AZERBAIJAN AND RUSSIA: CAN BAKU MAINTAIN THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAKU 000109 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/CARC, INR (PSTRONSKI),DEFENSE FOR OUSD(P) DMELLEBY E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL AJ AM RU SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN AND RUSSIA: CAN BAKU MAINTAIN THE BALANCE? REF: A. A) 08 BAKU 646 ¶B. B) BAKU 73 Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Analysts across the political spectrum in Baku suggest that Russia has stepped up diplomatic efforts to lure Azerbaijan away from its political, security, and energy links to the West. They note that this is part of a broader Russian effort to regain its position as the political and economic arbiter of affairs in the greater South Caucasus region. Recognizing the premium the Aliyev regime places on stability, Russia will likely continue attempts to show that the West is an unreliable partner, that westward orientation and democratization lead to chaos, and that the road to regime stability runs through Moscow. Recent allegations in Baku of a Russia-Armenia arms transfer, however, have muddied the waters for Moscow, as has an ongoing lack of trust in Moscow's dealings on the resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh. The GOAJ, recognizing that Russia is an important trade and investment partner and the host of 800,000 or more Azerbaijani guest workers, will likely act to maintain a balanced north-south, east-west foreign policy for as long as it is tenable, even as its giant neighbor more actively chips away at the middle ground Azerbaijan has successfully occupied since the 1990s. End Summary. Privileged Interests and a Subtler Approach -------------- ¶2. (C) Azerbaijani experts across the political spectrum agree that Russia's goal in Azerbaijan and the neighborhood is to maintain or re-establish influence in the Caucasus region, especially following its August invasion of Georgia. Many Russians have not accepted, nor will likely accept, that the South Caucasus countries are fully sovereign or independent. Moreover, they say, Russia worries that given too much leeway, Azerbaijan, like some other former Soviet countries, will move ultimately to integrate into the West. ¶3. (C) Government contacts and private analysts cite evidence that the Kremlin has a coordinated plan to diminish Western influence in its "near abroad." In addition to significantly intensified diplomacy, this includes the passing of falsified intelligence reports, public disinformation campaigns and other "active measures," they say. Private analysts suggest that the Russians manipulate local media outlets and warn leaders in the region about American intentions to spread so-called "color revolutions," like those in Georgia and Ukraine. This allows, they say, for Russia to stoke and then feed on the fears of regional leaders - whose enthusiasm for democracy is to say the least underdeveloped. In Azerbaijan, there is clearly a Russian hand behind deep- seated Azerbaijani ire over alleged Western &double standards8 on democracy and human rights and continuing suspicions about western interference in Azerbaijan,s domestic affairs. ¶4. (C) In this vein, Russia appears to be stepping up diplomatic activities to regain influence in Azerbaijan. The historic July 2008 visit of President Medvedev with a large official and business delegation underscored, according to the Russian Ambassador in Baku (Reftel A),that Azerbaijan is now a country of Russian "privileged interest." Intensified business and official contacts followed. Most recently, the November 2 Moscow declaration regarding Nagorno-Karabakh indicates that Russia is trying to position itself as the key mediator for the resolution of this conflict. Moscow's decision to invite Aliyev to Moscow soon after his October 29 inauguration was significant. The Kremlin's decision to send a high level Kremlin official, the Head of the Presidential Administration, Sergey Naryshkin, to visit Aliyev twice within two months after the inauguration was also notable. ¶5. (C) Local analysts note, however, that Russia's interests and approach in Azerbaijan differ in part, at least, from its approach to Ukraine, Georgia, and Armenia. Russia shares with Ukraine a Slavic heritage, (mostly) common language, and Orthodoxy. With Georgia and Armenia, Russia shares Orthodoxy and relatively strong pre-Soviet ties. