Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAKU20
2009-01-13 12:43:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Baku
Cable title:
AZERBAIJAN'S DISCREET SYMBIOSIS WITH ISRAEL
how-toVZCZCXRO5638 PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK DE RUEHKB #0020/01 0131243 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 131243Z JAN 09 FM AMEMBASSY BAKU TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0592 INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0059 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0864 RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1238 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0329 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAKU 000020
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/CARC
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2029
TAGS: PGOV, PRL, PTER, AJ, IS, IR
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN'S DISCREET SYMBIOSIS WITH ISRAEL
REF: A. IIR 6 941 0165 09//USDAO BAKU//061207ZJAN09
(NOTAL)
B. 08 BAKU 1119
C. BAKU 17
Classified By: POL/ECON COUNSELOR ROB GARVERICK, REASONS 1.4 B AND D
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAKU 000020
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/CARC
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2029
TAGS: PGOV, PRL, PTER, AJ, IS, IR
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN'S DISCREET SYMBIOSIS WITH ISRAEL
REF: A. IIR 6 941 0165 09//USDAO BAKU//061207ZJAN09
(NOTAL)
B. 08 BAKU 1119
C. BAKU 17
Classified By: POL/ECON COUNSELOR ROB GARVERICK, REASONS 1.4 B AND D
1.(C) Summary. Azerbaijan,s relations with ISRAEL are
discreet but close. Each country finds it easy to identify
with the other,s geopolitical difficulties and both rank
Iran as an existential security threat. Israel,s
world-class defense industry with its relaxed attitude about
its customer base is a perfect match for Azerbaijan,s
substantial defense needs that are largely left unmet by the
United States, Europe and Russia for various reasons tied to
Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Aptly described by Azerbaijani
President Aliyev as being &like an iceberg, nine-tenths of
it is below the surface,8 this relationship is also marked
by a pragmatic recognition by ISRAEL of Azerbaijan,s
political need to hew publicly and in international forums to
the OIC,s general line. End Summary.
2. (U) This cable is based on Embassy interactions with
Israeli colleagues in Baku and with Azerbaijani MFA officials
whom we have demarched on Israeli issues.
Common Threat, Quiet Cooperation
--------------
3. (C) Much like Israel, Azerbaijan perceives Iran as a
major, even existential security threat, and the two
countries, cooperation flows from this shared recognition.
The (U.S.-born) Israeli Ambassador in Baku, Arthur Lenk,
often conveys his country,s empathy by remarking with dark
humor that if he &had the chance to exchange
neighborhoods, with Azerbaijan, I wouldn,t do it.8 Even
open sources have identified an extensive relationship
between the countries, intelligence services that even
predated the presidency of Heydar Aliyev and it only stands
to reason that this remains a major area of cooperation which
both sides naturally seek to downplay.
4. (C) The Azerbaijani authorities assiduously protect
Israeli interests in Baku. For example, the DCM of the Baku
Embassy told Emboff that the GOAJ had noticeably improved
local security at the Israeli Embassy when the most recent
operations began in Gaza. When authorities got word of a
planned demonstration on January 2, they dispatched buses to
the place where the protesters were preparing to set off for
the Embassy and arrested them on the spot. Police detained
25 of the 150 demonstrators rounded up, and 20 of them were
sentenced to 10 or 15 days, detention. In sharp contrast,
the GOAJ allows demonstrators to picket the Iranian Embassy,
so long as the subject of the protest is the treatment of
Azeris in Iran. In connection with the December 2
demonstration, the Israeli Embassy told us that they &never
even saw8 the demonstrators and made no requests before or
after that anyone be held in custody.
Symbiosis on Weapons
--------------
5. (C) Through its close relations with Israel, Azerbaijan
gets a level of access to the quality weapon systems it needs
to develop its army that it can not obtain from the U.S. and
Europe due to various legal limitations, nor from its
ex-Soviet suppliers, Belarus and Ukraine. Where other
Wastern nations are reluctant to sell ground combat systems
to the Azerbaijanis for fear of encouraging Azerbaijan to
resort to war to regain NK and the occupied territories,
Israel is free to make substantial arms sales and benefits
greatly from deals with its well-heeled client. In September
2008 ) again in a little-publicized affair ) the GOAJ
signed an extensive agreement with the Israeli Defense
Ministry providing for three Israeli companies to provide
mortars, ammunition, rocket artillery and radio equipment.
The company &Soltam8 got the contract to provide mortars
and ammunition, &Tadiran Communications8 will provide radio
gear, and Israeli Military Industries will provide the
rockets. IMI sells a range of rocket artillery and
BAKU 00000020 002 OF 002
accessories ranging from upgrade kits for Soviet vintage
BM-21 &Grad8 122mm systems, guidance packages for
122mm-300mm rockets and launch vehicles for up to 300mm
rockets. It was not clear what exactly the Azerbaijanis
bought, as the deal was simply described as being worth
&hundreds of millions of dollars.8 Azerbaijan already
operates IMI,s 122mm &Lynx8 multiple-launch rocket system,
which it mounts on a KAMAZ 63502 heavy truck.
