Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAKU437
2009-06-01 08:20:00
SECRET
Embassy Baku
Cable title:  

IRAN/AZERBAIJAN: GOAJ INCENSED BY IRANIAN PRESSURE

Tags:  PREL PTER IS IR AJ 
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FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
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INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0062
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RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 000437 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2019
TAGS: PREL PTER IS IR AJ
SUBJECT: IRAN/AZERBAIJAN: GOAJ INCENSED BY IRANIAN PRESSURE
OVER PLANNED VISIT OF ISRAELI PRESIDENT

REF: A. A) BAKU 132

B. B) BAKU 139

C. C) BAKU 175

D. D) BAKU 282

Classified By: Robert Garverick, Polecon Chief, for Reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d)

Summary
---------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 000437 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2019 TAGS: PREL PTER IS IR AJ SUBJECT: IRAN/AZERBAIJAN: GOAJ INCENSED BY IRANIAN PRESSURE OVER PLANNED VISIT OF ISRAELI PRESIDENT REF: A. A) BAKU 132 ¶B. B) BAKU 139 ¶C. C) BAKU 175 ¶D. D) BAKU 282 Classified By: Robert Garverick, Polecon Chief, for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) The GOAJ, as well as a large number of political figures and organizations from across the political spectrum, has expressed deep resentment over recent heavy-handed Iranian government efforts to force the GOAJ to rescind its recently extended official invitation to Israeli President Peres to visit Baku. While most anger is focused on a strong condemnatory statement by the Iranian Army Chief of Staff that was widely reported in the local press, the GOAJ has recently informed post that the General's remarks were followed by a furious series of demarches (not yet made public, during which the Iranian Ambassador reportedly threatened the GOAJ with "very, very grave consequences" if the invitation is not rescinded. The GOAJ Foreign Minister and other senior officials have told us that they are incensed by the Iranian pressure, and have no intention of canceling the official - in fact, they say they want it more than ever. This is the latest effort by a neighboring country to strong-arm Azerbaijan, which is fighting craftily to maintain its independence as a secular, modernizing state. GOAJ officials look apprehensively toward an "inevitable" future with a nuclearized Iran on their borders, which they predict will in the short term encourage greater Iranian regional ambitions and adventurism. End Summary. GOAJ Invitation to Israeli President... -------------- ¶2. (SBU) On May 6, during a meeting with Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman in Prague, Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev agreed to invite Israeli President Shimon Peres to make an official visit To Baku, in concert with the latter's planned visits to several Muslim-majority Central Asian republics, expected to occur some time in late June or early July. The joint communique released after the Prague meeting added that President Peres will be received in Baku "at the highest level and with all honors." This will be the first visit of an Israeli President to Azerbaijan, although current Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu visited Baku during the mid-1990's, during his earlier term as Prime Minister. Sp
arks Anger, Condemnation in Tehran -------------- ¶3. (C) On May 19, Iranian Armed Forces Chief of Staff Major General Hassan Firuzabadi strongly criticized Azerbaijan's invitation to Peres during an interview with Iran's ISNA news service. ISNA quoted him as stating that "the Republic of Azerbaijan's invitation to the President of the Zionist regime is insulting to Muslims," and "in contradiction with Azerbaijan's (professed) friendship with Iran." Other press reports claimed that Firuzabadi described the Peres invitation as a "provocation." Firuzabadi's statements were widely reported in the Azerbaijani press, resulting in many angry retorts from Azerbaijani members of Parliament from all parties, as well as from several Azerbaijani NGOs, and local media. Azerbaijani MPs, Press Attack Iranian "Hypocrisy" -------------- --- ¶4. (C) For example, the Azerbaijani news agency Azadlig described Firuzabadi's statement as a "threat against Azerbaijan," while member of Parliament (and head of