AZERBAIJAN'S ECONOMY: TOO GOOD TO BE TRUE?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 000224 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2018 TAGS: EAGR ECIN ECON EFIN EPET ETRD EINV AJ SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN'S ECONOMY: TOO GOOD TO BE TRUE? REF: A. DOHA 150 ¶B. BAKU 188 Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) SUMMARY: In public February 23 remarks, President Ilham Aliyev lauded Azerbaijan's social development and economic situation with confidence and optimism, claiming that the goals of the 2004-2008 "State Program for Socio-Economic Development of the Regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan" had been exceeded ahead of schedule. The speech was upbeat, but noted there was work yet to be done to turn Azerbaijan into a fully developed nation "in-line with the highest international standards." Not surprisingly, the speech did not mention the potential impact of reduced oil prices and global economic slowing on future progress. meanwhile, pressure is mounting on Azerbaijan's national currency, the manat, which may be headed for devaluation in the near-term. Devaluations in neighboring countries, including Russia and Kazakhstan, and weakened currencies in Turkey, Ukraine, and even Europe have left Azerbaijan's currency unnaturally strong, and rendered the non-oil economy non-competitive. End Summary. GOOD NEWS -------------- ¶2. (U) At a February 23 conference addressing those responsible for implementing the country's social and economic development programs, President Ilham Aliyev announced that the goals of the country's 2004-2008 development plans had been achieved and even exceeded. In addition to general economic improvements, such as increased GDP and per capita income, as well as significant reductions in poverty, Aliyev noted specific successes in infrastructure development and social programs. These successes include the construction of many schools and hospitals, airports, roads, and domestic gas pipelines, specifically in the regions outside of Baku. He also praised projects supporting the agriultural sector, which he said was helping to diverify the economy and contribute to Azerbaijan's fod security. He lauded the country's management of its oil and gas wealth, pointing to the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan's (SOFAZ) participation in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative EITI) and related 2007 UN award as a sign of complete transparency in the country. (NOTE: In February 2009 Azerbaijan became the first country deemed "compliant" by the EITI Board (Ref A). End Note.) ;WORK YET TO DO -------------- ¶3. (C) Aliyev's speech also touched on issues close to USG diplomatic goals. In outlining the next steps for Azerbaijan's overall development, he praised "developed economies" for the "effectiveness of their economy, transparency, democracy, radical reform, technological progress, and education." He stated that Azerbaijan needs to continue its developmental work at a faster pace, using the experience of developed countries as an example. Aliyev noted that the country's vast economic potential lay in reducing dependence on oil and gas through diversification and infrastructure investment. He even noted the development of renewable energy resources as a future objective. He used examples of GOAJ investment in expensive, large-scale construction projects to highlight the government's commitment to development, stating that these projects, and the employment they provided, contributed to the improvement of the real sector. Aliyev further explained that this investment, along with fiscal discipline, income from the oil and gas sector, and political will prevented Azerbaijan from being hit significantly by the global financial crisis. LONG ROAD AHEAD -------------- ¶4. (C) Baku commentators note, however, that weaker oil prices and decreased production coupled with local implications of the global financial crisis are likely to belie Aliyev's rosy vision of Azerbaijan's future. The projected decrease of oil revenues has already begun to impact the budget, particularly planned capital expenditures. Projects already "in the pipeline," including Baku's many real estate/office space construction projects, are slated BAKU 00000224 002 OF 003 for completion, but some previously planned larger infrastructure projects not yet shovel-ready are being reconsidered or put on hold. International analysts note that price levels declined and that real GDP contracted 2.6 percent in January, the first time this has happened in Azerbaijan since the mid-1990s. Analysts speculate that weaker oil prices will continue to affect other industries, namely construction and retail companies throughout 2009. Azerbaijan already maintains a difficult business environment, with formal and informal monopolies and issues of corruption and transparency. To add liquidity issues into the mix would only further exacerbate growth, they say. The government is undecided about the right policy response, with the Finance Minister advocating a conservative policy of fiscal restraint, and the Central bank advocating increased credit. DEVALUATION LOOMING? -------------- ¶5. (C) In the past two weeks there have been signs that Azerbaijan's economic situation is not as strong as Aliyev's speech or GOAJ financial institutions would have observers believe. In late February, the National Bank of Azerbaijan (NBA),the nation's central bank, reduced its refinancing rate to 5 percent and again cut reserve requirements for commercial banks from 6 to 3 percent. Since January, large local enterprises, including steel mills, civil engineering and chemical companies, and the national airline AzAl have announced significant layoffs. Analysts also worry that an economic slowdown in Russia might reduce the remittance payments of the more than 800,000 Azerbaijanis who live and work there. ¶6. (C) Moreover, the GOAJ has also been propping up its national currency, the manat (AZN),spending over 1.5 billion USD to do so in the last two months. Speculation that a devaluation is coming, likely shortly after the March 18 constitutional referendum (Ref B),has caused long lines at automatic teller machines (ATM) throughout Baku. Emboffs have observed longer than