Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAKU900
2009-11-17 13:23:00
SECRET
Embassy Baku
Cable title:
AZERBAIJAN: PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR PREDICTS THAT
how-toVZCZCXRO0311 PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHTRO DE RUEHKB #0900/01 3211323 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 171323Z NOV 09 FM AMEMBASSY BAKU TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2045 INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES PRIORITY RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 3667 RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT PRIORITY 0729 RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 0119 RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY 0092 RUEHDE/IRAN RPO DUBAI PRIORITY RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 000900
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EB/ESC, EUR/CARC
DEPT FOR EB/ESC, EUR/CARC
DEPT FOR S/EEE AMB MORNINGSTAR AND DSTEIN
DEPT FOR EB/ESC DAS DOUG HENGEL
DEPT FOR S/CT FOR GROBERTSON, DKURSCH, CLARKS
DOE FOR LEKIMOFF, MBURPOE, AND DGOTTFRIED
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2019
TAGS: PREL ENRG AJ RU TX KZ IR
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN: PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR PREDICTS THAT
TENSIONS OVER THE IRANIAN DRILLING RIG WILL ESCALATE
REF: A. BAKU 877
B. BAKU 866
C. BAKU 818
BAKU 00000900 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Charge Donald Lu
Reasons 1.4 (B,D, E)
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 000900
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EB/ESC, EUR/CARC
DEPT FOR EB/ESC, EUR/CARC
DEPT FOR S/EEE AMB MORNINGSTAR AND DSTEIN
DEPT FOR EB/ESC DAS DOUG HENGEL
DEPT FOR S/CT FOR GROBERTSON, DKURSCH, CLARKS
DOE FOR LEKIMOFF, MBURPOE, AND DGOTTFRIED
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2019
TAGS: PREL ENRG AJ RU TX KZ IR
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN: PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR PREDICTS THAT
TENSIONS OVER THE IRANIAN DRILLING RIG WILL ESCALATE
REF: A. BAKU 877
B. BAKU 866
C. BAKU 818
BAKU 00000900 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Charge Donald Lu
Reasons 1.4 (B,D, E)
1. (S) SUMMARY: Charge, Naval Attache, and Regional Energy
Officer met on 16 November with Ali Asadov, senior energy
advisor to President Aliyev, to discuss recent movements of
the Iranian Alborz drilling rig into Azerbaijani claimed
territorial waters. Asadov told us that President Aliyev was
aware of the situation, and considered it 'difficult and
complex.' He also told us that Iranian actions had a
'provocative character,' and that the situation will
escalate. Asadov highlighted Iran's continued interest in
Caspian energy resources, and its willingness to militarize
the Caspian Sea to achieve its aims. He believes that Iran
and Russia are taking advantage of the current poor state of
Azerbaijani-Turkish relations and stalled gas transit
discussions to kill prospects for transit of Azerbaijani and
Turkmen gas to international markets. Asadov highlighted
prospects for energy resource flows to stop if there is a
military confrontation. End summary.
'This Tension will Escalate'
--------------
2. (S) Asadov was aware of and concerned about the Alborz
rig situation, but would not confirm the rig's location or
Azerbaijani Caspian boundary claims. Charge Lu shared
releasable information provided by Washington with Asadov, to
which he responded, "This situation is challenging, your
information shows this. This tension will escalate." Asadov
did not outline specific responses the Azerbaijani government
planned to undertake. Rather, like many of our GOAJ
interlocutors, Asadov appears to be gathering information and
weighing Azerbaijani options, in light of superior Iranian
naval strength.
Status Quo Ante No Longer Holds
--------------
3. (S) Asadov described as 'the status quo' an agreement
between Azerbaijan and Iran - in force since 2001 - not to
exploit the resources in this disputed area of the Caspian.
He told us that, in 2001, Azerbaijan attempted to explore the
Alov oil field with BP vessels. (Note: Asadov was then
President Heydar Aliyev's Assistant and witness to the event.
End note.) The GOAJ was dissuaded from further exploration
activities by Iranian vessel and plane activity. Asadov
described Turkish assistance in sending military planes to
Baku for demonstration flights, largely to send a message to
the Iranian regime.
4. (S) Asadov told Charge that after this confrontation, the
GOAJ and Iranian government agreed not to conduct petroleum
exploration and production activities in this disputed area,
until final resolution of Caspian Sea demarcation. Asadov
noted the GOAJ's commitment to avoid militarization of the
Caspian region, which he described as incompatible with
energy activities.
Violation is Provocative
--------------
5. (S) Charge Lu inquired whether the GOAJ regarded the
movement of the Alborz rig as a violation of the existing
agreement. Asadov stated, "Yes, this is a technical
violation like many others, but this one is different because
of its provocative character." Asadov indicated the Iranian
actions were designed to elicit a response from the GOAJ.
