RRT ERBIL: MND-N MG CASLEN MEETING WITH KRG PRIME

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000991 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2014 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR IZ IR TU SUBJECT: RRT ERBIL: MND-N MG CASLEN MEETING WITH KRG PRIME MINISTER BARZANI REF: BAGHDAD 811 Classified By: PMIN Robert S. Ford for reasons 1.4 (b). This is an Erbil Regional Reconstruction Team (RRT) cable. ¶1. (C) Summary: MND-N MG Caslen met with Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani on March 31 to discuss political and military tensions in Kirkuk and Mosul, to assure the KRG of U.S. efforts in creating a climate of trust and to resolve conflicts between the Iraqi Army and KRG Peshmerga units at the lowest level. Barzani gave a positive account of his March 23 meeting with Turkish President Gul and reported that PM Maliki would send a preliminary Dawa delegation to the Kurdistan Region in response to his request to Maliki to make a personal visit to Erbil. The Prime Minister said the he was not ready to pass judgment on the UNAMI Disputed Internal Boundaries (DIBs) reports and commented that it at least provide a basis for discussion. He asked for U.S. support in resolving Article 140 and hydrocarbons issues with the GoI. Not to do so, he argued, would fatally undermine the US military's "responsible withdrawal." End summary. ¶2. (U) MND-N Commander MG Robert Caslen met PM Nechirvan Barzani March 31. Other participants included MND-N Deputy, BG Robert Brown, KRG Minister of the Interior Karim Sinjari, KRG Director of Foreign Relations Falah Mustafa Bakir, MND-N POLAD Peter Thompson, MND-N KRG Liaison LTC Sidre and U.S. Regional Reconstruction Team (RRT) Team Leader. U.S. efforts to control tensions in Kirkuk -------------- ¶3. (SBU) In response to the PM's question on the military situation in Kirkuk, MG Caslen explained that the PM would be seeing more of a U.S. military presence in the Kurdistan Region (KR). There would be "more liaison, more partnering." He noted that the situation in Kirkuk was improving: there was more dialogue and communication. Moves were being "telegraphed." Caslen reported that the threat in Kirkuk city had been reduced by 90 percent. He noted that the 12th Division of the Iraqi army (IA) and the Kurdish Peshmerga in the area were working to build bridges. His goal was cooperation, trust and transparency. He gave the PM his commitment to keep tensions down and to build trust from the lowest level up. Meeting between PM Barzani and President Gul -------------- ¶4. (C) The PM described that Turkish President Gul had expressed satisfaction with KRG measures against the PKK. PM Barzani was pleased that the Turkish/Kurdish interaction had expended beyond discussion about PKK. He recounted that he had told President Gul that the KRG was ready to take military action against the PKK if necessary, but reminded them that previous attempts were unsuccessful. Answers come too late for President Barzani participation -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) PM Barzani reported that President Gul said, "Turkey will treat with the Kurdistan Region in accordance with the Iraqi Constitution." Barzani explained that this was the reason why President Masoud Barzani did not attend the meeting. Barzani had been unsure whether the Turks treat him as the individual, Masoud Barzani, or as the President of the Kurdistan Region. The Prime Minister admitted that by the time they found out, it was too late for President Barzani to attend the meeting. (Note. FM Zebari previously told Embassy Baghdad Poloffs that Masoud Barzani did not return from his QBaghdad Poloffs that Masoud Barzani did not return from his European trip in time to meet Gul because Barzani found out that he was to meet Gul only on the second day of Gul's visit lumped together with other 'tribal leaders.' End Note.) ¶6. (C) PM Barzani reported that President Gul told him that Turkey's first priority was to have excellent relations with Iraq, "and especially with the Kurdistan Region." According to Barzani, Gul repeated this three times (Note. Barzani also reported that President Gul specifically called the region Kurdistan, although in a meeting with British Acting CG Giles Lever, Lever reported to RRT Team Leader that Barzani was embellishing the story: when he first told it to Lever, he had said that Gul did not use the word Kurdistan. End Note). PM Barzani noted some of the initiatives that came out of the meeting: agreement to increase trade, moving forward on the establishment of a free trade zone between Zhako and Turkey and the expected visit of the Turkish Minister for Foreign Trade to the KR. In response to MG BAGHDAD 00000991 002 OF 003 Caslen's question about an oil pipeline, PM Barzani said that they had talked about energy cooperation, but that further discussions would be between the private sectors of the respective countries. H aving the governments discuss this issue politicized it, and he did not wish this to happen. PM Barzani concluded by saying that President Gul had offered to help with any problems that the KRG might have with Baghdad. According to Barzani, he said "thanks, but these are really family problems." PM Barzani meeting with PM Maliki -------------- ¶7. (C) Turning to his subsequent March 24 meeting with PM Maliki, Barzani reported that PM Maliki told him three things: --KRG/GoI problems had to be solved by dialogue. The logic of the Saddam era, when the weak were dominated by the powerful, was obsolete; --There was already a lot of talk and agreement but nothing happened on the ground; --The results of the last election should not make Maliki "arrogant." He needed to respect the situation on the ground. He received votes, but not the votes of the Kurds or the Sunnis. ¶8. (C) Barzani said that he had encouraged Prime Minister Maliki to come to Erbil and talk to KRG President Masoud Barzani and solve the problems. According to PM Barzani, Maliki agreed to do so. First he would send a Dawa delegation; then he would come