TEHRAN-BAKU TENSIONS HEAT UP

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAKU 000818



SIPDIS



E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2019

TAGS: PREL, PTER, SNAR, ECON, AJ, IR

SUBJECT: TEHRAN-BAKU TENSIONS HEAT UP



REF: A. BAKU 806

B. BAKU 139

C. BAKU 132

D. 2008 BAKU 1018

E. BAKU 175

F. BAKU 439

G. BAKU 282



Classified By: POLECON CHIEF ROB GARVERICK, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) and (D)



Summary

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1. (S) Azerbaijan's arms-length, frozen-smile political

relationship with Iran has combines firmness on issues of

sovereignty, avoidance of public confrontations, and

reluctance to engage Iran directly on certain "international"

(and some bilateral) issues. While concerned and even

alarmed about these issues, the GOAJ is reluctant to engage

Iran on its nuclear program, support for terrorism, Middle

East troublemaking, etc., because it sees the exercise as

pointless ("they don't care what we think"),and perhaps

leading to further strains in the bilateral relationship,

with potentially nasty repercussions. Azerbaijan's long

standing foreign policy is to maintain balanced and cordial

regional relations, not choosing sides or creating waves

among neighbors.



2. (S) The GOAJ is basically fatalistic about broader

international issues involving Iran, and looks to the West

and Russia to deal with them. It is more assertive with Iran

on bilateral issues, but even there its tendency is to

respond to all but the most egregious perceived pressures

quietly, and without public confrontation. Nonetheless, the

GOAJ acts forcefully when it feels necessary, e.g., in

rolling up massive Iranian influence-building networks in the

1990's, resisting Iranian pressure over its relations with

Israel, and intermittent highly publicized crackdowns on

purportedly "Iran-directed" gangs and plots. This cable

outlines recent bilateral flare-ups in the context of

submerged bilateral tension (Caspian delimitation and energy

aspects are discussed separately, see ref a). End Summary.



GOAJ-Iran October Shocks

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3. (C) Bilateral GOAJ-Iran tensions, never far from the

surface, flared anew in early October 2009, after a series of

unusually harsh attacks on the GOAJ by pro-regime Iranian

media. The attacks appeared immediately after public claims

by the GOAJ that a recently-convicted group of terrorists

were working for Iran, and international speculation about

possible future USG use (with Russia) of the Qabala radar

station to monitor Iran. The spat arose in the aftermath of

increasing Azerbaijani cooperation with Israel, reflected in

the Spring 2009 visit to Baku of Israeli President Peres, and

rumored weapons deals. The Iranian media attacks, which

included claims that the GOAJ is working to break up Iran,

depiction of the Azerbaijani flag upside down and with a star

of David in the center, resulted in a strong GOAJ diplomatic

protest. Whether these incidents signify a new chapter in

relations, or just another passing storm, remains to be seen.





Background

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4. (SBU) Iran made a major economic and political

influence-building effort in Azerbaijan in the early 1990's.

These included subsidizing a pro-Iranian Islamist movement,

active pro-Iran proselytizing by Iranian religious bodies and

NGO fronts, and similar aggressive outreach activities (ref

c). Most Iranian NGOs were expelled and Iranian networks

mopped up in the 1990's by former President Heidar Aliyev,

and Tehran now pursues a lower-profile, longer-term influence

building strategy targeting rural notables and Shiite

villages (see paragraph #). Since the late 1990's bilateral

relations have generally gravitated between mildly surly to

smilingly correct (which is basically the current state).

Azerbaijan's relatively cool, arms-length posture towards

Iran contrasts with its much closer relations with Russia and



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(at least until very recently) Turkey, with whom it

frequently exchanges high-level official visits.



5. (C) Following the return to power of Haidar Aliyev in the

early 1990's, the GOAJ and pro-government media dropped all

previous Pan-Azeri and Pan-Turkish rhetoric. In public, the

GOAJ has virtually ignored the recent domestic turmoil in

Iran and quickly recognized the election of Ahmedinejad to a

new term, and congratulated him. GOAJ comments and criticism

have been limited In private, in Baku to private

conversations, spoken to Embassy personnel and official

visitors at MFA meetings.



