THIS WEEK IN NORTHERN MALI: REBEL DISARMAMENT AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAMAKO 000107 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2019 TAGS: PGOV PINS ASEC PTER PREL ML SUBJECT: THIS WEEK IN NORTHERN MALI: REBEL DISARMAMENT AND BAHANGA'S COMPLAINT REF: BAMAKO 00069 BAMAKO 00000107 001.5 OF 004 Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, Embassy Bamako, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 1.(C) Summary: All known Tuareg rebel factions, excepting the remnants of Tuareg rebel leader Ibrahim Bahanga's Northern Mali Tuareg Alliance for Change (ATNMC),disarmed February 13-17 in northern Mali amid pledges by both the Malian and Tuareg sides to return to the Algiers Accords framework. The first wave of rebel disarmament, from Feb. 13-14, occurred with support from Libya rather than Mali's Algerian mediators. The second wave of five to seven hundred Tuareg rebel Alliance for Democracy and Change (ADC) members on February 17 was facilitated by Algeria. At least one Tuareg contact has expressed concern that the Tuareg rebels who disarmed prior to the February 17 ceremony in Kidal have been systematically excluded from the Algiers Accords process by Algeria and the ADC. This contact also warned that most of the weapons returned by Tuareg rebels were junk and that the rebels' real weaponry was carefully stashed out of sight. Although Bahanga's actual whereabouts remain unknown, reports of Bahanga sightings continue to trickle into Bamako, including a February 19 report that Bahanga had carjacked a Malian Berabiche drug caravan of 15 vehicles between Abeibara and the Algerian border. On February 18 Bahanga's father-in-law and Paris-based ATNMC spokesman issued a statement comparing this week's disarmament ceremonies to the one that occurred in March 2007, just a few weeks before hostilities led by Bahanga, resumed. Disarmament may be the easy part for Mali, Algeria, and the ADC. Rolling former rebels into mixed military units, providing economic "reinsertion" payments to ex-combatants, and disbanding the Tuareg and Arab militias Mali constituted to fight the rebels will likely prove more complicated. End Summary. -------------- Tuareg Rebels Disarm in Kidal -------------- 2.(U) A wave of Tuareg rebel disarmament ceremonies washed over northern Mali from February 13 to 17, resulting in the return of perhaps as many as 750 Tuareg rebel combatants back to Kidal. Some estimates claim that over 1500 rebels disarmed in total from February 13-17. The first two groups of Tuareg rebels to disarm - a group of approximately 165 tangential members of the ADC - were primarily Taghat Melet Tuaregs. This group turned over its weapons to military authorities on the outskirts of Kidal, then entered the city under military escort. Malian press reported that a smaller group of 32 rebels disarmed in the village of Djouhan, roughly 50 KM from Kidal. 3.(C) On February 14 a second group of rebels, an estimated 120 Idnane Tuaregs, participated in a disarmament ceremony in the northern town of Timitrine, to the west of Aguelhok. This group was led by National Assembly Deputy Deity ag Sidamou and Tessalit Mayor Abdoulahi ag Elbakaye. Ag Sidimou is an estranged member of the ADC. The Idnane rebel ceremony was engineered by Ahmed ag Boya, an Idnane community leader and Customs Inspector, and Mohamed ag Erlaf, a former Malian government Minister and currently Director of the Malian Agency for Local Investment. Ag Boya and Ag Erlaf previously organized the largely ceremonial disarmament of 140 Idnane "rebels" in the town of Bourem, north of Gao, on January 19 (Ref. A). They then traveled to Libya, along with other Idnane leaders from northern Mali, presumably to acquire the financial support needed to convince the real Idnane Tuareg rebels, led by ag Sidamou, to also put down their weapons. The February 14 ceremony in Tessalit was widely covered by Malian television. 4.(C) On February 19 presidential advisor and Kidal Tuareg Acherif ag Mohamed told the Embassy that neither of these two disarmament ceremonies were supported by the Algerian mediators. In other words, both were organized independent of the Algiers Accords process, likely with Libyan financing, by ag Erlaf who is half Idnane and half Taghat Melet. This added context to concerns articulated by another Taghat Melet leader, Kidal Chamber of Commerce President Abdousalam ag Assalat, regarding the perceived exclusion of Idnane and Taghat Melet constituencies from the Algiers Accords process (see para 14). 5.(C) On February 17 the most important group of Tuareg rebels - roughly 500 members of the ADC riding in perhaps as many as 80 vehicles - disarmed in Kidal. The ceremony had been scheduled for February 15 but was postponed, officially, for "technical reasons." Tuareg contacts indicated that the BAMAKO 00000107 002 OF 004 ceremony had been delayed in order to assure the attendance of the Algerian Ambassador to Mali, Abdelkarim Ghreib. Tuareg rebels handed over their weapons during the February 17 ceremony held at the Kidal airport. Presiding over the ceremony were key Tuareg rebel leaders including ADC spokesman Ahmada ag Bibi, former ATNMC member and chronic army deserter Hassan ag Fagaga, the Algerian Ambassador to Mali, Minister of Territorial Administration Kafougouna Kone, Mali's Military Chief of Staff General Gabriel Poudiougou, Col. Elhedj Gamou and others including the Cuban Ambassador to Mali who was ostensibly in Kidal to visit Cuban doctors working at a local health clinic. A number of ATNMC defectors were also among those turning in their arms. 6.