Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAKU136
2009-02-19 10:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baku
Cable title:  

AZAL: WECAN COOPERATE, BUT WE NEED SPECIFICS

Tags:  PGOV PREL MOPS MARR AJ 
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VZCZCXRO6609
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHKB #0136/01 0501007
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 191007Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0803
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0095
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0085
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 1825
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAKU 000136 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/CARC
DEFENSE FOR OUSD(P) DMELLEBY
TRANSCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS MARR AJ
SUBJECT: AZAL: WECAN COOPERATE, BUT WE NEED SPECIFICS

REF: BAKU 124

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ANNE E. DERSE, REASONS 1.4 B AND D

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAKU 000136 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/CARC DEFENSE FOR OUSD(P) DMELLEBY TRANSCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS MARR AJ SUBJECT: AZAL: WECAN COOPERATE, BUT WE NEED SPECIFICS REF: BAKU 124 Classified By: AMBASSADOR ANNE E. DERSE, REASONS 1.4 B AND D ¶1. (C) Summary. Following up on President Aliyev,s earlier indication of willingness to consider increased logistical support to supply operations in Afghanistan (ref),Azerbaijan Airlines (AZAL) President Jahangir Askerov, who manages Baku's Heydar Aliyev International Airport (GYD,) was highly receptive to the message that the United States is evaluating GYD among other regional alternatives as a strengthened link in the supply line to Coalition forces in Afghanistan. Askerov offered cooperation in each of the three areas DOD has identified as being of high interest, i.e. fueling (both additional gas-and-go and airborne refuelers),cargo transport and passenger transport. Askerov offered to liaise directly with the Embassy on defining AZAL and GYD's capabilities, but requested more specific requirements in all of the mission areas. End summary. ¶2. (C) Ambassador, accompanied by acting DATT, a representative from EUCOM J4 and Poloff, called on AZAL President Askerov on February 18 to brief him on the United States' potential interest in GYD for OEF logistical support. Ambassador recalled President Aliyev's supportive statements at their recent meeting (Ref) and further explained that the Administration is considering a wide array of options for passenger and cargo transport in the region in the context of a broad re-evaluation of policy as well as the specific situation with respect to Manas. Ambassador explained that the United States, in this context, is assessing regional capabilities, and would like to evaluate GYD in terms of its capacity to A) host expanded gas-and-go and/or house 4 or 5 KC-135 refuelers; B) expand cargo throughput, and C) support personnel movement, including potential overnights and also housing and provisioning of ground staff. She underscored that our request for information was at this stage only to form a better understanding of capacity at GYD and not a request for new support, which the USG understands would require a political decision. Tanker Potential -------------- ¶3. (C) Regarding expanded gas-and-go, Askerov asked for an approximate upper limit on the number of additional refuelings that are anticipated on a mont
hly basis and the volumes of fuel anticipated so that he can calculate how many more rail carloads of fuel will be needed and compare it to his bunkering capacity. On the question of housing KC-135s at GYD, Askerov seemed primarily concerned with how many, their size and how much space they would require, as well as the additional fuel needed for the planes' own use and for refueling. He asked about the proposed timeframe of the deployment. In this connection, he noted that without new resources he could maintain 40-50 support personnel in a nearby hotel. Cargo /Passenger Potential -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Askerov noted that GYD boasts one of the largest airport warehouses in the CIS, with20,000 sq. m. of space. He asked for specifics o the amount of space USG cargo could be expectedto take up and at what time intervals it would be in the warehouse. (DAO Comment: Askerov specifically stated that military cargo operations could be adequately segregated from already established commercial operations. This coupled with the potential availability of adequate space within the airport,s cargo terminal may make GYD a good alternative for future cargo operations). Turning to passenger throughput, Askerov asked for precision on the types of aircraft that would be coming through, numbers of people and whether the flights would be civilian or military - his clear preference being for the latter (he mentioned C-17,s). He emphasized GYD's capacities for catering and hospitality services, saying that GYD's caterers could produce up to 20,000 meals BAKU 00000136 002 OF 002 per hour on budgets from USD 3to USD 50 per head. Less clear was his preference for how to accommodate large groups of travelers with lengthy or overnight stays, although he mentioned the possibility of "tent camps." ¶5. (SBU) Askerov also told the Ambassador that Azerbaijani air transport company Silkways had been invited to Washington DC on February 26 by "the Pentagon" for a meeting at "the White House" to discuss supply operations to Afghanistan. He said he had asked Azerbaijani Ambassador Yashar Aliyev to join the Silkways President and Vice President in that meeting on behalf of the government. Comment -------------- ¶6. (C) Based on GOAJ officials, initial comments, GYD could in principle be a serious possibility for answering a meaningful part of CENTCOM's requirements in a post-Manas scenario. There would be many details that would have to be worked out, including billeting for U.S. ground staff and transient passengers and in the absence of a SOFA, the GOAJ's desire to maintain sole control of security of all assets at GYD. However, the key factor arguing for consideration of GYD at this stage, in addition to its location and relative sophistication, is the apparent political will to support the United States and Coalition operations in Afghanistan. Notably, Askerov encouraged Ambassador to liaise directly with him on follow up on logistics, and promised replies within two days of receiving the specific information he sought. Embassy/DATT will reach out to establish credible estimates of the parameters of possible operations at GYD and relay Askerov's eventual feedback. DERSE

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