AZERBAIJAN: SUMMER 2009 MOSQUE CLOSURES,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 000738 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/CARC, DRL/IRF E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2019 TAGS: AJ IR KISL PGOV PHUM PREL SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN: SUMMER 2009 MOSQUE CLOSURES, DESTRUCTION, AND OPENINGS REF: A. BAKU 405 ¶B. BAKU 396 BAKU 00000738 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Donald Lu, Reasons 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Through open source reporting and communication with embassy contacts, Post provides a list of specific allegations regarding mosque closures and destruction over the last four months. Much has been made in the press regarding these closures, with some alleging a trend of religious persecution. However, Embassy analysis shows that each mosque was closed for different reasons, including commercial disputes, challenges to property rights and perhaps even broader regional political issues. As such, Embassy is not inclined to link all mosque closings to suggest that the government of Azerbaijan has aimed wholesale to destroy Islamic religious movements. Embassy notes that these issues have come to light while the Abu Bakr mosque, previously one of the most prominent Sunni communities in the country, remains closed after authorities halted religious activities there pursuant to what has been called an on-going investigation following a grenade attack at the mosque on 17 August 2008. Finally, it should be noted that, in the wake of additional mosque closures, the Teza Pir mosque opened with great fanfare on 06 July. This mosque, which has been under renovation for several months, will serve as the headquarters for the Caucasus Muslim Board (CMB). End Summary. GOAJ Cites Property Rights, Safety Concerns -------------- ¶2. (C) On April 26, police destroyed the Prophet Mohammed mosque of the Yasamal District Religious Community, which started construction on the mosque in summer 2005. Details of the destruction of the mosque were transmitted per reftel B, but the issue seems to be one of legal wrangling over property rights vice limitation on religious gathering in the more traditional sense. ¶3. (C) A mosque known as the Oily Rocks mosque, which sat at a working site in the Caspian Sea, was destroyed in mid-June ¶2009. The reason for destruction, according to Zerkalo, an independent, respected Russian-language newspaper with print and online editions, was structural problems. (Note: the Oily Rocks complex is a Soviet era offshore oil and gas structure that is well past its prime. Access to the complex is severely restricted.) Mixed Messages at Turkish Mosques -------------- ¶4. (C) The Sunni Illahiyyat Mosque, near Baku State University, had been rumored to face possible closure in late May due to illegal construction and operation. As of the end of May 2009, embassy sources indicated that the mosque remained open. According to Zerkalo on 16 June 2009, activity at the mosque had been temporarily halted, and the head of the State Committee for Work with Religious Structure (SCWRS),Hidayat Orucuov, said that the mosque would be opened after the receipt of necessary documents. However, when the Embassy sought to confirm the report independently, the mosque was found to be functioning. On 03 September, Poloff and FSN visited the mosque and spoke with the Turkish akhund (cleric) who is heading the mosque and several worshippers. The mosque has remained open throughout the summer, and the Turkish akhund, who returns to Turkey after four years in Azerbaijan, had heard no reports that the government planned to close the mosque. The authorities did, however, destroy the Turkish akhund,s home, which was located next to the mosque. Ostensibly, the house was destroyed because of the government intention to build a road on the ground where the house stood but there was no visible evidence that a road was being constructed. ¶5. (C) The Sunni Shahidlar (Martyrs) Mosque, built with the support of the government of Turkey, is located at the Alley of the Martyrs in a central location in Baku (opposite Parliament) and was closed at the end of April 2009. The official response from the Embassy of Turkey on 28 April 2009 was that the renovation of the mosque had been requested by the authorities and there was no other reason for the BAKU 00000738 002.2 OF 003 closure. On 28 August, as reported by news outlet APA, the religious affairs advisor of the Turkish Embassy in Azerbaijan said that he could not comment on whether or not the mosque would be reopened and deferred to the Azerbaijani authorities, though he added that other Turkish mosques in Azerbiajan were not facing any problems. A representative from the State Committee for Works with Religious Structures (SCWRS) said that the mosque closure might be reconsidered "when the registration of religious communities is completed." The Turkish akhund from the Illihayat mosque worked at the Shahidlar mosque for several years. When asked about why the Shahidlar mosque was closed, he smiled and said in English, "no comment." ¶6. (C) A mosque in the Dalimammadli settlement of the Goranboy District near Ganja, which was rumored to have been destroyed, was said to be under reconstruction by its owner with the intent to re-open following the repairs, according the SCWRS. ¶7. (C) On 26 August, the "Fatmei Zahra" mosque filed a lawsuit against the Surakhaniy District Executive Authority. Located in the Yeni Gunashli settlement in eastern Baku, the mosque is still under construction. The local executive authority stopped the construction and asked the court to issue a verdict ordering the destruction of the mosque, provoking a countersuit by the mosque community. The religious community has claimed that it had all the documents required for the construction. On 01 September, APA reported that a Baku court ruled in favor of the Suraxani Executive Authority and that the incomplete construction of the mosque should be closed. On the same day, Sabayil District Police broke up a protest by the mosque's supporters in front of the Baku city hall. The community appealed directly to President Aliyev. According to Turan news agency on 07 September, the head of the CMB, Sheikh Allahshukur Pashazade said during his Friday sermon on 04 September that he opposed destruction of any mosque and had appealed to "higher authorities" regarding the issue. ¶8. (C) On 26 August, the opposition daily Azadliq reported that the government intended to destroy six additional mosques, and the reason for closure was not because of structural problems but rather because of threat to authorities posed by devout worshippers. In addition to the Fatmei Zahra mosque, the other mosques facing destruction included: Mehdi-Sabhid Azzaman, Imam Rza, Hazrat Ali, and the Illahiyyat (See para 4, above). Post has received no independent verification of Azadliq,s claim, and none of the named mosques have been destroyed. ¶9. (C) Comment: In a number of important respects the tendency toward closures of mosques supports the thesis that the Azerbaijani state apparatus is being deployed against Islamic communities as a means of pre-empting the rise of Islamism as a political challenge. Certainly other indications, such as the government's decision to reduce by two thirds the number of seats available on officially sanctioned charters for Hajj, (ostensibly due to fears of H1N1 flu),and legislative changes that prohibit foreign-trained imams from conducting Islamic rituals, tend to bolster this theory. It is clear enough that the GOAJ is avowedly secular in orientation. ¶10. (C) However, several of the mosque closure cases may plausibly be fueled by non-religious issues. For example, the Turkish Shahidler and Illahiyyat mosques' problems could have been part of a political response to Turkey's initiative to repair relations with Armenia. Also, the Prophet Muhammad and Fatmei Zahra mosques are embroiled in the kinds of property rights disputes with local executive authorities - who often wield more power than the nominally superior Baku city administration - that also routinely plague private businesses. Naturally it is possible that these more prosaic explanations are a cover for a more insidious policy, but this can not be reported conclusively now. The future of the additional mosques cited for destruction in paragraph eight above may serve as a crucial indicator of the government,s true intent. As to the corollary question of whether these cases are contributing to the political viability of radical Islam in Azerbaijan, there does not appear to be any linkage BAKU 00000738 003.2 OF 003 at this point. End comment. LU