Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAMAKO221
2009-04-10 10:56:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Bamako
Cable title:  

TUAREG BOUNTY HUNTERS LOOKING FOR SECURITY AND

Tags:  PTER PINS PINR PREL ML 
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VZCZCXRO5195
RR RUEHPA
DE RUEHBP #0221 1001056
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 101056Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0221
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0618
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0336
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
S E C R E T BAMAKO 000221 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

RABAT FOR LEGAL ATTACHE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2019
TAGS: PTER PINS PINR PREL ML
SUBJECT: TUAREG BOUNTY HUNTERS LOOKING FOR SECURITY AND
INCENTIVES

REF: BAMAKO 00186

Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, Embassy Bamako,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
S E C R E T BAMAKO 000221 NOFORN SIPDIS RABAT FOR LEGAL ATTACHE E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2019 TAGS: PTER PINS PINR PREL ML SUBJECT: TUAREG BOUNTY HUNTERS LOOKING FOR SECURITY AND INCENTIVES REF: BAMAKO 00186 Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, Embassy Bamako, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1.(S/NF) Summary: On April 6 Kidal Chamber of Commerce president Abdousalam ag Assalat and Tuareg trafficker Merzouk ag Acherif told the Embassy that they could no longer bear the personal and financial risks of tracking terrorism suspects in northern Mali without outside support in the form of "gas" money and assurances that those captured will not be released a few months later by Malian authorities. Ag Assalat said he and Merzouk believed it was too risky to pursue other high-profile kidnapping suspects - including Asultan ould Badi, Alassane ould Mohamed (aka Cheibani),and other unspecified AQIM leaders - without first resolving these issues. Ag Assalat indicated that he and Merzouk continued, however, to track both ould Badi and Cheibani's whereabouts, stating that Cheibani was in the northern Malian town of Menaka as recently as last week. End Summary. 2.(S/NF) Ag Assalat and Merzouk have already led Malian security forces to hideouts of two Tuaregs implicated in the January 22 kidnappings of four European tourists in northern Mali. The subsequent arrest raids, one outside of Gao and a second on March 23 in In-Khalil, netted two kidnapping suspects: Sidamar ag Ilaste and Inteweka ag Ahmayed (aka Ousmane) (Ref. A). Ag Assalat was back in Bamako, briefly, to conduct Chamber of Commerce business before returning to Kidal to campaign for Mali's upcoming April 26 local elections. Merzouk, who appears to speak only Tamachek and Arabic, was likely in Bamako to meet with the Director General of State Security (DGSE),Col. Mamy Coulibaly. On April 3 the British Embassy's political officer told the Embassy that Col. Coulibaly had confirmed that two Tuareg traffickers allegedly involved in the January 22 kidnappings were now in custody, but complained that Col. Coulibaly was providing only extremely limited information. 3.(S/NF) Ag Assalat originally told the Embassy that Merzouk had missed the primary target of the raid in In-Khalil, the ethnic Arab AQIM facilitator Asultan ould Badi, by only five minutes. On April 6, however, ag Assalat's story changed somewhat as he claimed that he had instructed Merzouk to leave Asultan just moments before the raid and focus instead on Inteweka. Ag Assalat cited ould Badi's status as a Malian Arab as one reason for this decision. As Tuaregs, ag Assalat and Merzouk claimed they could manage "social pressures" from their own Tuareg community stemming from the arrest of fellow Tuaregs like Inteweka and Sidamar. Ag Assalat said pressure from the Arab community following the capture of an Arab like Asultan would be much worse, entailing personal risks that he and Merzouk were currently unwilling to run - without help. 4.(S/NF) Describing his need for "gas" money and other expenses, ag Assalat said he and Merzouk had personally financed the capture of Sidamar and Inteweka. Ag Assalat also stressed the personal risks he and Merzouk were running, repeatedly asking rhetorically, "What's the point" of capturing kidnapping suspects if Mali is just going to release them a few months later. He faulted Malian authorities not only for their delinquency in detaining and prosecuting terrorism suspects, but for their inability to keep tabs on specific individuals with terrorism links. Ag Assalat noted that no one in the Malian government, for instance, knew that Cheibani was in the northern Malian town of Menaka as recently as last week. 5.(S/NF) Assuming their financing and security concerns are resolved, ag Assalat and Merzouk said it would be relatively easy for them to also corral senior AQIM leaders based in Mali as these individuals frequently traverse the northern Malian desert in convoys of just one or two vehicles with only limited security. MILOVANOVIC

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