SMOOTHER TURKISH DIPLOMACY KEEPS AZERBAIJANIS CALM

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAKU 000697 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/CARC, EUR/SE, DAS KAIDANOW E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2019 TAGS: PREL TU AM AJ SUBJECT: SMOOTHER TURKISH DIPLOMACY KEEPS AZERBAIJANIS CALM ON TURKEY-ARMENIA RECONCILIATION REF: A. BAKU 690 ¶B. BAKU 158 ¶C. BAKU 254 ¶D. BAKU 258 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Donald Lu, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ). ¶1. (C) Summary: Official Baku's reaction to the August 31 joint announcement by Turkey, Armenia and Switzerland on the next steps in the normalization process has been unexpectedly restrained (reftel A),particularly compared to their ferocious reaction to similar developments in March and April. Turkey appears to have done a much better job preparing the diplomatic ground this time, and its efforts appear to have paid off. However, there should be little doubt that for Baku, a border opening that is not accompanied by serious steps forward on Karabakh is anathema, and that Azerbaijan expects the GOT to respect this redline as the protocols advance toward parliamentary ratification. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Poloff met September 2 with a counterpart at the Turkish Embassy in Baku who was present at the recent meeting between Turkish Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs Sinirlioglu, Azerbaijani FM Mammadyarov and Deputy FM Araz Azimov. Sinirlioglu had arrived in Baku August 29 for a round of meetings intended to head off an exaggerated Azerbaijani response. The meeting went well, and Mammadyarov and Azimov focused most on the details of the protocols, confirming their understanding of the process and trying to pin down Turkey's timeline. ¶3. (C) Mammadyarov also pointed to several differences in Turkey's approach this time that pleased the GOAJ. He assessed PM Erdogan's phone call to Aliyev positively, and also praised FM Davutoglu. "In Eastern countries, personal relationships are very important," the Turkish poloff noted, relaying Mammadyarov's opinion that "(former FM Ali) Babacan did not take this factor sufficiently into account." ¶4. (C) Mammadyarov and Sinirlioglu also discussed two upcoming opportunities for senior Turkish visitors to Azerbaijan to demonstrate that Turkey's process with Armenia does not come at Azerbaijan's expense: Deputy PM Cicek will attend the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) meetings in Baku on September 18, and Speaker of Parliament Mehmet Ali Shahin will attend a conference of parliamentarians from Turkic-speaking countries in Azerbaijan September 28-29. ¶5. (C) Comment: Clearly Ankara took some lessons from the near-breakdown in relations that accompanied the announcement in April. At that time Erdogan's belated and (from Aliyev's point of view - reftels B-D) perfunctory approaches to President Aliyev and Babacan's apparent failure to reassure anyone in Baku provoked a testy Azerbaijani response that seriously complicated matters for Ankara. Azerbaijan's more confident, less confrontational response to the August 31 announcement seems to reflect a higher level of trust in the GOT's assurances that the protocols' ratification will go along with progress on Karabakh. This may be attributable to Turkey's more comprehensive diplomacy this time around. While there is no reason to believe that Azerbaijan has abandoned the redline that it would consider anathema an opening of the border without serious moves on N-K, Turkey's extra efforts to reassure its longtime ally clearly haven't hurt. LU