BAKU 00000900 002.2 OF 003
Iran was also communicating its continued interest in the
region, and willingness to protect these interests.
Russia and Iran Collude to
Block Region's Energy Exports
--------------
6. (S) Asadov stated that the Iranian incursion "was not
only about Iran, but about our northern neighbor (Russia)."
He told us that Russia was increasing military pressure in
the Caspian Sea, placing obstacles in the path of a possible
Trans-Caspian Pipeline, and preventing Azerbaijan's energy
cooperation with Turkmenistan. He described Russia's goal as
preventing the transport of Azerbaijani and Central Asian gas
to world markets. He noted that of all of the countries in
the region, only Azerbaijan's energy resources were now
exported to world Markets without transiting Russia. Russia,
he declared, blocked Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. He also
described Russia as eager to thwart thawing relations between
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan.
Timing no Accident vis-a-vis Turkey
--------------
7. (S) Asadov outlined his core concern: Iran and Russia
are taking advantage of the current poor state of
Azerbaijani-Turkish relations and stalled gas transit
discussions to kill the prospects for transit of Azerbaijani
and Turkmen gas to international markets. Asadov
underscored, "I believe this moment was chosen with a
purpose," and indicated that Iran was taking advantage of the
current "coldness in relations between us and Turkey." He
noted that Iran did not like Azerbaijan's warm relations with
the U.S. and Israel (Ref C),and its export of energy
resources to the west.
8. (S) Asadov lamented that an 'insignificant gas
misunderstanding between us and Turkey now leads to this.'
He noted that the original ACG and Shah Deniz energy
contracts were signed 15 years ago, when Azerbaijan first
gained its independence. Now, as the country was about ready
to sign a major expansion of Shah Deniz for the project's
second phase, 'someone has interfered.'
Energy Exports at Grave Risk
--------------
9. (S) Asadov explained that the GOAJ would respond
within its capabilities, but lacked the ability to mount a
significant military response. "You know our military
capacity on our borders. We do not have enough capacity. We
need military assistance." He further highlighted that,
"With even the smallest conflict in the region, all energy
activity in the Caspian Sea will be stopped." Asadov
indicated that it was not in Azerbaijan's interests to
escalate the confrontation unnecessarily, stating "you carry
a gun so that others will think twice."
Moving Forward
--------------
10. (S) After discussion of possible areas of cooperation,
Charge and Asadov agreed to several concrete steps:
-- (S) Asadov will brief President Aliyev on information
provided during the meeting, including the releasable
intelligence provided.
-- (S) The USG will continue efforts via its Defense Threat
Reduction Agency (DTRA) program to repair the Astara
Automatic Identification System (AIS) and radar. While this
radar does not cover the sector in question, it will
BAKU 00000900 003.2 OF 003
nonetheless enhance the GOAJ's limited maritime domain
awareness (MDA).
-- (S) Asadov agreed to contact the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs to jumpstart the approval process for the FLOWER
SHORE intelligence relationship proposal, which has been
stalled for several months in the MFA (ref A).
-- (S) Following up on the recent visit to Baku by Vice
Admiral Clingan (ref B),and in light of concern about the
Alborz, Asadov agreed that the GOAJ will draft to USNAVEUR a
letter outlining specific GOAJ assistance requests.
-- (S) Charge described standard international procedures
when a nation's waters have been trespassed for registering a
complaint with the U.N.'s International Maritime Organization
(ref A). Asadov agreed to direct the Azerbaijani Maritime
Administration to work with the Embassy Naval Attache to
provide the GOAJ with additional technical details on this
process, and to explore possible non-military responses to
the situation.
-- (S) Asadov agreed to seek additional technical details on:
any instructions provided to the Navy and/or Coast Guard
regarding Azerbaijan's borders, to clarify whether they are
charged with patrolling to the Astara-Hasangulu line (the
former Soviet Border),or only to the modified median line
proposal under discussion by the Caspian littoral states; any
Azerbaijani names for the block in which the Alborz was
located (commonly referred to as Iranian block 6); and the
role of the Azerbaijani Navy in a situation in which the GOAJ
has until now given the lead to the Coast Guard.