6. (C) Despite some recent Iranian media claims, the GOAJ

displays little interest in Iranian Azerbaijani cultural

aspirations and issues (although these are still covered by

Baku opposition media). However, Azerbaijan currently

provides refuge to a small number of largely inactive Iranian

regime opponents, including monarchists and

Iranian-Azerbaijani pan-Turks, autonomists, and separatists

(far more ethnic Azeris live in Iran than Azerbaijan). While

allowing these individuals residency, the GOAJ does not

tolerate overt anti-Iranian activities by them. In addition,

about 2,000 Iranian students are currently studying in Baku,

most from Iranian Azerbaijan. Unlike students in Armenia and

many other countries, these students are not entitled to GOI

loans or subsidies, and some reportedly experience

considerable harassment and red tape when they return to

Iran. Many Iranian students come from well heeled

regime-connected families. Ability to study in the Azeri

language, freer life style, and relatively easy cash-based

admissions policies at many Azerbaijani universities are

cited by Iranian students as key reasons for studying here.



Iran's Influence-Building Efforts...

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7. (S) Iranian influence-building activities inside

Azerbaijan rest on a tripod of "social engagement"

organizations, including an "Iran Assistance Society" that

networks with rural notables and grants micro-loans to their

nominees; the Baku-based Iranian Culture House and its

affiliates, which proselytize and build clerical networks;

and the Iranian Red Crescent society, based in "Iranian

Clinics" in Baku and elsewhere. Important satellite

institutions, such as charitable foundations administered by

Iranians with Revolutionary Guard ties and Iranian-funded

mosques (one led by a son-in-law of the late hard-line head

of the Council of Experts, Ayatollah Meshkini),exist as de

facto sub-sets under these three categories (see refs (b) and

(c) for details).



8. (S) Iranian government and semi-official foundations

(some of which operate businesses in Azerbaijan) provide

material support to some Farsi language schools, and offers

selected village and lower-income Azerbaijani children with

all-expenses paid Iran study scholarships (some reportedly

including stipends for their families),and organize free

pilgrimages to Mashad. Several Iranians with allegedly close

ties to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, Iranian

Intelligence, and/or other regime organizations also run

businesses or maintain investments here (see ref (e) and

septels on Iranian business activities and actors).



...And Propaganda Broadcasts

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9. (C) In addition to these efforts, a nominally private,

pro-regime Iranian television station tied to the

Revolutionary Guard continues to make propagandistic Azeri

language TV broadcasts into the south of Azerbaijan. The

programs include a widely watched Azeri language current

events show that includes gossip and stories embarrassing to

the GOAJ, and often challenges the secular policies of the

government. What to do about these broadcasts is a matter of

debate within the GOAJ: the Ministry of Telecommunications

and other GOAJ elements downplay the issue, while security

personnel reportedly believe that some tangible counteraction

is necessary. Despite grumbling and periodically rumored

GOAJ acquisition of blocking equipment, the Iranian

broadcasts continue. Iran also allegedly uses financial



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inducements to attract/corrupt key GOAJ officials and other

influential Azerbaijanis, and this may be a compounding

factor (ref d).



Baku Visit of President Peres

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10. (SBU) The GOAJ and Azerbaijani political figures and

organizations from across the spectrum expressed deep

resentment over heavy-handed Iranian government efforts to

force the GOAJ to rescind its April, 2009 invitation to

Israeli President Peres to visit Baku (ref (e)). Public anger

was focused on a strong public condemnation of the GOAJ

invitation and implied threats by the Iranian Army Chief of

Staff, which was widely reported in the Iranian and local

press. The Iranian general's implicit threats were followed

by a furious series of demarches, during which the Iranian

Ambassador reportedly threatened the GOAJ with "very, very

grave consequences" if the invitation was not rescinded.



11. (S) In the end, the visit went forward smoothly, and

some modest cooperation agreements were signed. The strong

Iranian reaction may have mitigated against a decision to

open an Azerbaijani Embassy in Tel Aviv (an action long

sought by the Israelis),but has not otherwise deterred

warming Israeli-Azerbaijan relations. In a new development

likely to anger Iran, an Israeli firm known for manufacturing

aircraft drones opened a Baku branch on October 6, amidst

speculation that joint Azerbaijan-Israeli drone production is

planned.



