Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAMAKO268
2009-04-30 14:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bamako
Cable title:  

MORE TUAREG PESSIMISM OVER ACCORDS AND AQIM

Tags:  PTER PINS PINR ASEC PGOV PREL ML 
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FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0287
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0634
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0342
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAMAKO 000268 

SIPDIS

RABAT FOR LEGAL ATTACHE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2019
TAGS: PTER PINS PINR ASEC PGOV PREL ML
SUBJECT: MORE TUAREG PESSIMISM OVER ACCORDS AND AQIM

REF: A. BAMAKO 00257

B. BAMAKO 00107

C. BAMAKO 00186

D. BAMAKO 00245

Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, Embassy Bamako,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAMAKO 000268 SIPDIS RABAT FOR LEGAL ATTACHE E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2019 TAGS: PTER PINS PINR ASEC PGOV PREL ML SUBJECT: MORE TUAREG PESSIMISM OVER ACCORDS AND AQIM REF: A. BAMAKO 00257 ¶B. BAMAKO 00107 ¶C. BAMAKO 00186 ¶D. BAMAKO 00245 Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, Embassy Bamako, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1.(C) Summary: Tuareg trafficker turned National Assembly Deputy Deity ag Sidamou said those who believe Mali will ever create mixed military units were "fooling themselves" and predicted a calamity "even worse" than what northern Mali has experienced so far if Mali fails to respect its Algiers Accords commitments. Ag Sidamou also shared his understanding of Arab and Tuareg involvement in the kidnappings of Canadian diplomats and European tourists by AQIM, and complained that none of the funds designated by the international community to combat terrorism in Mali ever make their way to those who are actually ready to combat terrorists. Unfortunately an important way to support Tuareg fighters ready to do battle with AQIM is via the very mixed military units ag Sidamou believes will never materialize. End Summary. -------------- Ag Sidamou: On the Outside Looking In -------------- 2.(C) Ag Sidamou is an Idnane Tuareg from Tessalit (see bio notes in Ref. A). Although he is one of the Tuareg rebel Alliance for Democracy and Change's (ADC) founders, the rebel movement is dominated by Ifoghas Tuaregs, and Idnane leaders like ag Sidamou have been steadily sidelined from the Algiers Accords. In February ag Sidamou helped orchestrate, with Libyan financing, the disarmament of Idnane rebel factions separate from the disarmament of the primarily Ifoghas dominated ADC (Ref. B). Ag Sidamou's view of the Algiers Accords is therefore one of a Tuareg rebel leader who finds himself looking in from the edge of the Algiers Accords process. -------------- A Divided Northern Mali -------------- 3.(C) Ag Sidamou's vision of northern Mali's future is bleak. Noting the profundity of the conflict in northern Mali, which dates back to Malian independence in 1960, ag Sidamou complained that every time violence flared Mali focused on prescribing aspirin as opposed to cures. He warned that those who still believe Mali and Algeria have any intention of creating mixed military units as stipulated by the Algiers Accords were "fooling themselves" and said Mali was more
interested in pitting Tuareg groups against one another. Ag Sidamou said high rates of illiteracy and poverty render Kidal Tuaregs particularly susceptible to this kind of victimization. 4.(C) Internal divisions among Malian Tuareg are already evident. In addition to the loyalist Imghad Tuareg militia created by Col. Gamou in 2008 to combat Tuareg rebels, rebel movements themselves are divided between Ifergoumessens generally loyal to Ibrahim Bahanga, Ifoghas primarily belonging to the ADC, Taghat Melets, and Idnanes like ag Sidamou who decided to disarm separately from the ADC and no longer appear to be part of the Algiers Accords process. 5.(C) The creation of ethnic Arab militias seems to have exacerbated this situation. Ag Sidamou said Mali faced significant obstacles in attempting to dissolve the primarily ethnic based militias it helped create. According to ag Sidamou, the Malian government is now trying to recruit some militia members into the regular army and pay off certain militia leaders with cash. The involvement of senior military officers allegedly with personal and financial interests in keeping their respective militias alive, however, is complicating this initiative. Ag Sidamou said Col. Abderahmane ould Meydou and Col. Lamana ould Bdou were busy running interference to protect their own Arab militiamen in order to preserve revenues from drugs and weapons trafficking. He alleged that Col. Gamou was running a similar operation on the Tuareg side. 6.