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, looks in many ways to Moscow like Central or South Asia ) an area where Russia has some historical ties, but less pre-Soviet influence and cultural congruence. For these reasons, Moscow's intentions toward Azerbaijan tend to be less based on historical and ethnic claims, and are more closely based on calculated national interests. Azerbaijan's strategic location and natural resource wealth are the focus of Moscow's attention. Redlines on Security and Energy -------------- ¶6. (C) According to local analysts, the "redlines" that Russia does not want Azerbaijan to cross are fairly clear. While it tolerates Azerbaijan's supply of troops to Afghanistan or inclusion in the South Asia supply corridor, joining NATO or hosting a U.S. military base would provoke a strong reaction by the Kremlin. Moreover, Russia would consider overt Azerbaijani political or military support for Georgia unacceptable. In the winter of 2007, Azerbaijan's willingness to defy Russia's natural gas blockade of Georgia tested Moscow's patience. Similarly, Baku's direct energy outreach to the West causes great consternation in Russia. Moscow clearly regrets its inability to halt the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil project in the mid-1990s, a period when the Kremlin was relatively weak and distracted in the region by the war in Chechnya, and appears determined to ensure that the experience is not repeated with Azerbaijani and Caspian gas. ¶7. (C) Analysts here argue that one of Russia's primary strengths continues to be its vast energy resources, and that it is determined to maintain the monopoly it holds on energy development and transport and the related influence this gives Russia in the region and, indeed, the larger neighborhood. As a result, they say, Russia is concerned with any country, like Azerbaijan, that might challenge Russia's energy dominance, even as a supplemental supplier. Azerbaijan cut imports of Russian natural gas in the winter of 2006-2007, after a dispute with GazProm on pricing. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan,s SOCAR has stepped up natural gas supply to Georgia and invested heavily in that country,s energy infrastructure. Russia has responded with numerous offers to buy Azerbaijan,s Shah Deniz Phase II gas at &market prices8; in the public sphere, at least, the GOAJ, which has struggled to forge a gas transit agreement with Turkey, has not entirely ruled out such a deal. ¶8. (C) Of particular concern to Moscow right now, many analysts here suggest, is the possibility that Azerbaijan could become a conduit for hydrocarbons from the opposite shore of the Caspian. With depletion of existing oil and gas fields and lack of investment in infrastructure, Russia relies on Turkmen gas to meet its commitments in Europe. Russian energy policy in the Caspian, therefore, is partly about minimizing the threat of competition, but it also is about covering up its own domestic shortcomings: lack of investment in exploration, development and transport, and inefficient use of energy resources at home. Bilateral Relations: Serious Leverage... -------------- ¶9. (C) At the highest levels, the Government of Azerbaijan often discusses the country's precarious geopolitical position -- squeezed between three historically powerful states: Turkey, Iran and Russia. Because of this tough neighborhood, and to consolidate his power, President Aliyev, like his father, puts a premium on domestic stability and &balance8 in foreign policy. He is also acutely aware that Russia has national security interests in Azerbaijan ) energy, a gateway to Iran and the Middle East, a north/south corridor, a backdoor to Georgia and the North Caucasus, and a military presence at the Qabala radar site. Among international observers here, there is concern that Russia is seeking increasingly to demonstrate that siding with the West did not bring stability or security to Georgia and that the West is not an effective partner in talks to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. That has led to speculation that President Aliyev, who was educated in Moscow and has family ties there, has the ability to drift towards a closer relationship with Russia if he is not actively courted by the West. Azerbaijan participates in the Commonwealth of Independent States, but (unlike Armenia) has resisted invitations to join the Collective Security Treaty Organization. ¶10. (C) Outside the energy sector, Russia is Azerbaijan's largest trade and investment partner. Azerbaijan's agricultural export production, for example, largely makes its way to markets in the North. Russia traditionally has also been the site of educational and cultural exchanges. Generations of Baku's top families have been educated at Russian universities. Much of Azerbaijan's power elite is known to have enormous financial interests in Moscow. Russia also hosts over 800,000 guest workers from Azerbaijan, many of whom are villagers who find work at Russian construction