IRAQ 201: KURDISH POLITICAL LANDSCAPE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000859 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2024 TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL IZ SUBJECT: IRAQ 201: KURDISH POLITICAL LANDSCAPE REF: A. BAGHDAD 811 ¶B. BAGHDAD 796 Classified By: PMIN Robert S. Ford for reasons 1.4 (d). (U) This is one in a series of messages intended to provide background for policy-makers on Iraq. ¶1. (C) Summary. The Kurdish political landscape is mostly about the delicate balance maintained by the two dominant secular parties - the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Changes in leadership for either party set off a game of musical chairs for Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and Kurd-designated national political positions. Of late, the PUK is experiencing internal power struggles which jeopardizes the KDP-PUK 50/50 power-sharing accord. Moves to ensure that the accord remain intact could end up weakening Kurdish political power in Baghdad at a time of heightened Arab-Kurd tensions. With Maliki and other Arab politicians running on a popular anti-Kurd platform for the provincial and national elections, the Kurds are nervous and on the defensive. As Maliki continues to flex his PM muscle with provocative actions like replacing Kurdish officers in the Iraqi Army (IA) with Arabs, moving IA troops into Peshmerga controlled areas of Khanaqin and Kirkuk, using Prime Minister Office funds to establish tribal support councils in disputed territories, and attempting to amend the constitution and dilute KRG autonomy, it is difficult for the Kurds to want to trust Maliki or play ball with the central government (GoI). The slow-moving process on the resolution of Kirkuk, the stalled hydrocarbons law, perceived USG indifference, and Dawa's (Maliki's party) success in the provincial elections has the Kurdish leadership primed to fight for what they have and if necessary retrench to "Fortress Kurdistan." We are urging the Kurdish leadership to lobby more for Kurdish interests in Baghdad, building alliances around issues. So far Massoud Barzani hasn't shown much interest in this, but the meeting between Nechirvan Barzani and the Prime Minister last week was a small step in the right direction (ref A). End Summary. -------------- THE PLAYERS -------------- ¶2. (C) Politically, the Kurds are organized into two main secular parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). Small Kurdish opposition parties do exist but are, in large part, funded by ;the PUK-KDP coalition. (Note. Some parties like the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) has an indepedent platform and some independent popular support. End Note) The head of the KDP is Masoud Barzani who is President of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The KDP consists of family clans, operating very much like a mafia organization. For example, his uncle is Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari, his nephew/son-in-law is KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani and his son Masrur is Head of KRG's Intelligence Directorate. By contrast, the PUK has been described as an umbrella of different personalities with Iraq's President Jalal Talabani at its head. Like KDP, PUK's politburo mainly consists of old guard Peshmerga generals. KRG VP is former Peshmerga General Kosrat Rasoul, however, Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih is a Princeton-educated western user-friendly fluent English speaker. Considering the tumultuous history of the Kurds, especially at the hands of Saddam, many Kurdish leaders sought refuge in various countries and maintain dual citizenship. -------------- KURDISH ALLIANCE - ONE AND ONLY QKURDISH ALLIANCE - ONE AND ONLY -------------- ¶3. (C) From 1994-1998, the KDP and PUK were at war with each other. The USG helped broker a KDP-PUK accord, which put an end to the fighting and split power-sharing 50/50 in the ministries, parliament, and its military. Since the fall of Saddam, Kurdish-controlled areas have become Iraq's most stable and prosperous region, although one that still depends heavily on government funding and, ultimately, rent from Iraqi oil exports. There is stability coming from an often stifling authoritarian style of democracy and pervasive corruption that likely hinders some investment (ref B). During the 2005 government formation, Talabani and Barzani put aside their ideological differences, formed the Kurdistan Alliance (KAL) and headed to Baghdad with all their eggs in a unified basket. The KAL has