IRAN: ALLEGED OPPOSITION STRATEGY: DEMONSTRATIONS,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 000745 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2019 TAGS: PGOV ECON ENRG PHUM KISL AJ IZ IR SUBJECT: IRAN: ALLEGED OPPOSITION STRATEGY: DEMONSTRATIONS, WORK SLOWDOWNS, NO GENERAL STRIKE CALL. STATE STEEL SECTOR CHIEF NOTES OUTPUT DECLINES, PURGES OF MOUSSAVI AND EJE'I PEOPLE; OIL REFINERY OUTPUT ALLEGEDLY DECLINING Classified By: PolEcon Counselor Rob Garverick, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (S) A Baku Iran watcher contact with a wide range of energy sector, government, and Mousavi advisor contacts, briefed Iran watcher on his recent trip to Tehran and Isfahan, where he met with Moussavi advisors, influential notables, and key economic figures. He related that current opposition strategies focus on huge Quds day turnouts, work slowdowns, and other tactics, but (in a rethinking since July) do not currently envision calling for a general strike, even if Karroubi and Moussavi are arrested. He also relayed information on steel plant and refinery production declines allegedly caused by work slowdowns as well as general disruption. He met with the Chairman of Iran's biggest steel company, and quoted him as alleging that large numbers of steel sector staff associated with Mousavi and (former Intelligence Minister) Mohseni-Eje'i are being purged, to be replaced with Ahmadinejad loyalists. He also reported that a large delegation was recently sent by the Moussavi camp to Najaf in Iraq, to seek out support from Ayatollah Sistani. End Summary. ¶2. (S) Baku Iran watcher met on September 17 with Vahid, a successful Baku-based international energy sector businessman, originally from Isfahan. Vahid formerly owned a large company in Iran, was President of the Iranian fencing organization, and returns frequently to Iran. He has a very wide network of Iranian contacts, and was the source of the status overview graphic of Iranian refinery expansion submitted by Baku Iran watcher to Washington in November, ¶2008. Vahid was deeply engaged in the Iran Presidential election as a Mousavi supporter, and has kept close tabs on the evolving political situation and opposition thinking since last June. ¶3. (S) Vahid explained that he had returned the previous day from a visit to Tehran and Isfahan, where he held a number of meetings with various political and business contacts, including a Mousavi advisor, Isfahani notables, and the Chairman of the National Iranian Steel Company (NISC). Based on these meetings, he relayed the following political and economic information: Quds Protests, Work Slowdowns/Sabotage, No General Strike -------------- -------------- ¶4. (S) Vahid related that Quds protests are aiming at huge turnouts, targeting especially the cities of Tehran, Tabriz, Isfahan, Qom, and Ahwaz (he mentioned this list twice). His contacts believe that the threat to arrest Mousavi has receded, due to pressure from Grand Ayatollahs. That being said, he asserted confidently that Mousavi and his allies no longer believe that calling for a general strike will be the right tactic if Mousavi and/or Karroubi is arrested, though he claimed that "a very strong reaction" of another type (involving calls for street protests, but including other, unnamed steps) would occur. ¶5. (S) He elaborated that the "general strike" reaction was the original plan in June and July, but has been abandoned because at best it would be hard to sustain for more than one or two weeks, and there is insufficient support among bazaaris. He said that the opposition has recognized that a great many people would suffer, both physically and economically, from organized mass strikes, and that "such bullets can only be fired" if there is a perceived likelihood that they will lead to positive movement. As an example of the risks of a strike, he said that bazaaris have been warned by the government that it has the legal authority to seize shops that are closed in protest, and deploy Basij, Hezballohi, or Sepah members to "sell your goods for you." A somewhat similar situation exists in factories, he added. ¶6. (S) For the above reasons, he claimed, an (initially spontaneous, but now opposition-encouraged) strategy of sabotage and work slowdowns is being pursued, and may be stepped up in future. He said that planning for such job BAKU 00000745 002 OF 003 actions are focusing on refineries, power stations, water works, communications facilities, and customs clearance. These choices