sites or in street markets. These workers, in turn, remit wages to relatives in some of Azerbaijan's poorest districts. Local economists note that these remittances constitute the bulk of economic activity in rural Azerbaijan ) areas far removed from the new wealth of Azerbaijan's offshore oil fields. Should Russia expel these guest workers or otherwise disrupt the flow of remittances, Azerbaijan would be subjected to an enormous economic blow, and quite possibly significant social unrest. The Russians employed this point of leverage during the fall 2006 gas dispute with Azerbaijan, with a crackdown on registration of illegal aliens in Moscow,s markets, many of which are staffed by ethnic Azeris. ...And Serious Baggage -------------- ¶11. (C) Azerbaijan, however, sees Russia as a defender of Armenia. Stories abound in Baku of Russian historical and current meddling in Nagorno-Karabakh; recently, with new charges, as yet unproven, of large arms transfers from Russia to Armenia. Azerbaijanis are acutely aware of the Russian security guarantee for Armenia based on Yerevan's membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization. In recent weeks, Baku has buzzed with harsh rhetoric for Moscow over an alleged weapons transfer from Russia's Gyumri military base in Armenia (Reftel B). Some suggest that a strong Azerbaijani lobby in Russia, including several prominent businessmen, presses Moscow to some extent to balance its position in the South Caucasus and not tilt too strongly toward Armenia. Nonetheless, a perception of unequal and unfair treatment, combined with an unpleasant legacy of Soviet domination, taints Russia's image in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan's Balancing Act -------------- ¶12. (C) Azerbaijan, to date, under Ilham Aliyev's leadership, has pursued a relatively balanced foreign policy, with a slight tilt to the West. Aliyev, who allegedly himself has financial interests in Moscow, has shown little appetite for conflict with his northern neighbor, and indeed is proud of what he considers to be his astute management of this difficult partner. In numerous meetings with foreign delegations, he has criticized Saakashvili and stated in no unclear terms that Georgia is not a model for Azerbaijan. In contrast to his father, Aliyev also has shied away from open confrontation with Iran, despite an intense distrust of Teheran's intentions in Azerbaijan. In spite of much grumbling behind closed doors, he has refrained from public criticism of Ankara, which he privately accuses of promoting an Islamic agenda in Azerbaijan. (Note: President Aliyev and his advisors routinely name Armenia and Iran, rather than Russia, as the greatest security threats to Azerbaijan. End Note.) Aliyev and his government have continued to cultivate ties with the US and the EU, while staking out a much tougher position vis-a-vis Western criticism and alleged &double standards8 towards Azerbaijan on democracy and human rights, with the most visceral reactions following unfavorable comparisons with Georgia and Armenia. ¶13. (C) Comment. Few in Baku doubt that Russia is actively seeking ways to reassert influence here and concurrently weaken the United States' position. In some quarters, analysts suggest, for example, that Russia could offer to strike a bargain with Baku to soften Azerbaijan's western loyalties and/or cooperation on energy projects for Russia's delivery of progress on a Nagorno-Karabakh settlement favorable to Azerbaijan. Most agree that delivery of demonstrable progress on Nagorno-Karabakh would be the one offer Baku would find hard to refuse. Aliyev has made it clear that Ukraine and Georgia,-- countries that have veered sharply to the West, and where political opening, in his view, has brought instability -- and Turkey, where in his view it has brought renewed Islamic influence -- are not models for Azerbaijan. The GOAJ's recent efforts to close down foreign broadcasts on national frequencies and hold a referendum to remove presidential term limits also reveal a new willingness to more openly break with some of the values of the West, especially where such steps aid in consolidation of the government,s power. ¶14. (C) Comment Continued. While Baku,s healthy historical mistrust of Russia tends to militate for it to continue its "balanced" foreign policy, in which it tilts to the West, but does not fully embrace or resist Moscow, Tehran, Ankara, or Europe, Azerbaijan,s new uncertainty about the reliability of the West as a partner and the shifting power balance in the region after the invasion of Georgia offer Russia real possibilities to undermine what has been the unifying concept of Azerbaijan's foreign policy for the last fifteen years. DERSE