AZERBAIJAN: FOREIGN MINISTER ON LAVROV VISIT,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 000229 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/CARC, DAS BRYZA DEFENSE FOR OUSD(P) DMELLEBY E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2034 TAGS: PREL PGOV AJ IR RU TU AM SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN: FOREIGN MINISTER ON LAVROV VISIT, ARMENIA, GABALA, IRAN, NABUCCO BAKU 00000229 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: AMBASSADOR ANNE DERSE, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (S) Summary: Ambassador Derse met Foreign Minister Mammadyarov March 13, one day after Secretary Clinton called President Aliyev and following a visit to Baku by Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov. Mammadyarov liberally shared his impressions of a correct but not warm Lavrov visit and showed a very constructive attitude to the Minsk Group's most recent formulations. He was neuralgic about recent developments with Iran, including the situation with the Alborz exploration rig. While very upbeat after the Secretary's call, he expressed real concern about what the GOAJ perceives as continuing ambiguities in the U.S. attitude to Baku. He expressed doubts as to the viability of the Nabucco pipeline project, given perceived European indifference. End Summary. Lavrov Visit and a Go-Ahead on Gabala -------------- ¶2. (C) Mammadyarov said the reason for Lavrov's visit was "nervousness" in Moscow after the controversy over alleged transfers of Russian arms to Armenia, Azerbaijan's plans regarding NATO, and "you guys," meaning the United States. "They wanted to check with us before they talk to you," he said, referring to the POTUS-Medvedev meeting planned for the G20 Summit. After Georgia, he said, the Russians feel they need to do something about Nagorno-Karabakh, adding humorously that "you never know if that's good." He added that notwithstanding continuing differences on a variety of issues, Lavrov rated his recent meetings with Secretary Clinton very positively. Mammadyarov also said that energy was not on the agenda with Lavrov, whom he reported saying &Let Gazprom talk to SOCAR.8 ¶3. (C) The Minister emphasized that Azerbaijan has no objection if the United States and Russia wish to negotiate the joint use of the Gabala search radar in the context of missile defense, asking only that Azerbaijan be kept fully apprised of any negotiations. (Note: The GOAJ is deliberately vague about whether the Russian lease on the site will be renewed in 2012. End Note.) Constructive Attitude on Armenia and NK -------------- ¶4. (C) Mammadyarov was adamant that Azerbaijan "is not interfering" in the ongoing Turkey-Armenia reconciliation progress. However, it needs to be made perfectly clear to Yerevan that it must accept the Minsk Group Co-Chairs' proposals. Azerbaijan is willing to define the width of the Lachin corridor and even demarcate it jointly. Lavrov, he said, was in agreement with that much and assured him that Russia tells the Armenians it will "not accept annexation." Russia may not be ready to give its imprimatur to a full N-K solution, Mammadyarov said, but it is ready to go along with the first stage, i.e. troop withdrawals from the first five, and subsequently the other two, occupied Azerbaijani provinces and an opening of "all" communications -- relating the latter point (as he has before) to Russian concerns about supply lines to its troops in Armenia, and underscoring that Azerbaijan is prepared to allow Russia to communicate with Armenia through its territory. Mammadyarov returned to his formulation that this would be a "win-win-win;" i.e. Azerbaijan gets the territories back, Armenia gets "opening of all communications," and Russia gets access to its bases, including the transit of military materiel. ¶5. (C) Mammadyarov added that he had spoken to Turkish Foreign Minister Babacan in Tehran a few days earlier and was sending his deputy, Araz Azimov, to Turkey to discuss discuss progress on NK. ¶6. (C) Asked how he envisions the interplay between Turkey-Armenia reconciliation and the NK negotiations, Mammadyarov said they are not "linked," but rather, "inter-binding parallel processes," in which steps in one process would be accompanied by steps in the other. His BAKU 00000229 002.2 OF 003 commentary indicated that Azerbaijan does not expect a hard linkage between the two but rather expects sequencing and and as much simultaneity as can be achieved as the two processes move forward. Iran: "I'm Going to Start Cursing" -------------- ¶7. (S) Mammadyarov was visibly irritated when talking about his recent travel with the President to Iran for an economic conference. Remarking in passing that he personally dislikes Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki, he predicted that Iran will cling to its position on Caspian delimitation at the next Caspian