normal lines at ATMs for the past three weeks and note that they have had to visit several in one day to find one still with cash. In 2008, the manat actually appreciated against the U.S. dollar, while regional currencies, including Russia's ruble, Ukraine's hryvnya, Turkey's lire and even the Euro, declined in relative value. Kazakhstan's February decision to sharply devalue its tenge made a powerful impression here, as did the dire economic situation in Armenia, which led to a sudden sharp devaluation there earlier this month. ¶7. (C) The GOAJ, according to well-placed sources, is currently considering four options to manage the downward pressure on the AZN, including: a) maintaining the current peg, which despite strong currency reserves (18 billion USD at year end 2008) is not likely to be sustainable given seemingly widespread expectations of a devaluation and significant short-term external debt repayment obligations of the commercial banking system; b) instituting a series of mini-devaluations (roughly the current Russia model),which could further dampen public confidence, and lead to deposit withdrawals; c) implementing one larger publicized devaluation and holding; or d) creating a managed float within an unpublished exchange rate band. USAID has recommended the last course of action -- a managed float-- to the NBA as the most effective and sustainable option available. The NBA is in the process of "stress testing" the various options to determine their differing effects on the banks. It plans to make a policy decision in early April. ADDITIONAL CONCERNS -------------- ¶8. (C) The Ministry of Finance recently announced a new policy to freeze expenditures, with a plan to reduce overall capital expenditures by a surprising 1.5 billion USD. The concern with this approach, financial experts say, is that it may be too conservative. With the reduction in oil exports and prices, the GOAJ will actually need to increase expenditures by at least the 15 percent envisaged in the original 2009 budget, in order to maintain growth in the non-oil sector. Another plan being considered is to infuse state capital into banks for directed major projects in specific sectors. International observers note that this BAKU 00000224 003 OF 003 course of action could fuel currency speculation, aggravate Azerbaijan's corruption and transparency issues, and in fact weaken the long-term financial sustainability of the banking system if misallocated. ¶9. (C) Moreover, the GOAJ lacks a coordinated anti-crisis plan, and the bodies which should be spearheading the initiative have diverging strategies, at best. The Ministry of Finance is staunchly conservative, valuing fiscal sustainability above all, and does not want to get involved in monetary policy issues nor to provide liquid stimulus to the banking sector. The Ministry of Finance is essentially taking a "wait and see" approach, which it feels it can afford based on SOFAZ and NBA currency reserves in excess of 18 billion USD, and internal budget calculations incorporating oil prices at 30 USD per barrel and 700 thousand barrels per day production. The Ministry of Economic Development (MOED),which should be weighing in on macro-economic policies which affect the various business sectors, is curiously silent under its new leadership. Observers opine that the new Minster is more focused on micro-economic indicators, which they believe are more suited to his previous experience in the Ministry of Taxation. This leaves the NBA "holding the bag," trying to balance the responsibilities of fiscal and monetary policies. The NBA is obviously feeling pressure to devalue the manat, which would benefit the small and struggling non-oil sector. It wants to do something to restore public confidence in the banking sector, but understands that this will be difficult without a near-term fiscal and/or financial stimulus plan to jump-start private consumption and investment expenditures. USAID has emphasized to the NBA that, under current conditions, an influx of liquidity to the banking system is likely to leak out in the form of dollar conversion and hoarding, and that in the near-term, moderate fiscal stimulus is critical to restore public confidence and stabilize the non-oil economy. Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) Azerbaijan has thus far avoided most of the storm associated with the global financial crisis, as oil and gas revenues, albeit lower than last summer, continue to infuse dollars into the economy. Moreover, banks here are not fully integrated into the global system, and Azerbaijan has more limited exposure to foreign debt than many other emerging market countries, although the two billion USD in near-term external debt obligations is placing significant liquidity pressure on selected commercial banks. Thus, Azerbaijan's financial situation is not as dire as Ukraine's, Latvia's, or Hungary's. It's not even as vulnerable as Kazakhstan's. The government also, according to the IMF, is committed to taking social protection measures to shield politically sensitive populations from the fallout of an economic slowdown. ¶11. (C) Still, a decrease in social spending and attendant shrinking incomes for average Azerbaijanis, combined with decreased access to credit and corollary decrease in consumption is a formula that could seriously hinder the economic potential of Azerbaijan, as could the fact that despite the President's assertions, there has been no significant support to or development of the non-energy sector, including agriculture. A very strong local currency, meanwhile, has rendered much of the non-energy economy non-competitive, and a system of monopolies has hindered imports of foreign goods, which would now sell at much more competitive prices. Ninety-six percent of exports in the fourth quarter of 2008 were oil and gas, or oil-related products. The NBA and the Ministry of Finance will need to do a more effective job of coordinating fiscal and monetary policy during this crucial period in order to maintain consumer confidence and enable the GOAJ to weather the rough seas ahead. The GOAJ needs to continue to drive ahead on critical structural reforms required to re-accelerate non-oil sector growth as it deals with the current macro/financial turbulence. End Comment. DERSE