6. (S/NF) Recent USDAO reporting also indicates that the GOAJ
through its Ministry of Defense Industries has created a
joint venture with an Israeli entity to produce unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs). This venture will have 51 per cent
GOAJ ownership and is distinct from the arrangements reported
in para. 5 above.
The &Iceberg8 - Political Pragmatism
--------------
7.(C) Israeli contacts tell us that President Aliyev aptly
described the bilateral relationship as &an iceberg;
nine-tenths of it is below the surface8 during the May 2008
visit of Agriculture Minister Shalom Simhon. The sentiment
is accurate because Baku balances its cordial relations with
the Jewish state with its perceived responsibilities in to
the OIC. Therefore Azerbaijan does not maintain an embassy
in Israel, it dutifully (although weakly) criticizes Israeli
military operations in the Palestinian territories and
Lebanon, and in international organizations supports the OIC
line and avoids any chance of angering Iran. When Emboff
delivered demarches on the UNGA ISRAEL resolutions recently
(Reftel A),our MFA contact explained that Azerbaijan would
follow the OIC line and that there was &an understanding8
with ISRAEL about Azerbaijan,s voting behavior. Our Israeli
contacts do not use the same word but acknowledge that they
do not attempt to pressure Azerbaijan on these questions.
The relationship also affects U.S. policy insofar as
Azerbaijan tries, often successfully, to convince the U.S.
pro-Israel lobby to advocate on its behalf.
7. (C) The relationship does have its limits; it does not
translate into any preferential treatment for Israeli
investors or capital in Azerbaijan (Note: this hardly sets
Israel apart among countries whose citizens invest here. End
note.) With some humor, the Israeli DCM told us that Israeli
businessmen expressed to her that they prefer corruption in
Kazakhstan to that of Azerbaijan because in Kazakhstan one
can expect to pay exorbitant &fees8 to do business but
those are generally collected at once, up front, whereas in
Azerbaijan the demands for bribes never cease.
Comment
--------------
8. (C) Israel,s relations with Azerbaijan are based strongly
on pragmatism and a keen appreciation of priorities.
Israel,s main goal is to preserve Azerbaijan as an ally
against Iran, a platform for reconnaissance of that country
and as a market for military hardware. In order to ensure
those goals, the Israelis have keenly attuned themselves to
the GOAJ,s needs as an OIC member and a state ) like ISRAEL
) wedged between large, powerful and unfriendly neighbors.
They forgo the option of pressuring the GOAJ on secondary
issues to secure the primary ones. It is apparent to us that
for now both sides are well satisfied with the bilateral
state of affairs.
LU
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/CARC
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2029
TAGS: PGOV, PRL, PTER, AJ, IS, IR
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN'S DISCREET SYMBIOSIS WITH ISRAEL
REF: A. IIR 6 941 0165 09//USDAO BAKU//061207ZJAN09
(NOTAL)
B. 08 BAKU 1119
C. BAKU 17
Classified By: POL/ECON COUNSELOR ROB GARVERICK, REASONS 1.4 B AND D
1.(C) Summary. Azerbaijan,s relations with ISRAEL are
discreet but close. Each country finds it easy to identify
with the other,s geopolitical difficulties and both rank
Iran as an existential security threat. Israel,s
world-class defense industry with its relaxed attitude about
its customer base is a perfect match for Azerbaijan,s
substantial defense needs that are largely left unmet by the
United States, Europe and Russia for various reasons tied to
Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Aptly described by Azerbaijani
President Aliyev as being &like an iceberg, nine-tenths of
it is below the surface,8 this relationship is also marked
by a pragmatic recognition by ISRAEL of Azerbaijan,s
political need to hew publicly and in international forums to
the OIC,s general line. End Summary.
2. (U) This cable is based on Embassy interactions with
Israeli colleagues in Baku and with Azerbaijani MFA officials
whom we have demarched on Israeli issues.
Common Threat, Quiet Cooperation
--------------
3. (C) Much like Israel, Azerbaijan perceives Iran as a
major, even existential security threat, and the two
countries, cooperation flows from this shared recognition.
The (U.S.-born) Israeli Ambassador in Baku, Arthur Lenk,
often conveys his country,s empathy by remarking with dark
humor that if he &had the chance to exchange
neighborhoods, with Azerbaijan, I wouldn,t do it.8 Even
open sources have identified an extensive relationship
between the countries, intelligence services that even
predated the presidency of Heydar Aliyev and it only stands
to reason that this remains a major area of cooperation which
both sides naturally seek to downplay.
