IRAQI MARSHES STRUGGLING TO MAKE A COMEBACK (PART

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 000959 AIDAC SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/I, OES/ENRC E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECON EAID SOCI SENV EWWT KGHG IZ SUBJECT: IRAQI MARSHES STRUGGLING TO MAKE A COMEBACK (PART 1 OF 2) REF: 07 BAGHDAD 3796 -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Iraq's marshes have been in trouble for a long time. Considering the marshes to be a waste of land and a breeding ground for mosquitoes, early British plans called for the near complete drying out of the marshes. By 1990, the marsh area had already been reduced by 50%. Saddam greatly accelerated the process following the First Gulf War, ultimately drying out 90% of the marshes. Iraq has only one water sharing agreement with its neighbors and major upstream projects continue to erode its share of the Tigris' and Euphrates' flow. Iraq has a widely vetted plan to restore the marshes to 75% of their 1972 area. Despite the marshes impressive natural capacity to regenerate, however, limited water resources and poor economic follow-up threaten the plan's ultimate success. This cable is the first of a two-part series on the Iraqi marshes. End summary. -------------- Why Are the Marshes in Trouble? -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The southern marsh region of Iraq had three distinct but interconnected marshes until late in the 20th century: the Hawizeh Marsh on the Iranian border, fed by the Tigris from Iraq and several smaller rivers from Iran; the Hammar Marsh stretching along the southern Euphrates before it empties into the Shatt Al-Arab; and the Central Marsh, a 60-kilometer wide shallow sheet of water flowing south from the Tigris to the Euphrates. In the 1970s, approximately 400,000 Madan, or Marsh Arabs, lived in the three marshes which altogether covered over 8,000 square kilometers. Considering the marshes to be a waste of land and a breeding ground for mosquitoes, the British introduced ambitious plans for land reclamation and water management in 1951, which were further refined by more detailed Russian plans in 1982. These early plans, which still largely guide the development of Iraq's major water management infrastructure projects, called for the near complete drying out of the marshes. There have been variations from the original plan, including numerous projects launched for tactical reasons in the Iran-Iraq War, and others to facilitate oil exploration and extraction. However, none was more environmentally damaging or internationally controversial than the 1991-94 "Glory River" project implemented to dry out the Central Marsh. -------------- Saddam's Damage -------------- ¶3. (SBU) The Iraqi marshes began drying out long before 1991. While Saddam greatly accelerated the process following the First Gulf War, comparison of satellite imagery from 1972 and 1990 shows that each of the three marshes had already decreased by about 50% before the Gulf War began. Then, under Saddam's rushed and environmentally thuggish "Glory River" project, the GOI built a 100 km-long, 2 km-wide canal that channeled the Tigris River around the Central Marsh. As a result, by 1994, the Central and Hammar Marshes were almost completely dry. By 2003, the Hawizeh Marsh had been reduced to a quarter of its original size, leaving a total marsh area of only 750 square kilometers, down over 90% from 1972. (Note: Since the Hawizeh marsh never completely dried out, it makes a convenient seedbed from which flora and fauna can be transplanted into the dried Central and Hammar marshes. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) identified this possibility immediately in 2003 and took steps to ensure Qpossibility immediately in 2003 and took steps to ensure water continued to flow into the Hawizeh marsh. End note.) -------------- Less Water Inflow -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Water projects in the marsh area are only part of the reason for the demise of the marshes. A second significant problem is that today, Iraq just doesn't receive as much water as it used to. While droughts in recent years have captured headlines, the lack of water is a more profound political and structural issue. Most of Iraq's surface water comes from upstream sources in Turkey and Syria, with a small amount from Iran's Karkeh River, which has recently been BAGHDAD 00000959 002 OF 004 diverted. Despite this reliance on water whose source is in other countries, Iraq currently only has one water sharing agreement, that with Syria regarding shared usage of the Euphrates River. Iraq has actively pursued dialogue with its