AZERBAIJAN: SOCAR: GAZPROM MOU NOT SIGN OF ENERGY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 000246 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL AJ TU TX SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN: SOCAR: GAZPROM MOU NOT SIGN OF ENERGY POLICY SHIFT Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse, reasons 1.4 b,d ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Azerbajian's State Oil Company (SOCAR) has denied reports that its March 27 Memorandum of Understanding with Gazprom implies any change in Azerbaijan's energy policy. Cautioning that these words "must not reach the Turks," a high-level SOCAR executive said that the MOU was primarily meant to galvanize Turkey to end its unwillingness to grant commercially viable access to European markets for Caspian gas. He warned, however, Azerbaijan will continue to explore "all its options" if no progress is made on Turkish transit. SOCAR is looking ito the possibility of purchasing the Tbilisi gas rid from its current owner KazMunaiGas. Despite press reports, SOCAR does not intend to allow Gazprom gas to transit Azerbaijan to Iran, or to sell Iran Azerbaijani gas, as the GOAJ is concerned such gas might be resold to Armenia. At SOCAR's urging, the Shah Deniz Consortium has increased the amount of funding allocated in its 2009 budget for development of the Shah Deniz Phase Two gas project from existing planned levels. END SUMMARY. GAZPROM-SOCAR MOU: NO "THERE" THERE ¶2. (C ) On March 31 EnergyOff met with SOCAR Vice-President for Marketing Elshad Nasirov, to discuss the March 27th Gazprom-SOCAR agreement, possible SOCAR investment in the Tbilisi gas grid, and press accounts of Russian desire to sell gas to Iran (COMMENT: Nasirov the high-level SOCAR official primarily responsible for all gas negotiations, and most recently accompanied SOCAR President Rovnag Abdullayev on his March 27 trip to Moscow, where they met with Gazprom head Alexey Miller). ¶3. (C) Referring to press reports of a March 27 SOCAR-Gazprom Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for launching talks that could result in GOAJ gas export to Russia, SOCAR Vice-President for Marketing Elshad Nasirov said that the USG "should not listen to Gazprom's press office." Despite press analysis of the MOU indicating a possible pro-Russian shift for Baku, Nasirov said "there was no change in Azerbaijan's energy policy." Prefacing his comments by saying that his comments should not make their way to Turkish officials, Nasirov said that SOCAR's primary motivation in signing such an MOU was to "get Turkey moving" (i.e. on providing commercially viable transit for Caspian gas to European markets). Gazprom was also happy with the MOU, since it could use it to claim it has "killed Nabucco." ¶4. (C) Nasirov showed the slightly longer than one page confidential MOU to EnergyOff, saying that it contained "no details, no prices, no gas amounts, no mention of other countries," and that it only "expressed an intention to start discussions on the possibility of gas transit through Russia." The MOU also referred to the possibility of technical inspections of the pipeline between the two countries and to the possibility of holding joint training seminars. Nasirov said a secondary motivation for signing this MOU was to explore the possibility of short-term access to the Russian transportation system for possible gas sales to Bulgaria in 2010. ¶5. (C) Nasirov said that he had met with Shah Deniz (SD) Consortium members BP, StatoilHydro and Total earlier that same day, and they were all "very happy" with the MOU signing, given hopes it might get Turkey to reconsider its position on transit. At SOCAR's prompting, the SD Consortium had increased the funds allocated in its 2009 budget for Shah Deniz Phase Two (SD2) development (NOTE: earlier, the SD Consortium had virtually slashed all but the minimal amount of funds needed for SD2 development funds from its draft 2009 budget, given lack of progress in Turkish transit). ¶6. (C) However, despite claiming that the MOU's main purpose was to prompt an intransigent Turkey into giving access to European markets for Caspian gas, Nasirov warned, as he has before, that if there continued to be no progress on Turkish transit, Azerbaijan would continue to explore "all its options." RUSSIAN-IRAN GAS SALES BAKU 00000246 002 OF 003 ¶7. (C) Nasirov confirmed press accounts that Russia was interested in selling gas to Iran, either transiting it through Azerbaijan to northern Iran or in some way working a swap deal with Azerbaijan whereby Azerbaijan would