MALI'S ONLY ISLAMIC POLITICAL PARTY FALLS ON HARD

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAMAKO 000267 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PINR KISL KDEM KIRF ML SUBJECT: MALI'S ONLY ISLAMIC POLITICAL PARTY FALLS ON HARD TIMES REF: A. 07 BAMAKO 01336 ¶B. 08 BAMAKO 01357 ¶C. 08 BAMAKO 00237 ¶D. 07 BAMAKO 01223 1.(SBU) On April 17 the Embassy met with National Union for Rebirth (UNPR) president Modibo Sangare to discuss Mali's April 26 local elections. The UNPR is Mali's only Islamic political party and Sangare is the only political leader openly seeking to transform Mali into an Islamic Republic. Although the UNPR's platform is seemingly at odds with laws prohibiting non-secular political parties, Sangare and the UNPR continue to hover along the fringes of the Malian political spectrum, presumably because the party is so small that Malian officials simply prefer to leave well enough alone. As UNPR president and an outspoken member of Mali's al-Sunna or "wahhabi" community, Sangare is also on the fringes of Mali's religious spectrum. Any tendency toward religious extremism in the broader sense, however, is tempered by Malian traditions of tolerance, openness, and consensus, and Sangare remains effusive in his praise of the United States. During his meeting with the Embassy, Sangare described funding shortfalls that left the UNPR unable to register virtually any candidates for the local elections, and rehashed his on going feud with fellow al-Sunna leader and High Council of Islam president Mahmoud Dicko. End Summary. -------------- Modibo Sangare and the UNPR -------------- 2.(SBU) With no representation at any level within the Malian government and almost no resources, the UNPR would be indistinguishable from Mali's estimated 100 other micro-parties were it not for the UNPR's outspoken president, Modibo Sangare. In 2002 Sangare was one of 24 presidential candidates seeking to replace former President Alpha Oumar Konare. Although Sangare garnered only 11,600 of the 1.5 million votes cast, he finished as well or better than others with more resources and more mainstream messages. Sangare tried to run for president again in 2007 but was unable to muster the USD 20,000 registration fee. 3.(SBU) In 2007 and 2008 Sangare helped organize protests by Muslim groups against President Amadou Toumani Toure's still unrealized attempt to abolish the death penalty and revise Mali's Family Code in order to provide more equal rights for women (Ref. A). In November 2008 security forces used tear gas to break up one UNPR rally (Ref B). In addition to his vocal position against death penalty abolition, greater inheritance rights for women, or attempts by human rights groups to eliminate the practice of excision, Sangare openly advocates for transforming the secular Malian state into a Islamic Republic and the incorporation of certain aspects of Sharia law. 4.(SBU) Sangare's ideas on secularism and Sharia significantly differentiate him from other al-Sunna leaders like High Council of Islam president Mahmoud Dicko. Although Dicko and other mainstream Muslim leaders, whether al-Sunna or Sufi, would like to see more religious instruction in Malian schools, they have no interest in altering the secular nature of the Malian state or legal system (Ref. C and D). The UNPR's opposition to the secular nature of the Malian State also appears to place the party and Sangare on the wrong side of the Malian Constitution - which requires political parties to respect the principles of national sovereignty, democracy, territorial integrity, national unity, and secularism - and a 2005 law prohibiting non-secular political parties. 5.(SBU) Sangare has told the Embassy, "if it were up to me, Mali would be an Islamic country, but one open to the West." Sangare advocated for the establishment of an Islamic yet still democratic Republic, that would be governed by Sharia law while still respecting all human rights as outlined by the United Nations as the bases for "each of these rights is also found in the Koran." Sangare supported his argument by claiming that Mali had tried socialism from 1960 to 1968, a planned economy and military dictatorship from 1968 to 1991, and democracy from 1991 to the present, all without success. His plan for transforming Mali into an Islamic Republic therefore seems part process of elimination, part religious conviction. -------------- The UNPR's Financial Crisis -------------- BAMAKO 00000267 002 OF 002 6.(SBU) The UNPR's conspicuous lack of representation at any level of Malian government, to include the roughly 11,000 local councilors up for election on April 26, may explain why Malian officials have absolved Sangare and the UNPR for breaking the vow of secularism that binds political parties in Mali. Pursuing the UNPR for its political sins would also likely backfire, bringing Sangare much more attention and support that he would otherwise receive. Incentives for this sort of inquiry are even fewer now, as Sangare remains a political sideshow with almost no money to organize party members or support political campaigns. 7.(SBU) Sangare said the UNPR received CFA 2 million (USD 4,000) in public campaign finance funds from the Malian government for the 2007 presidential and legislative election cycle, and spent USD 3,000 more of its own money collected through party member contributions. Sangare said Malian officials refused the UNPR's application for public funds for the 2009 local elections due to discrepancies in receipts accounting for the public funds received in 2007, and accused Malian election officials of instructing him to produce fabricated receipts for small payments to local religious leaders and party members. His refusal - both on logistical and moral grounds - meant that the UNPR received nothing from the government in advance of the April 26 local elections. As a result, the UNPR ran candidates in just one Malian town - the city of Mopti in central Mali - on April 26, and preliminary election results indicate that they faired poorly. -------------- The U.S., AQIM, and the High Council of Islam -------------- 8.(SBU) Sangare was once again effusive in his praise for the U.S., citing everything from American respect for religious freedoms to open container laws governing the public consumption of alcohol. Sangare said he believed the U.S. defends the rights of Muslims more than any other country. "Americans," said Sangare, "are a tolerant people, a people who respect Islam." Comparing the U.S. to France, Sangare noted that Muslim women in the U.S. can wear head scarves or veils without fear of harassment or retribution. Sangare said that certain aspects of U.S. policy toward the Middle East, however, had recently introduced what he described as an element of "schizophrenia" in to his admiration for American values and freedom. Sangare said he was "marveled" by the recent election of President Obama. 9.(SBU) On AQIM, Sangare said he rejected all forms of terrorism and killing. He said the form of Salafism practiced by AQIM was at odds with Malian culture, Malian traditions of tolerance, and Malian values. Sangare also recounted his running feud with the Malian High Council of Islam (HCIM) and its president, Imam Mahmoud Dicko, whose 2008 election Sangare refused to accept, claiming that Dicko and other HCIM members had violated HCIM by-laws. A subsequent court challenge filed by Sangare has gone no where, contributing to the division within Mali's al-Sunna or "wahhabi" community over Sangare's refusal to recognize Imam Dicko as HCIM president. -------------- Comment: Fringe? Yes. Lunatic? No. -------------- 10.(SBU) In March the Embassy helped set up meetings with local Muslim leaders for a Canadian Embassy political officer dispatched to Mali to help manage the AQIM hostage crisis. After meeting with several al-Sunna leaders, including one senior "wahhabi" Imam who spent more than twenty years working for Embassy Bamako as a motor pool driver, the Canadian told us he was stunned to discover that even those at the absolute end of the religious spectrum in Mali were what he labeled as "Islam light." Although we might have selected a different phrase, this description also applies to Sangare and his UNPR, which is about as extreme as one can get in Mali. While Sangare's opposition to a revised Family Code, rather convoluted attempts to justify what he described as the least invasive form of excision, and vision of an Islamic Republic of Mali governed by some form of Sharia law are unsettling, Sangare still reveres Malians' traditional respect for tolerance and moderation. Sangare's tempered form of political Islam, coupled with the general public and Malian government's apparent disinterest in the UNPR platform, indicates that neither the UNPR nor Sangare pose any threat to these traditions. MILOVANOVIC