Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAKU136
2009-02-19 10:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baku
Cable title:  

AZAL: WECAN COOPERATE, BUT WE NEED SPECIFICS

Tags:  PGOV PREL MOPS MARR AJ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6609
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHKB #0136/01 0501007
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 191007Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0803
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0095
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0085
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 1825
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAKU 000136 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/CARC
DEFENSE FOR OUSD(P) DMELLEBY
TRANSCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS MARR AJ
SUBJECT: AZAL: WECAN COOPERATE, BUT WE NEED SPECIFICS

REF: BAKU 124

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ANNE E. DERSE, REASONS 1.4 B AND D

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAKU 000136

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/CARC
DEFENSE FOR OUSD(P) DMELLEBY
TRANSCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS MARR AJ
SUBJECT: AZAL: WECAN COOPERATE, BUT WE NEED SPECIFICS

REF: BAKU 124

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ANNE E. DERSE, REASONS 1.4 B AND D


1. (C) Summary. Following up on President Aliyev,s earlier
indication of willingness to consider increased logistical
support to supply operations in Afghanistan (ref),Azerbaijan
Airlines (AZAL) President Jahangir Askerov, who manages
Baku's Heydar Aliyev International Airport (GYD,) was highly
receptive to the message that the United States is evaluating
GYD among other regional alternatives as a strengthened link
in the supply line to Coalition forces in Afghanistan.
Askerov offered cooperation in each of the three areas DOD
has identified as being of high interest, i.e. fueling (both
additional gas-and-go and airborne refuelers),cargo
transport and passenger transport. Askerov offered to
liaise directly with the Embassy on defining AZAL and GYD's
capabilities, but requested more specific requirements in all
of the mission areas. End summary.


2. (C) Ambassador, accompanied by acting DATT, a
representative from EUCOM J4 and Poloff, called on AZAL
President Askerov on February 18 to brief him on the United
States' potential interest in GYD for OEF logistical support.
Ambassador recalled President Aliyev's supportive statements
at their recent meeting (Ref) and further explained that the
Administration is considering a wide array of options for
passenger and cargo transport in the region in the context of
a broad re-evaluation of policy as well as the specific
situation with respect to Manas. Ambassador explained that
the United States, in this context, is assessing regional
capabilities, and would like to evaluate GYD in terms of its
capacity to A) host expanded gas-and-go and/or house 4 or 5
KC-135 refuelers; B) expand cargo throughput, and C) support
personnel movement, including potential overnights and also
housing and provisioning of ground staff. She underscored
that our request for information was at this stage only to
form a better understanding of capacity at GYD and not a
request for new support, which the USG understands would

require a political decision.

Tanker Potential
--------------


3. (C) Regarding expanded gas-and-go, Askerov asked for an
approximate upper limit on the number of additional
refuelings that are anticipated on a monthly basis and the
volumes of fuel anticipated so that he can calculate how many
more rail carloads of fuel will be needed and compare it to
his bunkering capacity. On the question of housing KC-135s
at GYD, Askerov seemed primarily concerned with how many,
their size and how much space they would require, as well as
the additional fuel needed for the planes' own use and for
refueling. He asked about the proposed timeframe of the
deployment. In this connection, he noted that without new
resources he could maintain 40-50 support personnel in a
nearby hotel.

Cargo /Passenger Potential
--------------


4. (SBU) Askerov noted that GYD boasts one of the largest
airport warehouses in the CIS, with20,000 sq. m. of space.
He asked for specifics o the amount of space USG cargo could
be expectedto take up and at what time intervals it would be
in the warehouse. (DAO Comment: Askerov specifically stated
that military cargo operations could be adequately segregated
from already established commercial operations. This coupled
with the potential availability of adequate space within the
airport,s cargo terminal may make GYD a good alternative for
future cargo operations). Turning to passenger throughput,
Askerov asked for precision on the types of aircraft that
would be coming through, numbers of people and whether the
flights would be civilian or military - his clear preference
being for the latter (he mentioned C-17,s). He emphasized
GYD's capacities for catering and hospitality services,
saying that GYD's caterers could produce up to 20,000 meals

BAKU 00000136 002 OF 002


per hour on budgets from USD 3to USD 50 per head. Less clear
was his preference for how to accommodate large groups of
travelers with lengthy or overnight stays, although he
mentioned the possibility of "tent camps."


5. (SBU) Askerov also told the Ambassador that Azerbaijani
air transport company Silkways had been invited to Washington
DC on February 26 by "the Pentagon" for a meeting at "the
White House" to discuss supply operations to Afghanistan. He
said he had asked Azerbaijani Ambassador Yashar Aliyev to
join the Silkways President and Vice President in that
meeting on behalf of the government.

Comment
--------------


6. (C) Based on GOAJ officials, initial comments, GYD could
in principle be a serious possibility for answering a
meaningful part of CENTCOM's requirements in a post-Manas
scenario. There would be many details that would have to be
worked out, including billeting for U.S. ground staff and
transient passengers and in the absence of a SOFA, the
GOAJ's desire to maintain sole control of security of all
assets at GYD. However, the key factor arguing for
consideration of GYD at this stage, in addition to its
location and relative sophistication, is the apparent
political will to support the United States and Coalition
operations in Afghanistan. Notably, Askerov encouraged
Ambassador to liaise directly with him on follow up on
logistics, and promised replies within two days of receiving
the specific information he sought. Embassy/DATT will reach
out to establish credible estimates of the parameters of
possible operations at GYD and relay Askerov's eventual
feedback.
DERSE