ammunition, during training.

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Comment: More than just Gas
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6.(C) Mali's current offensive against AQIM represents a
major undertaking for the Malian government, and has been
taken at considerable risk. It reflects a genuine commitment
on the part of the Malian government to confront terrorism,
but is limited by Mali's lack of resources and the very real
logistical difficulties posed by operating in isolated and
expansive desert environments. Mali's long term goal of
securing northern Mali requires a more permanent security
force presence than Mali's northern military infrastructure
can currently support. Mali has no defensible outposts in
northern Mali outside of the major cities, which necessarily
means that each military operation in pursuit of bandits,
terrorists, or rebels invariably exposes Malian forces to
harsh desert terrain and limits their resupply. This
isolation and exposure is exacerbated by the lack of adequate
training to teach Malian soldiers to survive and fight in
such an environment. If Mali is to secure its northern
regions, its military support infrastructure will have to be
expanded, and training will have to be improved. Since
Mali's recent offensive against AQIM is a positive step
forward responsive to long-standing international community
expectations and consistent with American interests, Mali's
efforts should be supported both morally and materially.
MILOVANOVIC