4. (C) The Azerbaijani authorities assiduously protect
Israeli interests in Baku. For example, the DCM of the Baku
Embassy told Emboff that the GOAJ had noticeably improved
local security at the Israeli Embassy when the most recent
operations began in Gaza. When authorities got word of a
planned demonstration on January 2, they dispatched buses to
the place where the protesters were preparing to set off for
the Embassy and arrested them on the spot. Police detained
25 of the 150 demonstrators rounded up, and 20 of them were
sentenced to 10 or 15 days, detention. In sharp contrast,
the GOAJ allows demonstrators to picket the Iranian Embassy,
so long as the subject of the protest is the treatment of
Azeris in Iran. In connection with the December 2
demonstration, the Israeli Embassy told us that they &never
even saw8 the demonstrators and made no requests before or
after that anyone be held in custody.
Symbiosis on Weapons
--------------
5. (C) Through its close relations with Israel, Azerbaijan
gets a level of access to the quality weapon systems it needs
to develop its army that it can not obtain from the U.S. and
Europe due to various legal limitations, nor from its
ex-Soviet suppliers, Belarus and Ukraine. Where other
Wastern nations are reluctant to sell ground combat systems
to the Azerbaijanis for fear of encouraging Azerbaijan to
resort to war to regain NK and the occupied territories,
Israel is free to make substantial arms sales and benefits
greatly from deals with its well-heeled client. In September
2008 ) again in a little-publicized affair ) the GOAJ
signed an extensive agreement with the Israeli Defense
Ministry providing for three Israeli companies to provide
mortars, ammunition, rocket artillery and radio equipment.
The company &Soltam8 got the contract to provide mortars
and ammunition, &Tadiran Communications8 will provide radio
gear, and Israeli Military Industries will provide the
rockets. IMI sells a range of rocket artillery and
BAKU 00000020 002 OF 002
accessories ranging from upgrade kits for Soviet vintage
BM-21 &Grad8 122mm systems, guidance packages for
122mm-300mm rockets and launch vehicles for up to 300mm
rockets. It was not clear what exactly the Azerbaijanis
bought, as the deal was simply described as being worth
&hundreds of millions of dollars.8 Azerbaijan already
operates IMI,s 122mm &Lynx8 multiple-launch rocket system,
which it mounts on a KAMAZ 63502 heavy truck.
6. (S/NF) Recent USDAO reporting also indicates that the GOAJ
through its Ministry of Defense Industries has created a
joint venture with an Israeli entity to produce unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs). This venture will have 51 per cent
GOAJ ownership and is distinct from the arrangements reported
in para. 5 above.
The &Iceberg8 - Political Pragmatism
--------------
7.(C) Israeli contacts tell us that President Aliyev aptly
described the bilateral relationship as &an iceberg;
nine-tenths of it is below the surface8 during the May 2008
visit of Agriculture Minister Shalom Simhon. The sentiment
is accurate because Baku balances its cordial relations with
the Jewish state with its perceived responsibilities in to
the OIC. Therefore Azerbaijan does not maintain an embassy
in Israel, it dutifully (although weakly) criticizes Israeli
military operations in the Palestinian territories and
Lebanon, and in international organizations supports the OIC
line and avoids any chance of angering Iran. When Emboff
delivered demarches on the UNGA ISRAEL resolutions recently
(Reftel A),our MFA contact explained that Azerbaijan would
follow the OIC line and that there was &an understanding8
with ISRAEL about Azerbaijan,s voting behavior. Our Israeli
contacts do not use the same word but acknowledge that they
do not attempt to pressure Azerbaijan on these questions.
The relationship also affects U.S. policy insofar as
Azerbaijan tries, often successfully, to convince the U.S.
pro-Israel lobby to advocate on its behalf.
7. (C) The relationship does have its limits; it does not
translate into any preferential treatment for Israeli
investors or capital in Azerbaijan (Note: this hardly sets
Israel apart among countries whose citizens invest here. End
note.) With some humor, the Israeli DCM told us that Israeli
businessmen expressed to her that they prefer corruption in
Kazakhstan to that of Azerbaijan because in Kazakhstan one
can expect to pay exorbitant &fees8 to do business but
those are generally collected at once, up front, whereas in
Azerbaijan the demands for bribes never cease.
Comment
--------------
8. (C) Israel,s relations with Azerbaijan are based strongly
on pragmatism and a keen appreciation of priorities.
Israel,s main goal is to preserve Azerbaijan as an ally
against Iran, a platform for reconnaissance of that country
and as a market for military hardware. In order to ensure
those goals, the Israelis have keenly attuned themselves to
the GOAJ,s needs as an OIC member and a state ) like ISRAEL
) wedged between large, powerful and unfriendly neighbors.
They forgo the option of pressuring the GOAJ on secondary
issues to secure the primary ones. It is apparent to us that
for now both sides are well satisfied with the bilateral
state of affairs.
LU