ALBORZ RIG MOVEMENT HIGHLIGHTS NEED TO ACCELERATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 000877 C O R R E C T E D COPY (ADDED NOFORN CAPTION) SIPDIS NOFORN DEPT FOR EUR/CARC DAS KAIDANOW DEPT FOR S/EEE AMB MORNINGSTAR AND DSTEIN DEPT FOR EB/ESC DAS DOUG HENGEL DEPT FOR S/CT FOR GROBERTSON, DKURSCH, CLARKS DOE FOR LEKIMOFF, MBURPOE, AND DGOTTFRIED E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2019 TAGS: ENRG EPET ECON PREL TU AJ SUBJECT: ALBORZ RIG MOVEMENT HIGHLIGHTS NEED TO ACCELERATE USNAVEUR ASSISTANCE REF: A. BAKU 866 ¶B. BAKU 860 BAKU 00000877 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Charge Don Lu Reasons 1.4 (B,D, E) ¶1. (S) This cable contains action requests for S/CT, the inter-agency CEIP working group, and USEUCOM/USNAVEUR (Center for Naval Analysis) in paras 8, 12, and 14. Summary -------------- ¶2. (S) The recent move of the Iranian Alborz rig into potentially disputed waters in the Caspian offers a timely opportunity to gain traction on Caspian maritime cooperation with the GOAJ. The Azerbaijani Navy, Coast Guard, and Azerbaijan,s state oil company, SOCAR, all appear eager to accelerate potential maritime cooperation. They recognize their current maritime domain awareness (MDA) capabilities are weak, covering only about 30 percent of the maritime sector claimed by Azerbaijan. From the USG perspective, most immediately concerning is that the GOAJ lacks shore-based visibility on half of the ACG oil fields, the country,s largest, which feed 1 million-plus barrels per day of crude oil into the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline flowing to western markets. USEUCOM USNAVEUR likewise is eager to explore cooperation on maritime and MDA issues (Ref A). Embassy Baku recommends that we move swiftly now to capitalize on current Azerbaijani concerns about the Alborz rig to jointly develop additional Azerbaijani MDA capabilities. Azerbaijani Navy: Standing Request for Assistance on the Alborz Rig -------------- ¶3. (S) The Azerbaijani President,s Office, Navy, and Coast Guard have a standing request for U.S. assistance to follow the movements of the Alborz rig. With Iran,s final deployment of the Alborz, we are in a position to provide timely and relevant information to enhance our security relationship. Embassy Baku has requested authority to share appropriate intelligence information, and hopes this request can be granted in a timely manner. Azerbaijan Lacks Capability to Monitor its Significant Energy Assets -------------- �A;¶4. (S) Azerbaijan has extremely limited maritime domain awareness (MDA) in the Caspian Sea - that is, it can "see" or identify via its limited shore-based radar, AIS, camera, and intelligence systems no more than 30 percent of its claimed maritime sector. The GOAJ,s on-shore radar systems, depending on a number of technical variables, can typically provide 10 to 25 miles of visibility off the coast, but coverage is not continuous along the shoreline. The most important of Azerbaijan,s oil fields are located 75-100 miles off shore, beyond the Azerbaijani,s MDA capability. Single Radar Covers Most Significant Energy Assets -------------- -------------- ¶5. (S) A single radar at Jiloy island and industry-controlled radars at each of the oil platforms provide MDA coverage of Azerbaijan,s significant energy assets. This one radar covers the massive Shah Deniz gas field, but only half of the ACG oil fields, which feeds the 1 million bpd westward BTC pipeline. The newly-installed radar is often non-operational because of broken parts, poor communication links, or poor system maintenance. ¶6. (S) The GOAJ can temporarily improve its limited MDA picture by moving vessels into areas to fill gaps, but their ability to sustain this is limited by the small number of BAKU 00000877 002.2 OF 003 capable ships, trained crews, and weak command and control. Poor MDA Increases Maritime and Regional Risks -------------- -- ¶7. (S) Azerbaijan's poor MDA risks unwitting confrontation with Iran, Russia, or other regional actors, as Azerbaijan must physically deploy vessels to potentially disputed waters to ascertain even basic information regarding developments in the maritime sector. Lack of MDA also leaves both the ACG fields and Shah Deniz vulnerable to attack by nations in the region, terrorists, or other non-state actors. Azerbaijan understands that both Russia and Iran regularly violate their claimed sector, but can do very little about it. USNAVEUR Offered Cooperation -------------- ¶8. (S) USNAVEUR has expressed strong interest in cooperation with Azerbaijan, including MDA enhancement and development of a country action plan. In light of recent developments, Embassy Baku would urge the acceleration of these cooperation efforts, which we