neighboring countries over the past three years on water sharing, but has made little tangible progress. The Iraqi Minister of Water Resources, Dr. Abdul Latif Rashid, made a visit to Turkey in June 2008, where he requested and received a small amount of additional flow in 2008. However, this will not have a significant impact on the marshes' revival. The Tripartite Technical Commission for Water Resources, established between Turkey and Iraq in 1980 and joined by Syria in 1983, met for the first time in over 20 years in February. Results, however, were little more than symbolic. ¶5. (SBU) The annual volume of water flowing from the Tigris and Euphrates into the marsh region dropped by almost 40% between 1970 and 2000 due to the large number of water management projects built upstream. Equally detrimental to the health and extent of the marshes was the loss of the yearly "pulse" of flood water caused by the spring melt in northern Iraq and Turkey. With Turkey and Iraq continuing to build large dams, further reduction in annual flow volume to the marshes is inevitable unless (a) additional regional water sharing agreements are established; (b) Iraq improves its water usage efficiency; or (c) Iraq decisively alters its water allocation among agriculture, drinking water, and environmental demands like the marshes. -------------- Wide Agreement on Iraq's Technical Plans... -------------- ¶6. (SBU) EmbOffs and Dhi Qar PRT met on 12 November 2008 with MoWR Provincial DG Abdul Al-Kazim, the NGO Nature Iraq's in-country Director Dr. Jasim Al-Asadi, and Dhi Qar University's Marsh Research Center Manager Dr. Talib Hussein. They described in detail the integrated plan for water management in the marsh region: A main inlet regulator to be built on the north end of the Central Marsh (vicinity PV 88 86) will allow up to 270 cubic meters per second (m3/s) of Tigris water to flow into the marsh. Another main regulator for the Hammar Marsh (vicinity PV 66 24) will allow inlet flow up to 320 m3/s. The system contains 11 other regulators of varying capacity as well as more than 50 control gates. The system's design is based not only on managing flow volume, but also water quality by balancing the amount of irrigation drain water and clean water ("sweet water") released into the marsh. The system is also designed to try to mimic the spring pulse of melt water. ¶7. (SBU) Of greatest interest, Kazim, Al-Asadi, and Hussein -- who represent two different GOI ministries and an NGO -- were in complete agreement on the system's design and on the GOI's marsh restoration goals. When asked directly, Kazim said, "You can talk to anyone who has been working on marsh issues and you will see that we agree with this general plan." Most of the marsh areas that will not be re-flooded are either now populated with small towns, as is the case along the entire north side of the Central Marsh, or reserved for oil exploration and recovery, including the West Qurna 1 and 2 oil fields, he said. "When drying out the Central Marsh, Saddam dictated where many people would be relocated QMarsh, Saddam dictated where many people would be relocated by restricting their ration card access," said Al-Asadi. "But you should also note that many people just moved in with relatives in Baghdad, especially Sadr City, or fled to Iran." (Note: Al-Kazim, Al-Asadi, and Hussein did not know how many of the approximately 150,000 people that have returned to the marshes since 2003 were from Sadr City or Iran. End note.) ¶8. (SBU) The Ministry of Water Resources Director General of the Center for the Restoration of the Iraqi Marshes (CRIM), Abdul Kadhem Lahmood, corroborated these remarks in his meeting with EmbOffs on March 18 in Baghdad, and added that such widespread agreement "had been achieved because of science and engineering, not negotiation." "We considered a range of plans, all the way from getting rid of the marshes entirely, to 25% restoration, 50% restoration, or even 75% -- engineering tells us there is adequate water resources to restore 75% of the marsh area," he said; "5,592 square kilometers," including restoring sheet flow in the southern part of the Central marsh. Construction began in December 2008 on many of the regulators and gates and the MoWR plans to finish construction of the entire system in 2010. MoWR BAGHDAD 00000959 003 OF 004 will pay the approximately 120 billion ID (approximately 100 million USD) for the system, he said. -------------- -------------- ...But Little Agreement on Economic Plans for the Marsh -------------- -------------- ¶9. (SBU) In contrast to Iraq's success thus far in water management planning for the marsh region, there is far less evidence