AZERBAIJAN: DAS BRYZA MEETS APPARAT OFFICIALS ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 000329 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/CARC E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV AM AJ TU SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN: DAS BRYZA MEETS APPARAT OFFICIALS ON TURKEY-ARMENIA ISSUE Classified By: AMBASSADOR ANNE DERSE, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) Summary. Following meetings with President Aliyev on April 15, as well as with Foreign Minister Mammadyarov and Minister of National Security Mahmudov (septels),EUR DAS Matthew Bryza and Ambassador Derse met with Presidential Apparat chief Ramiz Mehdiyev and foreign policy counselor Novruz Mammadov to assure them that while the United States is supportive of Turkey-Armenia normalization, it is also prepared to intervene at the highest level to bring about a concomitant breakthrough on Nagorno-Karabakh (NK). Bryza also clarified the intermediary steps between agreement to normalize and an opening of the border, which has been a point of confusion at all levels in the GOAJ. Azerbaijan,s interests are understood and being considered, he said, and Baku should be patient and trusting in ensuing days, particularly through the critical period leading up to April ¶24. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Bryza, accompanied by Ambassador Derse and Poloff, met with Chief of Presidential Apparat Ramiz Mehdiyev and presidential counselor Novruz Mammadov (Note: Mammadov was present at the meeting with Mehdiyev, as was political-social policy advisor Ali Hasanov. DAS Bryza met Mammadov separately in his office immediately after the meeting with Mehdiyev. End Note.) Tough Sell With Mehdiyev -------------- ¶3. (C) Bryza told Mehdiyev that President Obama's readiness to push for a breakthrough on Nagorno-Karabakh as the Turkey-Armenia process moves forward is a unique opportunity to be seized. The President is determined that the Turkey-Armenia process should not break down, but is fully cognizant that NK also has to be addressed, as it is of critical importance to Azerbaijan. Mehdiyev replied that it was the NK issue that needs to be addressed first; that if Armenia withdrew from Azerbaijani territory, there would no longer be a reason for the borders to be closed; and expressed frustration that no pressure - from the United States, Russia, Turkey, or Europe - was being applied to Armenia to free the Azerbaijani lands under occupation. ¶3. (C) Mehdiyev's reply seemed to misconstrue the mechanics of the Turkey-Armenia process. DAS Bryza clarified that the border opening would come later in the process, rather than the beginning, and could take months to implement. Therefore there is a window of time for intense diplomacy at the highest levels to secure a breakthrough on NK that will ensure that Azerbaijan's equities and relationship with Turkey are preserved. To Mehdiyev's argument that NK needs to be considered first, Bryza gently put it to Mehdiyev that in effect, the Turkey-Armenia process is a train that has left the station, and it would not be in Azerbaijan's interest to be seen by the United States, much less Turkey, as the party responsible for derailing it. At the end of the meeting, Mehdiyev said the United States' position was "clear" and warmly expressed satisfaction at the news of President Obama's willingness to engage personally on NK. ¶4. (C) Comment. Mehdiyev is always a tough sell on U.S. policy positions across the board, and is generally reckoned to have a preference for, or at least comfort in, dealing with Russia, although he allows himself blistering criticisms of Moscow when speaking about NK to U.S. interlocutors. At the very least, this meeting served to correct Mehdiyev's misperceptions about how the process is intended to play out, and may also have given him a moment of pause, as he now has to reckon whether his hard-line stance will pay off if it costs Azerbaijan the opportunity for POTUS involvement in the NK process. Pro-US Advisor Also Uncomfortable BAKU 00000329 002 OF 003 -------------- ¶5. (C) Novruz Mammadov's intensity and genuine apprehension were obvious at the beginning of the second meeting. He told Bryza that he feared that one of the consequences of the Turkey-Armenia normalization would be that Azerbaijan's pro-western orientation would be unlikely to last. He noted that President Aliyev had just left for Moscow (Note: His trip was planned in February, and so its original purpose was not linked to the Turkey-Armenia issue. End Note.) Azerbaijan hears a constant refrain from Russia and Iran that the West does nothing for Azerbaijan, and this issue will give them a perfect chance to say "I told you so." The problem is not just a debating point, as "there are circles here, now silent, with very strong links to Russia." If NK is left unsolved in the wake of the Turkey-Armenia deal, Mammadov said, the West will be discredited in Azerbaijan and those circles will have the upper hand. ¶6. (C) Mammadov also warned that the domestic political consequences if the Azerbaijani public perceives that its interests have been sold out by Turkey will be substantial. While accepting the logic of the position outlined by DAS Bryza in the previous meeting with Ramiz Mehdiyev, i.e., that the United States would apply unprecedented levels of diplomatic effort to securing a breakthrough on NK as the Turkey-Armenia process went forward, he fretted that it might not give President Aliyev sufficient political grounding to counsel calm and patience. Mammadov openly worried that the Turkey-Armenia situation was creating an unpredictable atmosphere, and the result would be that Azerbaijan would be like "a small boat, rudderless on a large sea." ¶7. (C) DAS Bryza told Mammadov that the United States understands Azerbaijan's apprehension, and that his mission was to provide assurance to Baku that the NK process would not fall by the wayside as Turkey and Armenia move forward. He underlined that the United States had not forced either Turkey or Armenia into their present negotiations, however the United States supports their efforts and sees the opportunity to use this historic turning point to resolve several issues at once, including NK. He assured Mammadov that the United States government to its highest levels recognizes Azerbaijan's strategic importance. The President, he said, would be in position to drive for the needed breakthrough on NK very soon, provided that the Turkey-Armenia process endures without interference the present politically suspenseful period. Bryza asked Mammadov to trust the United States as a strategic partner. ¶8. (C) Comment. Mammadov took on Bryza's advice but was unconvinced that President Obama, with all the momentous domestic and foreign issues on his agenda, would have the time to engage directly on NK. Mammadov, despite a subsequent outburst in the media that questioned the USG,s commitment to Azerbaijan (septel),is perhaps the most consistently pro-U.S. and pro-Western member of the President's inner circle. His obvious emotional involvement and apprehension about the future tell us clearly that Azerbaijani trepidation and mistrust of the Turkey-Armenia negotiations, and suspicion of the United States' role in bringing them about, is by no means limited to hard-liners and pro-Russian circles within the GOAJ. Under the surface but also easy to detect was Mammadov's apprehension of what the result of all of this will be for him personally and other pro-Western officials if an Armenian-Turkish agreement cements a consensus among elites that Azerbaijan's partnership with the West - perceived to be the driving force between Turkey-Armenia rapprochement - has failed to serve the country's interests. Mammedov had earlier described to us the GOAJ's April 6 National Security Council meeting, at which, he said, he was unanimously "blamed and reproached" by NSC members, with the single exception of President Aliyev (who remained silent) for his consistently pro-Western stance -- when the US had proven by its stance on Section 907, Jackson Vannick and MCC, and now, its support for Turkey-Armenia reconciliation delinked from NK,that BAKU 00000329 003 OF 003 "Azerbaijan is nothing for the US." End comment. DERSE