are standing by to support. ¶9. (S/NF) In the meantime, Post will use the current episode as an opportunity to intensify efforts at senior levels to advocate for MFA approval of the FLOWERSHORE project proposal, which aims to deepen the intelligence relationship with Azerbaijan. Build on Existing Programs -------------- ¶10. (S) Post notes that a significant portion of Azerbaijan,s existing MDA capabilities have been installed under the auspices of the DOD,s Defense Threat Reduction Agency program (DTRA) and the State Department,s Export and Border Security program (EXBS). DTRA has operated in Azerbaijan since 2004 and plans to wrap up its programs in ¶2011. However, DTRA goals, program funding, and infrastructure projects are explicitly tied to its Weapons of Mass Destruction/Proliferation Prevention Initiative (WMD/PPI) mandate, and do not/not address energy infrastructure protection goals. Likewise, EXBS has operated in Azerbaijan since 1999, installing vessel and shore-based navigation and radar systems primarily for the Coast Guard. Again, programs were not oriented to addressing energy security specifically. In sum, the current infrastructure provides an MDA foundation to build on, but in no respects can be considered to have holistically addressed energy infrastructure protection in Azerbaijan. Accelerate NAVEUR Caspian MDA Study -------------- ¶11. (S) Azerbaijan,s current MDA capabilities include legacy systems from the Soviet era, systems installed by DTRA and other U.S. assistance programs, and systems installed by other international partners. Unfortunately, the USG does not yet have a clear, integrated picture of Azerbaijani MDA, and hence, the scope of our assistance task moving forward. ¶12. (S) To address our knowledge gaps, USNAVEUR has commissioned the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) to study existing GOAJ MDA capabilities, and outline a path forward. However, this project may not have a timeline suitable to Post,s needs. In light of Iranian actions, and the need to accelerate MDA cooperation with Azerbaijan, we strongly recommend and request that USNAVEUR accelerate this study. Azerbaijanis Concerned with Underwater Sabotage of Energy Installations -------------- ¶13. (S/NF) The GOAJ remains deeply concerned with potential BAKU 00000877 003.2 OF 003 underwater sabotage of its energy facilities. Naval Attache notes that the USSR developed and fostered significant underwater sabotage capabilities at a special operations center in Baku. Soviet capabilities were actively matched by Iranian efforts, in a type of low-intensity conflict which persisted for many years. There is evidence to suggest that both Russia and Iran maintain these capabilities. Therefore, DAO,s best assessment is that the GOAJ,s deep concern about underwater sabotage of its energy facilities is not misplaced. MDA Cooperation Supports CEIP Goals -------------- ¶14. (C) Embassy Baku also requests CSG and CEIP interagency support for accelerating maritime cooperation and NAVEUR Caspian MDA Study. We would note that collaboration on MDA projects broadly advances the goals of the CSG's Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection (CEIP) program. The Caspian Sea sector where the Alborz rig has been located currently has no energy infrastructure, but assisting the GOAJ to develop a robust MDA ability will enhance its ability to control maritime resources, and so enhance energy installation security. Appropriate MDA would provide better maritime visibility to Azerbaijan, and assist the GOAJ to: -- better understand and assess Caspian security developments, including those in potentially disputed waters, -- help to avoid potential unwitting confrontations with neighbors such as Iran, Russia, and Turkmenistan; -- provide better warning of threats from non-state actors, and -- learn about and potentially forestall threats to existing Azerbaijani energy infrastructure. ¶15. (C) Post also would note that security flare-ups significantly contribute to delays in the commercial development of energy infrastructure. For example, after the 2001 military confrontation between Azerbaijan and Iran at the disputed Alov field, BP and Statoil withdrew from exploration efforts. Eight years later, the Alov field is no closer to development. Comment -------------- ¶16. (S) Swift and timely collaboration on MDA is an important tool to improve Azerbaijan's ability to manage its maritime resources. A longer term solution involves states in the region resolving their Caspian Sea delimitation issues through a negotiated settlement. However, we have little input or influence over this process. Crucially, accelerating MDA collaboration is one step we can take now on a bilateral basis to improve energy security. LU