Comment
--------------
11. (S) The strategic picture that Asadov painted was grim:
the strategic encirclement of Azerbaijani and Central Asian
energy resources by Russia and Iran, assisted, wittingly or
unwittingly, by Turkey. According to Asadov's assessment,
Turkey's gas transit dispute with Azerbaijan, hitherto a
commercial issue, has morphed into a broader strategic and
security issue, for Azerbaijan, the EU and U.S. With
Azerbaijan now effectively hemmed in by Turkey on westward
transit of its gas, Asadov also believes that Iran and Russia
are now poised to squelch prospects of Turkmen gas coming
west for the foreseeable future. The Embassy agrees that
escalation of military tensions in the southern Caspian could
serve as a disincentive for further western energy firm
interest in a Trans-Caspian pipeline.
12. (S) This meeting was our first indication of
Presidential engagement on the Alborz rig movement.
Follow-on actions from this meeting should provide us with
some details on how President Aliyev assesses this situation
and if the GOAJ intends to respond beyond its current ship
deployments.
LU
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EB/ESC, EUR/CARC
DEPT FOR EB/ESC, EUR/CARC
DEPT FOR S/EEE AMB MORNINGSTAR AND DSTEIN
DEPT FOR EB/ESC DAS DOUG HENGEL
DEPT FOR S/CT FOR GROBERTSON, DKURSCH, CLARKS
DOE FOR LEKIMOFF, MBURPOE, AND DGOTTFRIED
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2019
TAGS: PREL ENRG AJ RU TX KZ IR
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN: PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR PREDICTS THAT
TENSIONS OVER THE IRANIAN DRILLING RIG WILL ESCALATE
REF: A. BAKU 877
B. BAKU 866
C. BAKU 818
BAKU 00000900 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Charge Donald Lu
Reasons 1.4 (B,D, E)
1. (S) SUMMARY: Charge, Naval Attache, and Regional Energy
Officer met on 16 November with Ali Asadov, senior energy
advisor to President Aliyev, to discuss recent movements of
the Iranian Alborz drilling rig into Azerbaijani claimed
territorial waters. Asadov told us that President Aliyev was
aware of the situation, and considered it 'difficult and
complex.' He also told us that Iranian actions had a
'provocative character,' and that the situation will
escalate. Asadov highlighted Iran's continued interest in
Caspian energy resources, and its willingness to militarize
the Caspian Sea to achieve its aims. He believes that Iran
and Russia are taking advantage of the current poor state of
Azerbaijani-Turkish relations and stalled gas transit
discussions to kill prospects for transit of Azerbaijani and
Turkmen gas to international markets. Asadov highlighted
prospects for energy resource flows to stop if there is a
military confrontation. End summary.
'This Tension will Escalate'
--------------
2. (S) Asadov was aware of and concerned about the Alborz
rig situation, but would not confirm the rig's location or
Azerbaijani Caspian boundary claims. Charge Lu shared
releasable information provided by Washington with Asadov, to
which he responded, "This situation is challenging, your
information shows this. This tension will escalate." Asadov
did not outline specific responses the Azerbaijani government
planned to undertake. Rather, like many of our GOAJ
interlocutors, Asadov appears to be gathering information and
weighing Azerbaijani options, in light of superior Iranian
naval strength.
Status Quo Ante No Longer Holds
--------------
3. (S) Asadov described as 'the status quo' an agreement
between Azerbaijan and Iran - in force since 2001 - not to
exploit the resources in this disputed area of the Caspian.
He told us that, in 2001, Azerbaijan attempted to explore the
Alov oil field with BP vessels. (Note: Asadov was then
President Heydar Aliyev's Assistant and witness to the event.
End note.) The GOAJ was dissuaded from further exploration
activities by Iranian vessel and plane activity. Asadov
described Turkish assistance in sending military planes to
Baku for demonstration flights, largely to send a message to
the Iranian regime.
4. (S) Asadov told Charge that after this confrontation, the
GOAJ and Iranian government agreed not to conduct petroleum
exploration and production activities in this disputed area,
until final resolution of Caspian Sea demarcation. Asadov
noted the GOAJ's commitment to avoid militarization of the
Caspian region, which he described as incompatible with
energy activities.
Violation is Provocative
--------------
5. (S) Charge Lu inquired whether the GOAJ regarded the
movement of the Alborz rig as a violation of the existing
agreement. Asadov stated, "Yes, this is a technical
violation like many others, but this one is different because
of its provocative character." Asadov indicated the Iranian
actions were designed to elicit a response from the GOAJ.
BAKU 00000900 002.2 OF 003
Iran was also communicating its continued interest in the
region, and willingness to protect these interests.
Russia and Iran Collude to
Block Region's Energy Exports
--------------
6. (S) Asadov stated that the Iranian incursion "was not
only about Iran, but about our northern neighbor (Russia)."
