C O N F I D E N T I A L BAKU 000680

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CARC, OSD FOR DMELLEBY, USNATO FOR HEVANS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS MARR AJ GE TX
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN: GERMAN MOD COMMENTS CLOSE OFF AWACS
ISSUE

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Donald Lu, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).


1. (C) Summary. Local media gave top billing August 28 to
reporting Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan's apparent refusal to
allow Konya (Turkey)-based NATO AWACS aircraft to overfly
their territory en route to their NATO missions over
Afghanistan. The news broke through a statement by a German
MOD spokesman, Thomas Raabe, in Suddeutsche Zeitung that
"uncooperative allies" had refused permission and therefore
the deployment that the Bundestag had specifically authorized
to support the mission had to be recalled. In the local
context the reports are unusual, because there has been very
little effort by any Allied mission to push the issue here,
and there was no confirmation of an outright refusal.
However, it was clear from the outset that the GOAJ was
apprehensive about the idea because of its lack of knowledge
of the capabilities of the E-3 aircraft, and more importantly
the optics of the issue vis--vis Russia and Iran. GOAJ
reaction to the media attention has been indirect. The
Embassy is monitoring whether this latest controversy is
likely to invite scrutiny of existing blanket U.S. overflight
arrangements. End Summary.



2. (C) Raabe's statement blaming Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan
for the recall of the German assets from Konya ran in
Suddeutsche Zeitung August 26. Responses from GOAJ
ministries have been minimal. MOD denied any knowledge of
the issue and referred questioners to MFA. MFA spokesman
Elkhan Polukhov avoided the issue, noted Azerbaijan's recent
doubling of its military contingent in Afghanistan and
reiterated Azerbaijan's commitment to cooperate in
peacekeeping efforts. The German Embassy also denied any
knowledge of the issue. (Comment: The German Embassy's denial
of knowledge is credible. The German mission is small and
disengaged on most issues. End Note.)


3. (C) In fact, there was little diplomatic effort in Baku on
the issue to supplement whatever discussions were going on in
Brussels. Apart frm the brief visit of the SYG's Special
Representtive to the Caucasus and Central Asia Bob Simmons
on 24 July and an earlier, discreet mention by Charge to
presidential adviser Novruz Mammedov on July 17, both of
which were inconclusive, we know of no other concerted
efforts or formal requests that would have drawn a definitive
reply from the GOAJ.


4. (C) The public commentary by Germany is likely to make
this issue very difficult to recover. Local press speculated
that the government's refusal - which media reports all took
as a given - was due to Russian pressure. The GOAJ was
clearly sensitive to this issue, as the unusual downplaying
of Simmons' visit attests (no NATO embassies were briefed or
participated in any aspect of the visit.) Whether or not
Moscow intervened in the issue, the "fact" of Azerbaijan's
refusal is public knowledge and a chip Baku can try to cash
in with Russia at a later time. Also, even as Baku discussed
the issue in good faith with Simmons, they were unlikely to
take the plunge unless they knew the Turkmen were about to do
the same.


5. (C) Comment. Regardless of whether Azerbaijan refused
outright NATO's requests for AWACS overflight, the German MOD
comments have created that fact on the ground in Baku.
Existing U.S. gas-and-go and blanket overflight for transport
aircraft are immensely valuable. Pushing the NATO AWACS issue
further in Azerbaijan raises considerable risk that our
existing arrangements could be called into question.
LU