AZERBAIJAN: PRESIDENT INTENT TO ENFORCE TURKISH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAKU 000829

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CARC, DAS KAIDANOW, AMBASSADOR BRADTKE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV AM TU AJ
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN: PRESIDENT INTENT TO ENFORCE TURKISH
"PROMISES" IN THE WAKE OF PROTOCOLS

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Donald Lu, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. Azerbaijani reaction to the signing of the
Turkey-Armenia protocols has been cagey but restrained. The
interval between the announcement of the "road map" in April
and the ultimate signing of the protocols appears to have
given Aliyev time to overcome his anger at what he still
perceives as a betrayal by Turkey. Baku now appears to be
looking at the issue clinically, with a view to keeping the
pressure on Erdogan to hold out on ratification and the
opening of the border until progress acceptable to Baku is
achieved on Nagorno-Karabakh (NK). A senior advisor to
Aliyev said that the signing was a disappointment and that
Baku sees no evidence of American and EU activism to solve
NK. President Aliyev is now focused on ensuring that Erdogan
- whom he distrusts - is unable to grasp at a minor piece of
good news to justify moving forward, while stepping back from
irrevocable steps while the ratification is still in doubt.
End Summary.


Official Reactions Negative But Measured
--------------



2. (C) Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Novruz Mammadov
told the Charge that Azerbaijan was very disappointed over
the events in Zurich (the protocol signing) and Chisinau (the
Minsk Group organized meeting of the two Presidents).
Mammadov had accompaned Aliyev to Chisinau. He said that the
only reason the Turkey-Armenia process was moving ahead was
EU and American pressure, but he could see no such resolve to
push forward a resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh. "I personally
believe there will be no results. Three Foreign Ministers
went to Zurich. No U.S. Secretary of State has ever visited
Azerbaijan in its 17 years of independence. We want to
maintain our trust in the U.S., but the people of Azerbaijan
are losing this trust," he remarked. He concluded by noting
that Baku is now waiting to see whether the Turkish
Parliament will act.


3. (SBU) As expected, Azerbiajan's Foreign Ministry issued a
negative statement following the October 10 signing. The
statement acknowledged Ankara and Yerevan's right to pursue
their relations as they wish but was very clear that Baku
would regard the opening of the border without an end to
Armenian occupation of its territory as an affront to
Azerbaijani interests that would "eclipse the spirit of
fraternal relations between Azerbiajan and Turkey" and "call
into question the regional peace and security architecture."
While certainly tough, the statement appeared to be
calibrated so as to be clear that there is no rupture yet in
Azerbaijani-Turkish relations.


4. (SBU) President Aliyev took the unusual step of granting a
full-length interview - his first in three years - to the
state television network on the eve of the signing, following
his meetings with Armenian President Sargsian (bilaterally
and with Russian President Medvedev) in Chisinau. Aliyev
characterized the meeting as negative and explained his view
that the normalization should only happen simultaneously with
linkage. In the interview, Aliyev said he "trusted" the
assurances Azerbaijan has extracted from senior Turkish
officials including President Gul, Prime Minister Erdogan,
Foreign Minister Davutoglu and parliamentary speaker Mehmet
Ali Shahin, that Turkey would withhold ratification until the
NK problem is resolved. Without this, he said, Armenia would
adopt even more uncompromising positions in the NK talks.


5. (SBU) Thus far there has been little public unrest and few
demonstrations against Turkish interests, although the public
mood is basically negative toward the protocols. The
ineffectual Karabakh Liberation Organization (KLO) staged a
small protest outside the Turkish Embassy, burning effigies
of Gul, Erdogan and Davutoglu. A few protestors, including
the organization's leader, were arrested and released. The
Embassy refused to accept the written complaints of the
protestors. All local media also gave significant attention
to reports that spectators at the Turkey-Armenia soccer match

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would be forbidden from bringing Azerbaijani flags to the
stadium. In general, the Azerbaijani media, as the
International Crisis Group's Tabib Huseynov notes, choose one
of three explanations for the "betrayal" by Turkey: Ankara's
EU aspirations, Turkish desire to dispense with the genocide
question, or they believe that the rapprochement is a
Western-inspired plan to strip Armenia from Russia's sphere
of influence.


Turkey Responding With Diplomacy, Visits
--------------



6. (C) The GOAJ's carefully crafted public statements citing
the assurances of Turkish leaders together with the local
media's less nuanced presentation of facts have compelled a
Turkish response. In addition to Erdogan and Davutoglu's
public statements following the signing referring to the NK
problem, the Turkish Embassy in Baku issued its own statement
citing Erdogan to the effect that the "border cannot be
re-opened unless the occupied Azerbaijani territories are
released," and saying that the processes have to be
"simultaneous." (Note: The Turkish Embassy referred
separately in its statements to NK and the surrounding
occupied territories. End Note.) Turkey is also pursuing a
new round of diplomacy, with a parliamentary delegation set
to arrive in Baku October 18 (Erdogan received and reassured
Azerbaijani parliamentarians on October 14),and a visit by
Foreign Minister Davutoglu expected October 21-22 for the
BSEC meeting of foreign ministers.


Aliyev Not Buying It
--------------



7. (C) Despite his expressions of "trust" in Turkish
promises, it is clear that when it concerns Erdogan, Aliyev
is going to judge by actions rather than words. Many
observers judge that Aliyev harbors significant personal
doubts about the Turkish government and Erdogan in
particular, and he may believe that Erdogan would grasp at
the thinnest possible evidence of "progress" on NK to justify
moving forward with ratification and opening the border.
This is likely why Aliyev insisted that the Minsk Group
Co-Chairs' characterization of the Chisinau meeting not
include any form of the word.


8. (C) Comment: Azerbaijan's response to the signing of the
Turkey-Armenia protocols so far has been logical and
unsurprising. The lack of emotion in public statements thus
far is reflective of Baku's preference to keep all of its
options open until the last moment - in this case, not to
take a precipitous measure with respect to Turkey while the
fate of the protocols is still in the air. Azerbaijan has
also cleverly couched its statements in terms Turkish leaders
have already used; thus Baku is able to express its views in
terms of its trust in Turkish promises, rather than explicit
demands on Ankara. However, it is early in the process and
it would be reasonable to expect Baku to be less restrained
as the protocols proceed toward a final parliamentary vote.

LU