(U) According to the Malian government newspaper L'Essor, 78 of the returning rebels were military deserters who will be re-incorporated into mixed units. Another 500 rebels who were previously not part of Malian military will also be integrated into the Malian armed forces. -------------- Next Steps: Reintegration and "Reinsertion" -------------- 7.(U) During an interview with Radio France on February 18, Algerian Ambassador Ghreib said the next steps for northern Mali would be strict application of the Algiers Accords by rolling former rebel combatants into mixed military units under the command of the Malian army and arranging "economic reinsertion" payments for several hundred "youth" who were formerly part of the Tuareg rebel fighting force. Ambassador Ghreib told the Malian newspaper l'Independant that he expected as many as 3000 Tuareg rebels to return to the peace process, seeking either to be integrated into the Malian military or receive economic reinsertion payments. 8.(C) Acherif ag Mohamed told the Embassy that mixed units would likely be commanded by ADC Commandant Moussa Bah. He described Hassan Fagaga, who commanded one mixed unit for no more than a month or two in 2007 before deserting once again to the rebellion, as tired and no longer suitable for command. 9.(U) There are a number of funds and programs already available to ease rebel combatants' return to civilian life. These include the Malian government's Agency for Northern Development (ADN); the approximately USD 2 million Mali and Algeria have already set aside for returning rebels; the USD 22 million Integrated Rural Development Program for Kidal (PIDRK) which is partly funded by the West African Development Bank, Belgium, and other donors. -------------- Hassan Fagaga: It Ain't Me -------------- 10.(U) On February 19 the Malian newspaper l'Independant published an exclusive interviews with Col. Hassan ag Fagaga and ADC spokesman Ahmada ag Bibi. Fagaga - who deserted from the Malian military in 2006 to participate in the first Tuareg rebel attacks of May 2006 then returned briefly to serve as the Commander of a mixed unit in Kidal in June 2007 before deserting once again - said the ADC had returned to Kidal and the Algiers Accords after receiving assurances from the Malian government that, this time, the Accords would be properly implemented. Indicating that he was already reintegrated into the Malian army, Fagaga said he would prefer to stay in Kidal but that this would depend on orders received from his superiors within the Malian military. 11.(U) Fagaga also described himself as "a partisan for peace, contrary to everything newspapers in Bamako say." Asked if he would have a problem working with Col. Elhedj Gamou, who led the Malian military and irregular Tuareg Imghad militia units against both the ADC and the ATNMC, Fagaga responded: "Gamou, who is he? He is a member of the army. There is no Gamou problem. Nor is there a problem between me and Gamou or any of the other soldiers of the army." Fagaga blamed journalists for seeing non-existent divisions and said the divide between himself from Col. Gamou is political, not military. Our demands, said Fagaga, "are of a political rather than a military nature." When asked what these demands are, Fagaga said this was an issue between Tuareg rebels and the Malian government but stressed the need for the "correct" implementation of the Algiers Accords. 12.(U) The l'Independant asked Fagaga if he planned to use the failure to implement part of the Accords as a pretext for deserting once again, to which Fagaga responded: "It is God BAMAKO 00000107 003 OF 004 that decides. It isn't me. It is God that knows." Referring to erroneous press reports of Fagaga being wounded and transported to Algeria for treatment in 2008, the l'Independant asked if Fagaga had recovered from his wounds. "I was never wounded," said Fagaga. "It was you who wrote that I was wounded and was in Algeria for treatment. But no. I never killed anyone or attacked an army position. I was never in combat, so how could I ever have been wounded? However, there were some attacks against our positions and I defended myself without much difficulty. Whether you believe me or not, it's the truth. What is sure is that today more than yesterday, I'm doing just fine." -------------- Ag Bibi: Development First -------------- 13.(U) ADC spokesman and National Assembly Deputy Ahmada ag Bibi told L'Independant that he believed the ADC was prepared to stay in Kidal "for eternity." When asked what's next for the peace process, however, ag Bibi turned to the more sweeping (and expensive) aspects of the Algiers Accords. "We need an airport (in Kidal),schools, health centers, water supplies, roads, and farming land. Without forgetting the socio-economic reinsertion of youth. In short, we need development." -------------- A Quiet Note of Discord -------------- 14.