Harsh Iranian Press Attacks

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12. (C) In early October 2009, after a closed trial, an

Azerbaijani court sentenced the group of alleged terrorists

arrested the previous spring, and supposedly connected to

Lebanese Hezbollah plot to bomb the Israeli Embassy in Baku

AND the Qabala radar station in northern Azerbaijan. (FYI:

This was the first time the radar station (and not just the

Embassy) had been publicly named as an intended target of the

gang. The Qabala radar station is currently being used by

Russia to monitor the greater Middle East and Indian Ocean

region, and has been raised by Russia for consideration by

the USG or others as a possible missile defense post. End

FYI). In a public statement the state prosecutor repeated

earlier claims that the entire plot was an operation of the

Iranian Revolutionary Guard.



13. (C) In another development likely to anger Iran, on

October 4 an Israeli military equipment company opened a

branch office in Baku, amidst speculation that joint

Azerbaijani-Israeli aircraft drone production may soon begin.

The opening occurred in the midst of a spate of recent harsh

Iranian press attacks on Azerbaijan, including claims by an

Iranian Press TV journalist that the GOAJ wants to annex

Iranian Azerbaijan, and a depiction by Iranian Sahar TV

(nominally private) of the Azerbaijani flag upside down, and

emblazoned with a star of David.



...Evokes GOAJ Protest

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14. (C) The Iranian media attacks led to a highly unusual

publicized protest by the GOAJ to the Iranian Ambassador and

Foreign Ministry on October 7, in which the GOAJ complained

about "the insulting of Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijani flag."

Comment: The long term significance of the Iranian press

offensive against the GOAJ remains unclear. The recent press

attacks have not yet been echoed by Iranian officials, and it

remains to be seen if these tensions over Israel and other

issues will be papered over by the two sides, or mark the

beginnings of increased tension in relations, in which

Iranian sensitivity over possible USG-Russian use of the

Qabala radar station, and increased GOAJ cooperation with

Israel, are new elements. End Comment.



GOAJ Accusations on Heroin Smuggling

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15. (S) Though relatively unpublicized compared to the above



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issues, GOAJ concern over the skyrocketing of

Iranian-processed heroin and other narcotics in Azerbaijan is

also a potential source of tension. Several senior GOAJ

officials have even privately accused the Iranian government

and/or security services of deliberately "flooding"

Azerbaijan with narcotics in order to undermine its

stability. During a meeting with Ambassador (ref g),Deputy

Foreign Minister Khalafov also asserted that:



-- The Iranian government has repeatedly released convicted

Iranian drug smugglers handed over by the GOAJ under the

terms of a treaty allowing respective nationals to serve out

their terms in their home nation's jails: "in several cases

we have even caught again Iranian drug smugglers that we had

previously handed over to them."



-- Senior Afghan government authorities have told the GOAJ

that Iranian security forces are actively collaborating with

selected groups of Afghan drug smugglers;



-- Interrogations of Iranian smugglers arrested in

Azerbaijan over the past year have elicited claims of active

Iranian security personnel collaboration in transit traffic

and in the operation of heroin processing laboratories in

Tabriz and elsewhere in Iran.



Comment

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16. (S) GOAJ leaders, from President Aliyev on down, have

made it very clear that they consider Iran a major source of

potential instability, and are deeply concerned by its

nuclear program, promotion of terrorism, and similar issues.

At the same time, the GOAJ is highly cognizant of the fact

that Azerbaijan is a small and vulnerable player in a very

tough neighborhood. For this reason, the GOAJ is highly risk

averse when it comes to confrontations with neighbors, even

on many bilateral issues. As a practical matter, this

translates into a desire to stay out of the picture on many

sensitive multilateral issues, while privately encouraging

others to do the heavy lifting. Although the longer

implications of the latest bilateral contretemps with Iran

are unclear, its likely impact in the short term will be to

reinforce this attitude. End Comment.





LU