AZERBAIJAN: DEFMIN SIGNALS TEP INTEREST TO CG

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAKU 000326 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/CARC DEFENSE FOR OUSD(P) DMELLEBY EUCOM PLEASE PASS TO USAREUR E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV AM AJ RU IR GE NATO MARR SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN: DEFMIN SIGNALS TEP INTEREST TO CG USAREUR REF: A. A) BAKU 229 ¶B. B) BAKU 266 ¶C. C) STATE 31102 Classified By: AMBASSADOR ANNE DERSE, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) Summary. On April 17, Commander, USAREUR General Carter Ham met with Azerbaijani Minister of Defense General-Colonel Safar Abiyev on the eve of the combined U.S.-Azerbaijan exercise REGIONAL RESPONSE 09 (RR09). During the meeting Abiyev expressed interest in a Train and Equip Program (TEP) for an additional Azerbaijani unit for OEF (reftels). He also provided insights to Gen. Ham on the pace of Russian military reforms as well as his country's evolving approach to NATO. He repeated oft-expressed frustrations with U.S. support to Armenia and legal restrictions on military sales to Azerbaijan, which he said force his army to rely on former Soviet equipment and increase Azerbaijan's dependence on Russia and its allies for supplies. See action request in paragraph 9 below. End Summary. REGIONAL RESPONSE 09 ¶2. (C) Both Gen. Ham and the Minister were enthusiastic about the beginning of RR09, a combined exercise for U.S. forces from the Utah Army National Guard and Azerbaijani army. Abiyev also noted with satisfaction the number of foreign officers and attaches who will be on hand to observe (Note: the GOAJ went to great lengths to secure foreign presence at the exercise to give it the appearance of a multilateral event consistent with the NATO IPAP, rather than a bilateral exercise - ref A. End Note.) He noted that Russia had even been invited to send officers to observe, but had declined, so "now they can't say anything." RUSSIA AND ITS MILITARY ¶3. (C) Abiyev expressed his concerns to Gen. Ham about Russia, from whom "you can expect anything," especially after the war in Georgia. He repeated the claims Azerbaijan has made since January that Russia had supplied some USD 800 million in weaponry to Armenia, and continues to deliver weapons. He warned that Russia, like Iran, wants the United States and its influence out of the South Caucasus. Gen. Ham remarked that since the invasion of Georgia the U.S. mil-to-mil relationship with Russia was frozen, and asked for Abiyev's thoughts on the state of the Russian military. Abiyev replied that he had met with Russian DefMin Serdyukov in late January. There is a great deal of disagreement within the Russian military about the future. Anyone looking at the Russian military should also focus on the other power ministries' armed formations, such as MVD (internal troops) and MChS (Ministry of Emergency Situations troops). Serdyukov told him that the financial crisis had hit the Russian military hard, that MOD had effectively lost 30 percent of his budget "and in a few months, who knows?" AFGHANISTAN AND NATO PERSPECTIVES ¶4. (C) Abiyev told Gen. Ham and the Ambassador that Azerbaijan is willing to do a TEP to train additional forces for Afghanistan but said he wished to avoid the outcome of the last inconclusive discussions on the possibility of establishing a TEP, which resulted in "conditions" that Azerbaijan could not meet (Note: This is an apparent reference to a mistaken GOAJ belief they might have to conduct combat operations in connection with a TEP. GOAJ has stated they wish to conduct only peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan, such as the fixed site security they provided at Haditha Dam in Iraq, not combat operations -- ref B. End Note). Ambassador told Abiyev that President Aliyev had told her that she should work the details with him and the Foreign Minister, and that the FonMin had requested the USG send a representative to Baku who can go over the details, a request we are currently pursuing with Washington. ¶5. (C) Gen. Ham asked Abiyev his opinion on the state of Azerbaijan's relationship with NATO. In beginning the meeting, Abiyev had described the relationship with NATO as one of two key relationships Azerbaijan needs to deepen, the other being its bilateral ties with the U.S. Abiyev said that BAKU 00000326 002 OF 002 Azerbaijan is ready to deepen practical cooperation with the Alliance but is not interested in publicizing its NATO ties as Georgia did, because of the regional reactions that would follow. Azerbaijan's preferred approach is to "talk less, and do more." The Minister said that after Georgia and Ukraine join NATO, which Azerbaijan favors, Azerbaijan would be next in line. BILATERAL COOPERATION AND FMS ¶6. (C) Abiyev also emphasized the theme of "talking less and doing more" as he addressed the bilateral military relationship. His complaint was reducible to frustration partly with offers of support over the years that he regards as unfulfilled, but mostly with the legal restrictions in the United States that prevent Azerbaijan from acquiring the sophisticated weaponry it needs. The United States' lack of ability or will to sell equipment to Azerbaijan increases the latter's reliance on Russia and other ex-Soviet suppliers of equipment, "and this is dangerous." For all the talk of strategic partnership, the Azerbaijani military is operating old Soviet equipment and has "not one bullet" from its American partner. Abiyev noted crossly that a wish list of equipment that he had provided at the USG's request following former Vice-President Cheney's September 2008 visit to Baku had gone essentially unanswered. ¶7. (C) Ambassador, DATT and ODC Chief explained to Abiyev that first of all, the wish list the GOAJ provided (which included several major systems including rocket artillery that could not reasonably be considered defensive in nature), would be difficult to fulfill for any FMS client, legal strictures such as 907 notwithstanding. Ambassador added that ODC had briefed MOD and the defense staff of the Presidential Apparat on the FMS process. Ambassador and Abiyev also agreed that the issue of FMS should be taken up at upcoming bilateral defense consultations in Washington. ¶8. (C) General Ham told Abiyev that he recognized that there are areas of less than full agreement in the military-to-military relationship, but they should not be allowed to overshadow the areas of common interest and the good work done to forward them. "I can disagree with my brother, but he's still my brother," he summarized, adding that Azerbaijan's decision to host the RR09 exercise was a "brave" one and a great step toward deepening cooperation. ¶9. (C) Comment and Action Request: The Minister was clearly pleased that internal GOAJ hurdles had been overcome so RR 09 could go forward as planned. His agreement in principle that an Azerbaijani battalion could be trained specifically "for Afghanistan," which he said reflected his discussion with President Aliyev after ref B demarche, is important, since in the past, the Minister has resisted sending more troops abroad. The next step is for a USG expert to come to Baku to discuss the basics of a TEP (as proposed ref C) with the Defense and Foreign Ministers, as President Aliyev requested. Early June bilateral defense consultations in Washington would be a good opportunity to follow up at lower levels. Please advise when an expert will be available. ¶10. (U) General Ham did not have the opportunity to clear this cable. DERSE