He told us that Russia was increasing military pressure in
the Caspian Sea, placing obstacles in the path of a possible
Trans-Caspian Pipeline, and preventing Azerbaijan's energy
cooperation with Turkmenistan. He described Russia's goal as
preventing the transport of Azerbaijani and Central Asian gas
to world markets. He noted that of all of the countries in
the region, only Azerbaijan's energy resources were now
exported to world Markets without transiting Russia. Russia,
he declared, blocked Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. He also
described Russia as eager to thwart thawing relations between
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan.
Timing no Accident vis-a-vis Turkey
--------------
7. (S) Asadov outlined his core concern: Iran and Russia
are taking advantage of the current poor state of
Azerbaijani-Turkish relations and stalled gas transit
discussions to kill the prospects for transit of Azerbaijani
and Turkmen gas to international markets. Asadov
underscored, "I believe this moment was chosen with a
purpose," and indicated that Iran was taking advantage of the
current "coldness in relations between us and Turkey." He
noted that Iran did not like Azerbaijan's warm relations with
the U.S. and Israel (Ref C),and its export of energy
resources to the west.
8. (S) Asadov lamented that an 'insignificant gas
misunderstanding between us and Turkey now leads to this.'
He noted that the original ACG and Shah Deniz energy
contracts were signed 15 years ago, when Azerbaijan first
gained its independence. Now, as the country was about ready
to sign a major expansion of Shah Deniz for the project's
second phase, 'someone has interfered.'
Energy Exports at Grave Risk
--------------
9. (S) Asadov explained that the GOAJ would respond
within its capabilities, but lacked the ability to mount a
significant military response. "You know our military
capacity on our borders. We do not have enough capacity. We
need military assistance." He further highlighted that,
"With even the smallest conflict in the region, all energy
activity in the Caspian Sea will be stopped." Asadov
indicated that it was not in Azerbaijan's interests to
escalate the confrontation unnecessarily, stating "you carry
a gun so that others will think twice."
Moving Forward
--------------
10. (S) After discussion of possible areas of cooperation,
Charge and Asadov agreed to several concrete steps:
-- (S) Asadov will brief President Aliyev on information
provided during the meeting, including the releasable
intelligence provided.
-- (S) The USG will continue efforts via its Defense Threat
Reduction Agency (DTRA) program to repair the Astara
Automatic Identification System (AIS) and radar. While this
radar does not cover the sector in question, it will
BAKU 00000900 003.2 OF 003
nonetheless enhance the GOAJ's limited maritime domain
awareness (MDA).
-- (S) Asadov agreed to contact the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs to jumpstart the approval process for the FLOWER
SHORE intelligence relationship proposal, which has been
stalled for several months in the MFA (ref A).
-- (S) Following up on the recent visit to Baku by Vice
Admiral Clingan (ref B),and in light of concern about the
Alborz, Asadov agreed that the GOAJ will draft to USNAVEUR a
letter outlining specific GOAJ assistance requests.
-- (S) Charge described standard international procedures
when a nation's waters have been trespassed for registering a
complaint with the U.N.'s International Maritime Organization
(ref A). Asadov agreed to direct the Azerbaijani Maritime
Administration to work with the Embassy Naval Attache to
provide the GOAJ with additional technical details on this
process, and to explore possible non-military responses to
the situation.
-- (S) Asadov agreed to seek additional technical details on:
any instructions provided to the Navy and/or Coast Guard
regarding Azerbaijan's borders, to clarify whether they are
charged with patrolling to the Astara-Hasangulu line (the
former Soviet Border),or only to the modified median line
proposal under discussion by the Caspian littoral states; any
Azerbaijani names for the block in which the Alborz was
located (commonly referred to as Iranian block 6); and the
role of the Azerbaijani Navy in a situation in which the GOAJ
has until now given the lead to the Coast Guard.
Comment
--------------
11. (S) The strategic picture that Asadov painted was grim:
the strategic encirclement of Azerbaijani and Central Asian
energy resources by Russia and Iran, assisted, wittingly or
unwittingly, by Turkey. According to Asadov's assessment,
Turkey's gas transit dispute with Azerbaijan, hitherto a
commercial issue, has morphed into a broader strategic and
security issue, for Azerbaijan, the EU and U.S. With
Azerbaijan now effectively hemmed in by Turkey on westward
transit of its gas, Asadov also believes that Iran and Russia
are now poised to squelch prospects of Turkmen gas coming
west for the foreseeable future. The Embassy agrees that
escalation of military tensions in the southern Caspian could
serve as a disincentive for further western energy firm
interest in a Trans-Caspian pipeline.
12. (S) This meeting was our first indication of
Presidential engagement on the Alborz rig movement.
Follow-on actions from this meeting should provide us with
some details on how President Aliyev assesses this situation
and if the GOAJ intends to respond beyond its current ship
deployments.
LU