sell its gas, as Russian gas, to Iran. Nasirov said such a deal was "out of the question" for Azerbaijan due to the possibility of this gas being sent on to Armenia from Iran. However, SOCAR was keeping talks open with Russia in this regard, as it was interested in pursuing the possibility of transit through Russia for Azerbaijani gas. SOCAR AND TBILISI GAS GRID ¶8. (C) Responding to a March 27 press story that SOCAR was a potential buyer for Tbilisi's gas grid, Nasirov said that KazMunaiGas (KMG),the present owner of the grid, had a forty million dollar debt to the Georgian National Gas Corporation (GNGC),"and this was a lot of money for Georgia." As such, GNGC was trying to get KMG to sell its ownership to SOCAR, with SOCAR looking into the possibility. SOCAR already owns part of the Georgian gas grid outside Tbilisi, around Batumi and in eastern Georgia. Although SOCAR realized the prospect might not be commercially attractive, he said that Azerbaijan might be interested in buying the grid for strategic reasons. GULER/NASIROV IN BRUSSELS ¶9. (C) Nasirov spoke with derision about his recent encounter with GOT Energy Minister Guler at an energy seminar in Brussels (COMMENT: Nasirov, like many GOAJ officials, holds Guler in disdain, and as such cannot be counted on for a dispassionate recounting of Guler's utterances. Symptomatic of this disdain, Nasirov delighted in pointing out that in the recent GOT elections, Guler's party lost in Guler's home town. END COMMENT). Nasirov said that he went to the conference at the last minute, without informing Guler, with whom he shared a panel. Nasirov said that Guler "lied" when asked during the panel if Turkey still insisted on a 15 percent off-take clause applied to Nabucco (COMMENT: Turkey has insisted it retain the right to off-take fifteen percent of all gas transiting Turkey). According to Nasirov, Guler said that Turkey no longer insisted on such an option, not disclosing the fact Turkey still sought to impose its option of buying a percentage of all transiting gas at sub-market prices. ¶10. (C) Similarly, Nasirov said Guler "lied" in Brussels when saying that Turkey had submitted its draft Nabucco Inter-governmental Agreement (IGA) to the Nabucco Consortium. The Consortium had already told SOCAR that it was still waiting on the GOT IGA draft. According to Nasirov, in response to a question at the seminar, Guler discounted the possibility of Turkmen gas transiting Azerbaijan, "since Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan can't agree whether the Caspian is a lake or a sea." Nasirov said he corrected Guler on this point during the panel, saying that Azerbaijan had no problems with Turkmenistan on gas, but that the possibility of Turkmen gas going west was being held up by Azerbaijan's and Turkmenistan's inability to access European markets. SD1 ARBITRATION? ¶11. (C) Nasirov said SOCAR had passed a message to GOT PM Erdogan's office concerning the likelihood of the Shah Deniz Phase One (SD1) price negotiations going into arbitration. SOCAR's message was that it would be better for all concerned if both parties (Botas and the Azerbaijan Gas Supply Company, which markets SD1 gas) entered arbitration willingly. Nasirov said SOCAR's goal was to enter arbitration "without being insulted by Turkey" about how arbitration was in some way an affront from Azerbaijan to its "Turkish brother." ¶12. (C) In speaking of the relative likelihoods of TGI, TAP and Nabucco, Nasirov repeated earlier points that the USG and EU should refrain from promoting specific pipeline projects, focusing instead on opening Turkey up for commercially viable transit of Caspian gas. Once such a transit regime is possible, commercial considerations along with geopolitical ones will determine which pipeline gets built. ¶13. (C) COMMENT: Although possible, we think it unlikely that Nasirov is "spinning" the MOU for USG ears, and that BAKU 00000246 003 OF 003 SOCAR involvement with Gazprom is in fact more serious than he lets on. Rather, it seems as if this MOU is further proof that SOCAR continues to seek access European gas markets via Turkey. It is worth noting, however, that although Nasirov characterized the MOU as basically a pressure ploy to get Turkey to change its transit position, he left the door open for the possibility of real increased gas cooperation with Gazprom in the future. In this regard, Nasirov suggested that the USG use any increased discomfort this MOU news generated in Ankara to continue to work to persuade our Turkish allies to grant commercially viable transit. END COMMENT. DERSE