reflect the desire to single out industries that deal with the public (thus advertising to all the breadth of support),and to hit pro-regime interest groups where it most hurts. Ahmadinejad Purging State Steel Industry -------------- ¶7. (S) Vahid said that he met in Isfahan last Sunday with his "longtime friend," Mohammed Raja'ei, Chairman of the Mobarakeh Steel company (Iran's largest),and Director of National Iranian Steel Company (NISC). He said that Raja'ei told him that steel production at Mobarakeh has declined by more than twenty-two percent since June, which he attributed to continuing unrest and instability related to post-election protests. He said that Raja'ei also complained that a large purge of experienced staffs is underway, initially targeting suspected Mousavi supporters, but more recently including persons associated with former Intelligence chief Gholam-Hussein Mohsen-Eje'i (with whom Raja'ei is himself reportedly close). ¶8. (S) Vahid added that Raja'ei expressed fear that a plan is being implemented to replace these people with outsiders from with pro-Ahmadinajad people with Hezbollahi and Basij organization ties. (Note: After four years as Intelligence Minister, Mohsen-Eje'i was fired by Ahmadinejad on July 26, ¶2009. Although considered to be (like Ahmadinejad a follower of Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi relations between the two have reportedly become increasingly strained, and Mohsen-Eje'i opposed Ahmedinejad's attempted appointment of Esfandiar Mashei as First Vice President. On August 24, 2007, the new Judiciary chief, Ayatollah Sadegh Larijani, appointed Mohsen-Eje'i as Iran's Prosecutor-General. End Note). Oil Refinery Production Down; Gasoline From Iraq -------------- --- ¶9. (S) Citing Ministry of Oil and Bandar Abbas Refinery sources, Vahid related that oil refinery production has fallen by 15-20 percent since June at Bandar Abbas, Tehran, and Tabriz refineries, with no sign of improvement. He attributed this decline to work slowdowns and general disruption relating to post-election instability. ¶10. (S) Asked about rumors that the Revolutionary Guard/Iranian government has begun pre-positioning large amounts of gasoline obtained from (or via) Iraq against the possibility of a future gasoline embargo, Vahid noted that Iran has considerable unused oil and gasoline storage facilities dating from the time of the Iran-Iraq war, and that these could theoretically be used to pre-position large amounts of gasoline prior to sanctions. (Note: Vahid subsequently contacted Iran watcher to report that he had just checked on this issue with some Ministry of Oil supply and storage officials in Tehran and Kermanshah, and said that these had no knowledge of the rumored large movements of gasoline into Iran from Iraq or elsewhere. He promised to keep checking on this issue. End Note). Seeking Help From Sistani? -------------- ¶11. (S) Vahid also reported that active opposition efforts are underway to obtain a fatwa from Ayatollah Sistani supporting the opposition. He claimed that Mousavi authorized a 14-person delegation to go to Najaf about two weeks ago; some of them may still be there. He did not know whether anyone from this group had been successful in meeting Sistani, or whether any of them are still in Najaf. He said that an idea is being discussed by some Mousavi supporters to launch a "march on Najaf" and/or a the tomb of Ali in Kerbala. If it occurs, Vahid said this would be portrayed as a people's "report to Sistani and Imam Ali" about their repression in Iran. He explained that this would get world exposure, give Iranians access to foreign journalists, and (presumably) create a window for action by Sistani. ¶12. (S) (Comment: Baku watcher has heard a lot of comments BAKU 00000745 003 OF 003 lately from Iranians speculating on the prospects of some kind of pro-opposition intervention by Sistani. These contacts stress his large following in Iran, and claim that a clear pro-opposition signal from Sistani would be a huge blow to Supreme Leader Khameini and Ahmadinejad As a former Iraq watcher, Iran watcher is skeptical that Sistani would actually commit himself publicly in any clear way ) it's usually not his style, and there would likely be significant political repercussions affecting his political image in Iraq. A more possible, but still unlikely scenario, is a public signal from Sistani's Qom representative, Sayeed Shahristani, who has reportedly met with Rafsanjani frequently since June. End Comment. LU