himself later. ¶9. (C) Barzani commented that he found PM Maliki concerned about the political, economic and security situation of the country. He was also affected by the reduction of his office's budget. He was worried about the "Special Groups." His relations with the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) were bad. He wanted smooth relations with the Kurds "if only for tactical reasons." Barzani recalled that PM Maliki had offered to have the KDP sign an agreement with Dawa "in order to ruin the KDP's relationship with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and ISCI." (see ref for another account of this meeting.) Article 140 and "Responsible Withdrawal" -------------- ¶10. (C) Turning to Article 140, MG Caslen stated that he believed that Article 140 needed to be resolved before the U.S. left Iraq. He asked what needed to be done to get the GoI and KRG to sit down together. PM Barzani explained that the Kurds felt that "responsible withdrawal" meant ensuring that that Article 140 and the hydrocarbons issues were resolved. He added, "We know that this is our country, and we have to solve these issues ourselves, but we cannot solve them on without continuing assistance. We are two nations. We are not Arabs. Baghdad's logic is to force a solution on us. They are waiting for your withdrawal. You have spent lives, money and time. To leave before these problems are resolved is not responsible." ¶11. (C) Prime Minister Barzani continued that "if it weren't for you, there would already be fighting in Kirkuk" and added "when you leave, don't leave the keys to someone else," going on to note that there had been more Iranian delegations since the SOFA Agreement was signed than American delegations. He noted that as the KRG's relationship with Turkey improves, its relationship with Iran worsens. "Iran can harm us a lot -- but we won't sit idle." PM Barzani noted here that the KRG intended to start a dialogue with Syria. Special Envoy for KRG/GoI issues -------------- ¶12. (C) Recalling Vice President-elect Biden's remarks during Q12. (C) Recalling Vice President-elect Biden's remarks during his pre-inauguration trip to Kirkuk in January, General Caslen wondered if it would be a good idea to have a special envoy to lead the contending sides to a deal to resolve the DIBs issue in accordance with Article 140, using the UNAMI reports as a basis. The Prime Minister responded that a special envoy was an excellent idea, and that Iraqis would accept a deal brokered by an outsider as long as there was consensus among Iraqi negotiators. He noted that there are other disputed areas in Iraq besides the territory bordering the KRG. PM Barzani said that SRSG Steffan di Mistura's imminent departure lessened his credibility as an BAGHDAD 00000991 003 OF 003 interlocutor. He believed that UNAMI would not propose solutions, but rather would put options on the table. It was too early to make any judgments, he said, and at least the report would provide a basis for discussion. He felt it was necessary to resolve issues surrounding hydrocarbon legislation at the same time. "We must have agreement on revenue-sharing," he said. The Prime Minister urged the USG to help facilitate a solution to these problems. He said that he "totally agreed" with the idea of a special envoy, and that any person selected ought to be a political figure of international repute. Kurdistan Region Elections -------------- ¶13. (C) Turning to KRG elections, PM Barzani said that some might say closed lists were not democratic, but he justified this on the basis that this allowed smaller parties to become part of the KDP/PUK coalition and obtain seats that they wouldn't in an open list election. He appreciated Coalition offers to assist with security, and said that there might be a need for aerial protection and perhaps ground security in some areas. He concluded that he wanted the election to be free and fair, with robust international monitoring. IA and Coalition movements -------------- ¶14. (C) MG Caslen mentioned the recent Diyala suicide bomb at a Kurdish event. PM Barzani responded that that this was Al Qaeda (AQI) trying to draw Arabs and Kurds into a fight. General Caslen warned the Prime Minister that the Kurds would be seeing AQI displaced northwards towards Kifri and other areas currently controlled by the Kurds as the IA and Coalition forces pushed them out of their accustomed lairs. He didn't want pursuing IA formations to elicit a hasty reaction from Peshmerga forces as they neared the disputed areas. PM Barzani said that this was fine as long as the Coalition forces were with the IA. ¶15. (C) MG Caslen also raised campaign promises by Athiel Najafi, presumptive governor-elect in Ninewa, concerning residents of Mosul allegedly held in Kurdish prisons. Interior Minister Sinjari said that most had been released, although some were still before the court. The Prime Minister asked the General to give him a list of names, and undertook to confirm or deny these individuals were being held by the KRG. He promised that if they were not terrorists, they would be released. Nechirvan went on the say that the al Hud'ba Gathering won only 19 out of 37 seats in Ninewa, and they would be unable to govern effectively without the Kurds. If Najafi attempted to govern with the same rhetoric as during the campaign, there would be problems. If, however, he chose to govern in an inclusive and pluralistic fashion, progress on all issues was possible. The people must believe in their government, PM Barzani said, and the government must provide essential services and ensure the rule of law. ¶16. (C) MG Caslen brought the meeting to a close by reiterating the U.S. commitment to reduce tensions and to promote a solution to all issues through dialogue. PM Barzani observed there are other regional players who seek to destabilize Iraq. The Saudis, he stated, had offered to assist the KRG against PM Maliki (NFI). MG Caslen and PM Barzani parted with promises to work closely together to maintain stability in northern Iraq. BUTENIS