(C) Ag Sidamou went on to accuse the Malian government and ethnic Arabs of conniving to use AQIM to disadvantage Malian Tuaregs. Ag Sidamou said Mali wanted AQIM to stay in Tuareg controlled areas in order to further tarnish the Tuaregs' BAMAKO 00000268 002 OF 003 international image. He also alleged that certain Malian officials and local Arab leaders had an informal arrangement enabling Arabs like Tarkint Mayor Baba ould Chieouk to negotiate ransom payments for western hostages on behalf of AQIM and then divide the proceeds between Arab leaders and corrupted government officials. 7.(C) Ag Sidamou described Mali's Tuareg population as "blockaded" by the Malian military, local Arab populations, and AQIM. He said this blockade deprived Tuaregs of access to potable water, education, and health services and complained that every time he and other Tuareg leaders ask the international donor community for help, donors respond by explaining why they can't go to Kidal because of Salafists and other security concerns. He then complained that he and other Tuareg political leaders cannot raise this issue in Bamako without being accused of rebellion - a rather ironic statement given ag Sidamou's recent efforts to foment exactly that. -------------- AQIM, Arabs, and Western Hostages -------------- 8.(C) Ag Sidamou cited many of same names previously reported in connection with the kidnappings of two Canadian diplomats in Niger and four European tourists along the Mali-Niger border. Ag Sidamou said he believed only one Tuareg was involved in the European kidnappings - Inteweka ag Ahmayed (aka Ousmane) - and stressed that Ousmane had been captured by fellow Tuaregs, as opposed to Malian forces, on March 23 in the northern Malian town of In-Khalil (Ref. C). Ag Sidamou speculated that Malian authorities were blocking outside nations from visiting Ousmane in prison or obtaining details about his capture in order to prevent Ousmane from revealing information about Malian officials complicit with the kidnappings or trafficking in northern Mali. 9.(C) Ag Sidamou said four Arabs were involved in the Canadian and European kidnappings, but only provided the names of two: Asultan ould Badi and Alhassane ould Mohamed (aka Cheibani). Ag Sidamou referred to ould Mohamed as "Cheibani ould Inawaye". Chiebani's father was Mohamed ould Inawaye (Mohamed the son of Inawaye). Ag Sidamou could have been confused by Cheibani's parentage or perhaps Cheibani has resorted to using the family name Inawaye to further mask his identity. Ag Sidamou also reported that Cheibani was related to Tarkint Mayor Baba ould Choueich, who played an instrumental role behind the liberation of the two Canadians and their Nigerien driver. 10.(C) Ag Sidamou alleged that the two unnamed Arab kidnappers were relations of Col. ould Meydou and Col. Lamana and that they had received messages from Col. Lamana following the transfer of the hostages to AQIM instructing one to leave Mali and the other to enlist in an Arab militia to avoid detection by Malian authorities. 11.(C) Referring back to the ADC's October 2006 battles with what was then the GSPC and is now AQIM, ag Sidamou recounted his disappointment with the international community's failure to help the Tuaregs pursue their vendetta against Algerian Salafists. He noted that the widows and children of Tuaregs who died fighting AQIM in 2006 never received any assistance. He also faulted the U.S. and other nations for wasting counterterrorism resources, saying he and other Tuaregs frequently heard about money set aside to combat terrorism in Mali but that these funds never went to those actually ready to combat terrorists. -------------- Comment: Again the Mixed Units -------------- 12.(C) Mali could respond to the increasing levels of skepticism expressed by ag Sidamou and other Tuaregs about Malian commitment to the Algiers Accords by taking the leap of faith required to constitute actual mixed military. On April 14 Foreign Minister Moctar Ouane once again told the assembled diplomatic corps in Bamako that Mali remained committed to the "rapid" constitution of these units (Ref. D). Unfortunately, Minister Ouane and the Malian government has already said as much many times before. Ag Sidamou has his own interest in ensuring the success of these mixed units as they present the best, and only, way for western counterterrorism dollars to reach rehabilitated and reintegrated former members of the Tuareg rebellion ready and BAMAKO 00000268 003 OF 003 willing to cross swords with AQIM. MILOVANOVIC

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