the Azerbaijani People's Front) Fuad Qahramanli cited Firuzabadi's statement as a reminder that Azerbaijan is threatened by Iranian "fanatics." Another MP, Sabir Rustamanli, attacked Iran's "hypocrisy," noting that "this (Muslim country) embraces and supports (Christian Armenia) against us." Former Azerbaijani Ambassador to Iran Aliyar BAKU 00000437 002 OF 003 Safarli similarly wondered out loud if Iran was consulting Azerbaijan over its close relations with Armenia. Another Azerbaijani MP, Arzu Samadbayli, called for the immediate opening of an Azerbaijani Embassy in Tel Aviv (Note: While Israel has maintained an Embassy in Baku since the early 1990's, Azerbaijan has yet to open a counterpart Embassy in Israel, officially citing "budget limitations." Unofficially, the GOAJ has told us that Iranian sensitivity to such an Embassy opening has also slowed the process. End Note.). Iranian Demarche: "Very Grave Consequences" If Visit Occurs -------------- -------------- ¶5. (S) On May 18, newly-arrived Iranian Ambassador to Azerbaijan Bakir Bahrami presented his credentials to President Aliyev. During a meeting with Staffdel Makovsky-Katz on May 27th, Presidential Office Foreign Relations Division Chief Novruz Mammadov related that Ambassador Bahrami had called on him the previous day to furiously protest the invitation to President Peres. According to Mammadov, Bahrami told him there would "very, very grave consequences" if the GOAJ went forward with this visit. Later the 27th Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov confirmed the harsh Iranian demarche to Ambassador Derse. He told Ambassador Derse that the GOAJ is now more committed than ever to going ahead with the Peres visit, if only to send a message to Iran that it "cannot push Azerbaijan around." ¶6. (S) Mammadyarov revealed that the GOAJ had actually extended the invitation to the Israeli President to visit months ago (well before Prague),but that Israel had refrained from making any announcement. He added that he told Ambassador Bahrami in no uncertain terms that Azerbaijan did not need Tehran's permission before inviting official visitors. Note: information about the above Iranian demarches to the GOAJ has not/not yet been released publicly by either government, and must be held close. End Note. "Revolutionary Guard Flooding Azerbaijan with Narcotics" -------------- -------------- ¶7. (S) During a separate meeting with Staffdel Makovsky-Katz, Presidential apparat Chief-of-Staff Ramiz Mehdiyev railed at Iran's alleged multi-faceted efforts to destabilize Azerbaijan. Among other measures, Mehdiyev claimed to have evidence that Iranian security forces are collaborating with drug traffickers and flooding Azerbaijan with inexpensive narcotics, including heroin. (See reftels (a) (b) and (c) for detailed analysis of Iran's Hezbollah-like influence-building tactics in Azerbaijan; reftel (d) also relates GOAJ accusations concerning Iranian security authorities alleged collaboration in trans-Caucasus drug trafficking). Comment -------------- ¶8. (S) Azerbaijan in many ways can be seen as a brave little country stubbornly attempting to hold on to its independence and chart a secular path in a very tough neighborhood. GOAJ officials are deeply aware of their limited menu of options in repelling perceived Iranian and Russian attempts to turn their country into a satellite state, or an object within a sphere of influence, but have managed to play their cards fairly well up to now. In several recent conversations GOAJ officials have signaled to us that they are very concerned at what a notionally nuclear Iran will mean for this region and their country. Though seemingly resigned to the eventual inevitability of a "nuclear Iran," they express little doubt that in the short term such capability will embolden Iranian adventurism. ¶9. (S) The implications of Ambassador Bahrami's threats and General Bahrami's public statement remains to be seen. Further public Iranian protests (not excluding organized "spontaneous" protest demonstrations in Tehran and elsewhere) are to be expected once the actual date of Peres visit is announced, and during the visit itself. What other concrete actions by Iran, if any, will be revealing. How to handle BAKU 00000437 003 OF 003 this may be the first major foreign policy test of the incoming Iranian President, especially if Ahmedinanjad is not re-elected. DERSE

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