AZERBAIJAN: WHAT FOLLOWS THE RAPPROCHEMENT?

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 000252 NOFORN SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/CARC, DAS BRYZA DEFENSE FOR OUSD(P) DMELLEBY, APIXTON E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2034 TAGS: PREL PGOV TU AM AJ SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN: WHAT FOLLOWS THE RAPPROCHEMENT? REF: A. BAKU 158 ¶B. BAKU 201 ¶C. BAKU 222 Classified By: AMBASSADOR ANNE E. DERSE, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (S/NF) Summary. As Turkey and Armenia head toward a historic reconciliation, official Baku is in shock at what it views as possible major abandonment by its closest cultural and political partner. Foremost in the minds of Azerbaijani leaders is the effect of renewed Turkey-Armenia relations on the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) negotiation process, which they fear implies a major loss of leverage on Yerevan. While shuttle diplomacy by the United States has good prospects for keeping that process alive, GOAJ leaders have made clear that normalization between Turkey and Armenia without concrete action on Nagorno-Karabakh would result in a serious rupture in Azerbaijan-Turkish relations, with implications for United States interests in the Caucasus and beyond. ¶2. (S/NF) Summary continued. Azerbaijan's likely policy shifts in the aftermath of normalization without concurrent progress on NK would affect U.S. Eurasian energy policy goals, would possibly affect Azerbaijan's attitudes toward cooperation with NATO, could tilt Azerbaijan's traditionally balanced foreign policy more in favor of Russia, and over time could change the internal GOAJ dynamic on NK for the worse. The GOAJ has been careful to make clear that the United States would not be the primary target of negative policy changes, but U.S. interests would be at risk from the fallout of Turkey-Azerbaijan rupture or a GOAJ determination that the USG is not a committed partner in finding a solution to NK. End Summary. ¶3. (S/NF) President Aliyev has made no secret to the United States of his dissatisfaction with the trend toward reconciliation between the two countries (Reftel A). Azerbaijan's response to an opening of the border would likely have a domestic component, seeking to limit Turkish influence and undermine Turkish interests in Azerbaijan, as well as a campaign of active measures to influence Turkish domestic politics to the detriment of the AKP. ¶4. (S/NF) Azerbaijan's response at home could include freezing new Turkish capital and businesses out of the Azerbaijani market and a Russian-style legal assault on prominent Turkish investors and companies. Aliyev would also be very likely to curtail more rigorously what he already views as negative religious influences emanating from Turkey, which he has only tolerated up to now as a personal concession to Erdogan (Reftel B). Turkish broadcasting, especially programs depicting women in Muslim headscarves, would be further frozen out and the GOAJ might take tough action to curtail the educational and missionary activities of the Fetullah Gulen movement, despite the organization's network of influential supporters. ¶5. (S/NF) In Turkey, Azerbaijan would likely spend freely to help political opponents of the AKP and sour Turkish public opinion - which Baku believes to be ambivalent at best on the issue - on the Armenian opening. Senior Azerbaijani officials have hinted that Azerbaijan is able and willing to cause political problems for the sitting Turkish government, which it could do most effectively by pursuing an across-the-board effort with overt and clandestine components to deny Erdogan a parliamentary majority for ratification of the agreement. However, it would be out of character for Baku to go so far as to sever ties with Turkey or take any irreversible steps. Energy Consequences - Southern Corridor ¶6. (S/NF) The most obvious manifestation of Azerbaijan's dissatisfaction with an Armenian opening would likely be seen in its energy export policy. The natural gas transit negotiations between Turkey and Azerbaijan are already acrimonious, but the problem has largely been a combination of pricing issues, market access and onward transit, business issues that at least admit of solutions. President Aliyev's bitter remark that after an opening to Armenia, Turkey could BAKU 00000252 002 OF 003 "get gas from its new best friend, Russia" (Reftel A),and Turkey's need to negotiate a new supply deal with Gazprom by 2011 could well mean that after a Turkey-Armenia opening the possibility of establishing a "Southern Corridor" through Turkey for Caspian gas to find its way to European markets would be substantially more problematic. In this case the logic for Azerbaijan to keep its gas in the ground, sell it to Russia, or make a deal to ship its gas to European markets using Russian infrastructure would be stronger than it is today. Press reports allege that such deals are already in the works, although the sources of information are dubious (septel). At the same time, it is implausible that Baku would move to disrupt oil transit through Turkey, as oil exports through the BTC pipeline and corresponding revenue is Azerbaijan,s economic life line. Tensions May Rise on the LOC ¶7. (S/NF) Azerbaijan's general receptiveness to United States shuttle diplomacy aimed at producing a breakthrough on NK as the Turkey-Armenia process