summit, because its insistence on a 20 percent share irrespective of length of coastline originates in a statement of Supreme Leader Khamanei and therefore cannot be altered except by him. ¶8. (S) Asked by Ambassador about recent Iranian press reports of Iran's deployment of the Alborz exploration rig, the Minister replied, "(i)f you ask me about this I'm going to start cursing." He explained that Mottaki had shown him the coordinates to which the rig was supposedly being moved, and that those are just outside the disputed field (referred to as Alov by the Azerbaijanis) to the south. Mammadyarov said he repeatedly warned the Iranians not to cross into the field. Saying Mottaki had confirmed that Iran would not move into disputed waters, Mammadyarov clearly remains skeptical. If they do make such a move, he said, Azerbaijan has already been thinking of ways to respond. He was not prepared to say how. ESA ¶9. (C) The Minister told the Ambassador and Defense Attache present at the meeting that he had personally withheld GOAJ support for the Exercise Support Agreement (ESA) underpinning the planned April-May bilateral exercise REGIONAL RESPONSE 09 (RR09). He said that the Defense Ministry had been moving forward without adequately considering the political environment and the message a bilateral exercise with the United States would send to Iran and Russia. He sought United States assurance that the exercise could be portrayed as a normal part of Azerbaijan's PfP and IPAP activities, and floated the idea of inviting other countries' representatives to give the exercise a multilateral feel and emphasize its transparency. ¶10. (C) Ambassador and DATT responded positively to the Minister's ideas, but noted that there are distinctions between exercise "participants" and "observers" that would have to be clarified. The Minister did not appear perturbed by the details, and agreed to DATT's offer to request a negotiating team from USEUCOM right away to finalize the ESA, which for logistical reasons had to be signed by the end of the following week. Looking for Definition on US Attitudes -------------- ¶11. (C) The Minister stated that the President had assessed the Secretary's call as "very positive," and underscored how it important it was that this initial outreach had occurred. He noted that the GOAJ is still awaiting signals of how the USG wishes to move forward in its relations with Azerbaijan, revealing continuing uncertainty about U.S. policy toward Azerbaijan going forward. While emphasizing how positive the Secretary's call was, he expressed alarm that as Finance Minister Sharifov had relayed to him, the USG was resisting Azerbaijan's desire to refer to repeal of Section 907 of the FSA in the communiqu from the last meeting of the U.S.-Azerbaijan Economic Partnership Conference, held in November 2008. Noting that every USG Administration since 907 was adopted has been explicitly and publicly in favor of its repeal, ("Madeline Albright wrote letters to the Hill" calling for repeal, he recalled) he asked whether this signaled a fundamental change in USG policy. BAKU 00000229 003.3 OF 003 Energy -------------- ¶12. (C) FM Mammadyarov said the S call to President Aliyev showed a good understanding in DC of &who,s who in the game.8 The Ambassador passed a message from DAS Bryza that he was 'leaning hard' on Turkey this week, to which the FM replied that Turkey was not his only problem: Hungarian President Gyurcsany was in Moscow this week making a deal. Bulgaria, he said, was looking for one bcm/yr from Azerbaijan. ¶13. (C) The FM said these latest signs confirm his idea that Europeans "are not serious about Nabucco" - they cut their support from 250 million Euro to 200 million, and they are more interested in the French-led Mediterranean initiative. He facetiously suggested that "maybe Merkel will interview for a job at Gazprom," because she will lose to Steinmeier. ¶14. (C) Mammadyarov asked about the suggested Caspian energy envoy, curious as to whether it would be an envoy of the Secretary or the President, and underscoring the importance of a Presidential mandate for the envoy to be effective in the region. COMMENT: ¶15. (C) The GOAJ continues to watch with great attention every "signal" from the new Administration to discern what policy directions will emerge with respect to Azerbaijan. The Secretary's call, as we heard from Mammadyarov and others in Baku, was an important first step in establishing personal contact and positive communication with the President, essential to effective engagement in Azerbaijan's top-down system. On energy, it seems as if the FM were suggesting that, in the midst of the financial crisis which renders the high-price Nabucco project more questionable for many involved, Azerbaijan might now be seeking a "capillary" approach, by seeking to reach deals with individual countries (Bulgaria, Rumania, Austria). DERSE