of cooperative planning for economic development. While CRIM's interest in the marshes extends far beyond water resource issues, their expertise unfortunately does not. Noting that GOI priorities for the marsh region are, first, restoration, and second, employment, Kadhem said, "Anyone seeking marsh restoration should help us prepare the land adjacent to the marshes with housing and agricultural development." He cited two particular marsh region housing projects under consideration: One, funded by the Dutch and Swedish Governments in the Hawizeh marsh, which, he admits, is still in the discussion phase. The second is a plan for 5,000 "special marsh homes," phase one of which would consist of 1,000 homes to be built in the south region of the Central marsh. The design is complete and construction has begun, based on grants arranged through the Marsh Restoration Committee, he said. When asked, Kadhem claimed that he did not know who was funding the project. (Note: This is perhaps a pilot project for the NGO Nature Iraq's (NI) "Eden Again" plan to build eco-friendly villages for returning Marsh Arabs in the vicinity of the village of Chubayish (septel). NI has been searching for donors for this project for several years, but the Embassy is not aware of any having stepped forward. End note.) -------------- Water Supply--The Long Pole in the Tent -------------- ¶10. (SBU) While there is noteworthy agreement on the water management system design, the actual water available to the marshes is a more controversial topic. Nature Iraq's Alwash is not fully convinced of MoWR's will to provide sufficient water resources. "I will take whatever water they can give us--drainage water, salty water, even brackish water," he said. Alwash also claims there is more than enough water for all of Iraq's needs if MoWR properly utilizes its water resources. (Note: Reftel, approximately 90% of Iraq's water usage goes to irrigation. End note.) When asked, CRIM DG Kadhem claimed that the ministry's water supply calculations in support of the 75% restoration goal are based on conditions of normal rainfall and took into account projected upstream water consumption in Iraq, Turkey, and Syria. "While we of course seek improved water sharing arrangements with our neighbors, our present plan, assuming normal rainfall, will provide enough water to achieve our goal of 75% marsh restoration," he said. "The Hawizeh marsh is a RAMSAR site, so there should be some regional or international obligation to help protect it." (Note: The Hawizeh Marsh was declared a RAMSAR Convention on Wetlands site in February 2008. Embassy water experts agree that there will be insufficient water supply to achieve the 75% restoration goal and that the GOI will likely use the marshes and their investment in marsh water management structures as a bargaining tool to apply international pressure to Syria and Turkey to expand Iraq's share of the Tigris and Euphrates Qand Turkey to expand Iraq's share of the Tigris and Euphrates flow. End note.) -------------- Drought Effects -------------- ¶11. (SBU) According to both CRIM and Nature Iraq, Iraq's present drought has reduced the marsh area to approximately 40% of its 1970 size, a significant reduction from the United Nations Environment Program's pre-drought estimate of 58% restoration in December 2006. Alwash told EmbOff that NI met with MoWR officials in February and presented detailed plans for temporary structures on the Euphrates to prevent further drought damage to the Hammar and Central marshes. Recent international media reports are also creating pressure on the MoWR for near-term remediation of the drought's effects. Kadhem said the drought, while unfortunate, "is the way life has always been in the marshes." When the water level in the marsh changes, people move their homes, he said. "Some are using this unfortunate situation to push their own agenda," he lamented. BAGHDAD 00000959 004 OF 004 -------------- Part Two: Who's Who in Marshland Restoration -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Despite Iraq's lack of coordination between the central and provincial governments, well over 100,000 Iraqis have returned to the marsh area, and it is possible many more will follow if an adequate system of social services is established. The second of this two-cable series will review the various GOI, international, and USG efforts to help restore the Iraqi marshes. Embassy believes that the South Florida Water Management District (SFWMD--lead agency for Everglades restoration) can make a unique contribution to Iraq's efforts, based on the Iraqi marshland's striking resemblance to the experience of the Florida Everglades. BUTENIS