AZERBAIJAN: FOREIGN MINISTER EXPLAINS RATIONALE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAKU 000848 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/CARC E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2034 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER TU AM AJ SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN: FOREIGN MINISTER EXPLAINS RATIONALE BEHIND LATEST UN RESOLUTION ON NAGORNO-KARABAKH Classified By: Charge Donald Lu, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: EUR DAS Ambassador Tina Kaidanow had a wide-ranging discussion in an introductory meeting with Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov in Baku October 23. Mammadyarov said the negotiations on Nagorno-Karabakh are "so close" to a breakthrough, but lamented Armenian &delaying tactics8 at the latest meeting of Presidents in Chisinau. Mammadyarov maintained that the GOAJ's disquiet with recent statements by Armenian President Sargsian regarding IDPs from NK was the motivation for the new UNGA resolution draft Azerbaijan plans to circulate. DAS Kaidanow pointed out the potentially counter-productive effect of such a resolution and urged the Azerbaijani government to coordinate any resolution with the co-chairs, to prevent a repeat of May 2008 when the three co-chair countries were forced to vote against a similar Azerbaijani resolution. Kaidanow also engaged the Minister on the proposed Train and Equip (TEP) program to support increased Azerbaijani deployments to Afghanistan and sought the Minister's assistance in solving pressing security problems at Mission facilities in Baku. End Summary. N-K, UNGA and Turkey-Armenia -------------- ¶2. (C) Referring to the last meeting of the Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents in Chisinau, Mammadyarov lamented what he characterized as Sargsian's dilatory quibbling on the referendum issue, which he called "a stupidity," and obvious stalling. He told DAS Kaidanow that even Russian President Medvedev became exasperated with Sargsian as the latter fenced with him for two hours on the subject. (Note: Charge recently heard the same from OSCE Personal Representative Andrzej Kasprzyk. End Note.) Between this and the Armenians' re-opening issues on interim status that had long been agreed, it was obvious, said Mammadyarov, that Sargsian wanted no disturbance to the status quo on NK while the Turkey-Armenia issue is the center of attention. Turning to the work of the Minsk Group, Mammadyarov looked forward to consulting with the co-chairs on October 26, but asked that the co-chairs refrain from implying in public that one milestone or another will be reached within a specific timeframe, such as by the end of the year. ¶3. (C) Mammadyarov said he had spent several hours the day before DAS Kaidanow's visit with Turkish FM Davutoglu, who was in Baku for the ministerial meeting of the forum on Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). Mammadyarov reiterated his oft-stated view that the Turkey-Armenia and NK processes might be parallel, but have to move forward together. He said that if Armenia withdrew from five of the seven occupied territories and committed to withdraw from the other two, Azerbaijan would have no objection to the Turkish border opening, and would open "all communications" itself. ¶4. (C) DAS Kaidanow told the Minister that the USG understands Azerbaijan's equities in the Turkey-Armenia normalization process and recognizes that both problems -- NK and Turkey-Armenia -- need to be addressed if the solution to either is to be successful. She added that the United States hoped to increase the frequency of the Presidents' meetings under the auspices of the Minsk Group in order to maintain the momentum of the process. Mammadyarov asked DAS Kaidanow for a readout of her meeting with Sargsian October 21 in Yerevan. DAS Kaidanow said that Sargsian understood the political necessity in Ankara for the perception of forward movement on NK, but she noted that the public rhetoric from Turkey -- at Azerbaijan,s urging ) linking Turkey-Armenia normalization to the NK negotiations was placing pressure on Sargsian to avoid anything that might be construed as &one sided8 Armenian concessions. Mammadyarov, unsympathetic, laughed and said that considering the Armenian President's "background" he was sure Sargsian could find a way to make (the opponents of the protocols) "an offer they can't refuse." ¶5. (C) The Minister confirmed that Azerbaijan is planning to present a draft resolution at the United Nations, but said that unlike the last such attempt, this would only address BAKU 00000848 002 OF 002 &humanitarian concerns.8 He said that he had discussed this matter with the President following DAS Kaidanow's meeting (one hour earlier) with Aliyev. He claimed the impetus for the draft was a position recently taken by Sargsian indicating that Azerbaijani IDPs could only return to NK once final status was determined, which conflicts with international law. He mentioned that he had spoken at length to Russian FM Lavrov about this and warned him that this idea was unacceptable. DAS Kaidanow counseled the Minister that even a narrowly drafted resolution would not help matters in the negotiations; the best thing would be not to submit the resolution at all, but if Azerbaijan was determined to go forward, it should work closely with the co-hair countries to avoid a replay of the May 2008 disaster when all three co-chair countries had no choice but to vote against Baku's draft. Mammadyarov agreed, saying that "we are calculating this very carefully." Train-And-Equip -------------- ¶6. (C) DAS Kaidanow asked the Minister to ensure GOAJ approval for the visit of a EUCOM assessment team in November that would observe Azerbaijani units of the kind that would deploy to Afghanistan and prepare the cost and equipment estimates for a train and equip program. She emphasized the narrow window of opportunity for the visit, and stressed that Azerbaijani acquiescence to the visit would not/not equal assent to participation in TEP. Mammadyarov was upbeat in his response but did not appear acquainted with the details. He said he would follow up with MOD. NEC/Embassy Security -------------- ¶7. (S) DAS Kaidanow raised the issue of Embassy security in the context of counterterrorism, beginning by conveying the Secretary's gratitude for Azerbaijan's assistance in following through with the conviction and sentencing of Hizballah terrorist Ali Mohammed Karaki. DAS Kaidanow and Charge pressed Mammadyarov on the issues of the Ministry of Interior's insistence that the Embassy pay for police protection and the weapons permits for the COM's local-hire bodyguards. The Minister had little to offer on these issues but said he would look into it with the Interior Ministry, and added that he would need to find an "unconventional answer" to the permits issue so as to avoid a precedent other embassies could exploit. When Charge and DAS Kaidanow asked the Minister about the continuing negotiation over the New Embassy Compound, following up on the positive tone the President had established on the issue, Mammadyarov hedged and referred Charge back to Presidential Apparat official Ali Asadov, who has thus far been unable to help the Embassy find a solution. Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) Although the Minister appeared to walk back some of the positive elements of DAS Kaidanow's discussion with President Aliyev, this was still a far more positive meeting than it was expected to be. Mammadyarov, who was accompanied by the entire staff of the Americas Section of MFA, was genuinely friendly and refrained entirely from polemic and complaints, and encouraged DAS Kaidanow to be a "frequent flyer" to Baku. On Afghanistan/TEP and the permits issues, he seemed not to have been well-briefed: for example, on TEP the Embassy had submitted at MFA's request a long dipnote explaining all of the points that the Minister said needed to be clarified to move forward. However, he was positive toward the idea, and his lack of information probably reflects his near-total focus of late on the Turkey-Armenia issue. Embassy followed up immediately to provide the requested information on TEP directly to the Minister's personal office. ¶9. (U) DAS Kaidanow cleared this cable. LU