(C) On February 18 Kidal Chamber of Commerce President and ADC member Abdousalam ag Assalat told the Embassy from Kidal that the arms turned in by the ADC were useless antiques and that Tuareg rebels had hidden away any weapons that were serviceable. Ag Assalat said that the success of this latest push toward disarmament and reintegration of rebel fighters depends on Mali and Algeria's motivation to adhere to their Algiers Accords commitments. 15.(C) Ag Assalat also complained that Mali, Algeria and the ADC had systematically removed any Tuaregs not belonging to Kidal's dominant Ifoghas fraction from their spots on the Algiers Accords steering committee and the Algiers Accords technical committee. Ag Assalat, who is a Taghat Melet, held one of the ADC's three seats on the Algiers Accords steering committee until he resigned his seat in late December 2008 or early January 2009. According to ag Assalat, the ADC's three seats on the Accords steering committee are now held by three Tuareg Ifoghas - Hassan ag Fagaga, Haroun ag Saghid, and Cheikh ag Aoussa - meaning that the important Taghat Melet and Idnane Tuareg communities are no longer represented. The same holds for the Algiers Accords technical committee, which is also a nine person group composed of three representatives from Mali, Algeria and the ADC. The technical committee focuses on implementing the military aspects of the Algiers Accords. All three ADC representatives to this committee are also Tuareg Ifoghas led by ADC Commander Moussa Bah. 16.(C) Ag Assalat said he believed the ADC had pushed rebel Idnane and Taghat Melet Tuaregs aside because the ADC is, at heart, an Ifoghas rebel group and key ADC leaders questioned Idnane and Taghat Melet loyalties. He thought Algeria provided tacit approval to this move because Algeria perceives Idnane and Taghat Melet rebels to be closer to Libya than Algeria. -------------- Is Bahanga in the Building? -------------- 17.(U) On February 18 Bahanga's father-in-law Hama ag Sid'Ahmed issued another statement warning that the February 17 disarmament ceremony was no different than the one that occurred in Kidal on March 9, 2007, just weeks before hostilities - led primarily by Bahanga - resumed. Ag Sid'Ahmed described the ADC's return to Kidal not as disarmament but as an "unconditional surrender" and argued that no peace is possible without the participation of Bahanga. 18.(C) Meanwhile, Bahanga sightings continue. The Algerian DCM and Tuareg contacts told the Embassy on February 12-13 that Bahanga was in northern Niger with Nigerien Tuareg rebels. On February 18 a confidante of President Amadou Toumani Toure told the Embassy that Mali believed Bahanga was in Libya with a handful of his remaining followers. Acherif ag Mohamed told the Embassy that he believed Bahanga was with rebels in Niger. Acherif said he spoke to Bahanga's brother BAMAKO 00000107 004 OF 004 in law, Mohamed ag Aharib, on February 18 by telephone. Ag Aharib was one of the original three Tuareg rebel representatives to the Algiers Accords steering committee, along with ag Assalat and Haroun ag Saghid. Ag Aharib later defected from the ADC to join the ATNMC. Acherif said Aharib was currently in Libya, waiting for the dust in Kidal to settle before attempting to return to Mali. 19.(U) During an interview with Malian media on February 17 in Kidal, a Malian journalist asked the Algerian Ambassador if Bahanga was in Algeria. "Even if he was in Algeria," said Ambassador Ghreib "I wouldn't tell you." 20.(C) On February 19 Tuareg contacts told the Embassy that a group of Tuareg bandits led by Bahanga had held up an Arab Berabiche drug convoy of 15 vehicles somewhere between Abeibera and the Algerian border. Twelve of these vehicles were reportedly carrying cocaine. The other three 4x4s served as escorts. The attackers allegedly took all of the vehicles, as well as the drug shipment, and instructed the Arabs to return to Kidal with a message from Bahanga that more incidents of this kind would occur in the future. -------------- Comment: And Now the Hard Part -------------- 21.(C) Rebel disarmament will look easy compared to standing up mixed units and completing "socio-economic reinsertion" payments. Mali has, up to this point, been reluctant to arm integrated Tuareg rebels with a history of turning Malian military hardware against their fellow soldiers. Another serious, and perhaps even greater challenge, is disarming the Tuareg and Arab militia units Mali constituted to combat the ADC and Bahanga. There is little chance that many of these fighters are interested in, or would be allowed to, join the Malian army. Nor is it clear that Col. Elhedj Gamou and Col. Abderahmane ould Meydou, the two Malian military officers who led, respectively, Imghad Tuareg and Malian Arab militia units, are keen on disbanding what amounts to their private armies of loyal followers. With Bahanga still at large, Mali and Tuareg rebels still have a long way to go before formally declaring an end to the 2006-2009 Tuareg rebellion. MILOVANOVIC