continues is a hopeful sign reflecting a pragmatic acceptance of the inevitable and a decision to pursue the best deal possible under the circumstances. However, the GOAJ has signaled serious concerns that the result of even an initialed accord - not yet signed, ratified or implemented - will result in a strong domestic reaction in Azerbaijan and an increasingly intransigent Armenian position in negotiations over NK. If that assessment is correct, it will undoubtedly strengthen the hand of those in Azerbaijan's ruling circles who distrust the Minsk Group process and advocate a more belligerent approach to NK. Increased tensions, as we have seen before, could have destabilizing consequences along the Line of Contact. Turning to Moscow? ¶9. (S/NF) Although the GOAJ deeply resents Russia's support for Armenia, the loss of Turkey as a reliable ally would force Baku to look more to Moscow for support as the country with the most real influence on Yerevan. Moscow's recent behavior elsewhere in the post-Soviet space gives a fair idea of Russia's price for assisting its former possessions, which has possible negative implications for Azerbaijan's level of cooperation in such high-priority areas as OEF logistics. It is also an open question whether Azerbaijan would leave its troops in Afghanistan integrated into Turkish units in the event of a Turkey-Armenia opening. ¶10. (S/NF) While it is unclear that Russia coul deliver the Armenian concessions it would need o cement Azerbaijan's re-orientation toward the Kremlin, Turkey-Armenian normalization without progress on Nagorno-Karabakh will give Russia a new opening and new grist for its argument that the West applies double standards in its relations with Azerbaijan and is not a committed partner. This will further fuel the sharp debate that has been underway in the GOAJ for some time about the extent to which Azerbaijan has seen support from the West on its key national issue in exchange for Azerbaijan's cooperation with the West on security and energy. Azerbaijani Reaction ¶11. (C) Azerbaijan has been active since the GOAJ began to suspect that a Turkey-Armenia deal was at hand. After directly raising concerns with us, (Ref A),Azerbaijan engaged the Turks at the highest levels, using the opportunity afforded by the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) Summit in Teheran March 10-11 for bilateral meetings at the (foreign) ministerial and presidential levels. Foreign Minister Mammadyarov also told the Ambassador on March 13 that he was dispatching his deputy Araz Azimov to Ankara to continue lobbying the GOT (Ref C),and told EUR DAS Bryza on March 26 that Azimov would be sent again to Ankara to ensure the Turks understand "what they'll win and what they'll lose" from premature steps with Armenia. ¶12. (C) In recent conversations with the Foreign Minister and BAKU 00000252 003 OF 003 Turkish interlocutors, it has become apparent that Azerbaijan is preparing itself for an agreement that does not explicitly link N-K to reconciliation, but somehow preserves the leverage of the normalization process on the NK negotiations, with a step in one process followed by a step in the other -- as Foreign Minister Mammadyarov termed it, "inter-binding parallel." A Turkish diplomat described a similar idea, using the same hand motions as the Minister to illustrate it, and suggested that the time lag required for full ratification and implementation of an agreement might preserve leverage on Yerevan. ¶13. (C) The Foreign Minister and others have made clear that they view skeptically the idea that the intermediate steps to implementing the agreement will actually provide much leverage over Yerevan. The FonMin, however, told DAS Bryza that if the right formula could be found to extract enough progress on NK in conjunction with normalization, the result could be a "win-win win" in which "Armenia, Turkey and the US get normalization, Azerbaijan gets a paper sealed (i.e., a signed agreement on the Basic Principles and troop withdrawal from the occupied territories) and Russia will get railroad access to their bases in Armenia." In this scenario, "only Iran loses." Comment ¶13. (S/NF) Baku is seriously alarmed that it will lose important leverage with respect to resolving Nagorno-Karabakh through Turkey-Armenian normalization. The government is pulling out all the stops to ensure we and the Turks know it, and is gauging carefully our response. Many in Azerbaijan are also deeply emotional about Turkish "betrayal." While it would be uncharacteristic of Azerbaijan to let emotion drive matters of hard national interest, on NK, this factor could play a larger and more unpredictable role. Characteristically, the GOAJ is also scrambling to try to turn the (apparently) inevitable to some good effect. ¶14. (S/NF) There are two key risks to US interests in this scenario: the degree to which the GOAJ believes we are willing to "sell out" Azerbaijan on it most critical national issue, which would seriously set back our efforts to maintain existing and secure new GOAJ cooperation on key US interests; and the blowback on our interests from what could be strong negative steps against Turkey. The best course to managing both is sustained, intensified engagement with Azerbaijan, at senior levels, underscoring our commitment to produce results on NK as normalization goes forward -- and to produce the "win-win-win" scenario that the FonMin described. DERSE