PATTERN OF GOAJ CONFUSION OR DECEPTION ON FOREIGN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 000013 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/CARC E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM AJ SUBJECT: PATTERN OF GOAJ CONFUSION OR DECEPTION ON FOREIGN BROADCASTERS REF: A. 08 BAKU 1076 ¶B. 08 BAKU 1092 ¶C. 08 BAKU 1093 ¶D. 08 BAKU 1136 ¶E. 08 BAKU 1153 ¶F. 08 BAKU 1157 ¶G. 08 BAKU 1178 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Donald Lu, for reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During the two months from October 31 when the National Television and Radio Council (NTRC) first announced that it may ban foreign broadcasts from FM frequencies until the Council's December 30 final decision to do so, USG officials actively advocated against the decision. GOAJ interlocutors at the highest level gave assurances, although not clear promises, that the issue would be resolved and the broadcasts would remain on the air. This pattern could reflect intentional deception, but may also indicate that the final decision was not made until very shortly before the NTRC announced it. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) The December 30 decision by the National Television and Radio Council (NTRC) to remove Radio Liberty (RL),Voice of America (VOA),and BBC from FM frequencies took the USG, as well as the British government, by surprise. Officials of the GOAJ had repeatedly stated to Embassy officials and other USG visitors that the problem could be resolved through negotiations, and that these stations would remain on the air while the negotiations continued. This cable details the numerous, repeated statements by the GOAJ to this effect. AMBASSADOR TALKS TO PRESIDENTIAL APPARAT AND MFA -------------- --- ¶3. (C) After the initial announcement by the NTRC on October 31 that they might take the foreign radios off the air, on November 10 the Ambassador met with Foreign Minister Mammadyarov to discuss the issue (reftel A). Mammadyarov proposed a six month timetable for negotiations on the issue, and stated clearly that he concurred that the broadcasts should be allowed to continue during the negotiations. He promised to brief the President on the issue and the USG's displeasure. ¶4. (C) The next day the Ambassador met with Ramiz Mehdiyev, chief of staff to the President, and expressed the USG displeasure at the announcement (reftel B). In this meeting Mehdiyev argued that the decision was in line with international standards and then attacked the content of Radio Liberty, making no promises to keep it on the air. On the way out of the meeting however, Legal Advisor Shahin Aliyev stopped the Ambassador and explained that there might be a legal way out of the problem, referencing the Parliament. DAS BRYZA MEETS WITH PRESIDENT ALIYEV AND MEHDIYEV -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) On November 12, DAS Matthew Bryza and the Ambassador met with Ramiz Mehdiyev again (reftel C),and this time Mehdiyev had a more constructive attitude. He stated there was time before the end of the year to find a solution, and a new contract could be drawn up. He cautioned that parliamentary action would be required to change the law, however. ¶6. (C) Immediately following this meeting, DAS Bryza met one-on-one with President Aliyev, who explained that it was an issue of rule of law. President Aliyev told DAS Bryza that he "would do what he could" to ensure that the broadcasts continued during negotiations on the issue. DRL A/S KRAMER VISIT -------------- ¶7. (C) On November 18 DRL Assistant Secretary David Kramer met with President Aliyev and discussed the issue in detail (reftel D). After claiming rule of law again, President Aliyev attacked the content of Radio Liberty, asserting that 90 percent of its coverage was against the GOAJ. At the end of the two hour meeting, President Aliyev agreed that if the BAKU 00000013 002 OF 003 USG engaged in good faith negotiations with the GOAJ on the issue, then the broadcasts would not need to be taken off the air immediately. AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH FM AGAIN -------------- ¶8. (C) On November 27 the Ambassador met with the Foreign Minister and again discussed the radio issue (reftel D). Mammadyarov said he was working within the GOAJ to resolve the issue, and asked that the USG not make any more public statements. He asked for the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) to begin talks with the GOAJ on the issue. BBG VISIT -------------- ¶9. (C) Therefore on December 3 Doug Boynton and Enver Safir of the BBG and Julia Ragona of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty came to Baku (reftel E). The delegation met with NTRC Chairman Nushirvan Maharramli and discussed the long history of their relationship with the GOAJ. Maharramli claimed that a special exception had been made for VOA, RL, and BBC due to Azerbaijan's special relationship with the U.S. and the U.K. but nevertheless their ownership of FM licenses was against the law, and now had to be solved. Maharramli offered to defer the NTRC's decision for one to two months. Boynton replied that they would be happy to negotiate, but needed more than 30-60 days. After a long diatribe about the independence of the NTRC and his inability to make a decision for the whole Council, he asked if one year would be enough time. The delegation agreed that this would be a good start. Maharramli stated that the NTRC would take its final decision on December 25. ¶10. (C) The delegation and the Ambassador then met with Ramiz Mehdiyev. Echoing the NTRC's public statements, he said the issue could be resolved by broadcasting via cable, internet, or satellite. He then stated, however, that he could hear the acute sense of discontent from the U.S. on this issue, and that we needed to find a way to resolve the problem. Boynton stated he was optimistic after talking with the NTRC that the broadcasts will continue while the governments work on an agreement. Mehdiyev replied that he believes that the average Azerbaijani citizen can benefit from learning about the U.S. and Europe. It is completely unacceptable, however, to broadcast information that is geared to shattering the stability of Azerbaijan. Mehdiyev then proposed that, given that the law will not change, negotiations can be held. He designated Ali Hasanov as the lead in these negotiations, with Shahin Aliyev's advice on legal issues. He closed the meeting saying that he would "do what (he) could" to see the delegation's hopes realized, and that he wanted "the radio stations to be good friends of Azerbaijan." AMBASSADOR FOLLOWS UP WITH PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION -------------- -------------- ¶11. (C) Later in the day on December 3, the Ambassador and EUR/CARC Director Baxter Hunt used their meeting with Presidential Foreign Relations Advisor Novruz Mammadov to confirm the results of the BBG meeting (reftel F). Mammadov said the USG position was hard to explain inside the GOAJ. However, he said he was "sincere" and would work to resolve the issue, noting that Azerbaijan's policy of westward orientation was irreversible. LAST PUSH WITH NTRC -------------- ¶12. (C) On December 15 Embassy PAO met again with NTRC Chairman Maharramli to deliver a letter from the BBG (reftel G). PAO again asked for the broadcasts to continue while negotiations on an inter-governmental agreement went forward. Maharramli refused to promise this, but said he understood the strong U.S. and international reaction to the issue, and he did not expect a holiday surprise. He urged the USG to move quickly after the NTRC decision on arranging negotiations. BAKU 00000013 003 OF 003 COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) After the series of tough meetings on this topic, the GOAJ heard loud and clear the message that the banning of these radio stations would be a major impediment to deepening relations with the U.S. Senior GOAJ officials, from the President down, repeatedly told every USG interlocutor that they would work hard to see the issue resolved, but there was never a clear commitment that the broadcasts would continue while negotiations took place. According to U.K. Embassy officials, their government and the BBC were equally surprised by the decision, as they had also received assurances that the BBC would be allowed to continue broadcasting. ¶12. (C) Comment Continued: This obfuscation could have been a deliberate attempt to confuse the USG, but may also have resulted from uncertainty on the GOAJ side about what the final decision would be. The fact that the decision was delayed five days from the initial December 25 deadline may indicate that the confusion existed right until the end. This ) and his reputation as a bit of a dim bulb (reftel A) ) might explain Maharramli's statements. The statements by the President and Mehdiyev are more troubling. They are the two most powerful figures in Azerbaijani political life. Their statements appear to have been intentionally phrased to fall short of a commitment, while leading us to the conclusion that this situation would be resolved positively. LU