proven to be a disciplined force in both regional and national politics, with Talabani agreeing to stay in Baghdad and work with the GoI and Masoud Barzani assuming the mantle of KRG President. As long as Talabani is President of Iraq and Barzani is President of BAGHDAD 00000859 002 OF 003 Kurdistan, the KDP-PUK power balance is maintained. -------------- PUK SQUABBLES -------------- ¶4. (C) As such, Talabani brought a handful of trusted politicos to Baghdad to represent Kurdish interests at the national level. Talabani has demonstrated that he is the grand master of consensus building and deal making (nationally, if not within his own party),ensuring that the Kurds are not left out of the national agenda. However, in doing so, there is a schism between Baghdad PUK and Sulemaniyah PUK. PUK is weaker in the North, unable to match the power of Masoud Barzani and his KDP clan. The KRG seat of government in KDP's home town of Erbil has enjoyed accelerated growth and prosperity compared to PUK's home town Sulemaniyah. Even though Kurdistan has never had it so good, there is growing resentment by Sulemaniyah-based PUK towards KDP and in part towards Talabani and his Baghdad team for being more "Iraqi" than "Kurdish." ¶5. (C) While Talabani continues to "fight the fight" in Baghdad, disgruntled PUK leaders sit in Sulemaniyah, with few understanding the value of having Talabani in Baghdad. In October 2008, after spending 3 months in the US recuperating from heart surgery, Talabani addressed PUK leaders' demands for reform by establishing committees to overhaul PUK's 32 centers worldwide. In addition, he delegated equal authority to KRG VP Kosrat Rasoul Ali and DPM Barham Salih to manage PUK affairs on his behalf. The committee findings, unveiled in February 2009, did not anoint the disgruntled with key positions. As a result, more PUK internal powerplays have ensued and negotiations continue to plague Talabani. In an effort to restore PUK's regional prowess, Talabani decided to nominate DPM Barham Salih to be KRG's next Prime Minister. The move would boost the PUK's power in the KRG but also would weaken the Kurds influence in Baghdad. KDP leaders can only fret on the sidelines and hope that Talabani's health remains stable. At a time when Kurd-Arab tensions are elevated, the Kurdish leadership recognizes the need to be a unified front in battling with Maliki and the central government. -------------- THE FUTURE - SUCCESSION -------------- ¶6. (C) The PUK's internal squabbles have revealed that competent Kurdish leaders are few in number. Several Kurdish leaders do not speak Arabic, have no interest in national politics and could not effectively serve in Baghdad. Others lack the Peshmerga legacy that gives them credibility to thrive in regional politics. Maintaining the PUK-KDP accord becomes a burden since leadership positions must rotate between KDP and PUK. The current family structure of the KDP and lack of acceptable new blood in PUK leaves both parties struggling to fill strategic posts. The KRG draft constitution limits the presidency to two four-year consecutive terms. Thus,KDP leader Masoud Barzani has an end date. There is much speculation about who in the KDP could succeed Masoud Barzani and be a counterweight to Jalal Talabani's successor in the PUK. Recent polling in Kurdistan indicates that the people are fed up with the insider game, want an end to KRG corruption and lack of transparency. At some point, KDP and PUK will need to amend their accord. In addition, on March 14, Talabani mentioned that he may not run for President in the next national elections. This has started another round of musical chairs that would involve Arab Sunnis who seek more high-profile external Iraqi QArab Sunnis who seek more high-profile external Iraqi positions like the Presidency and the Foreign Ministry. Several trades would have to be negotiated. -------------- BROKEN TRUST - FORTRESS KURDISTAN -------------- ¶7. (C) Kurdish leaders have more than just internal party politics to worry about. Their prosperity is viewed by the lower 14 governorates as greedy overreach. PM Maliki's rhetoric reflects the general Arab view that it is time to push back on the Kurds and replace KRG "facts on the ground" in disputed areas. In this year of elections, Maliki and other Arab nationalist politicians play the Kurd card often. Barzani is not able to refrain and has entered into a tit for tat, criticizing Maliki's dictatorial ways. Rhetoric has increased on both sides. The relationship between Masoud Barzani and Maliki has devolved into a precarious war of words. ¶8. (C) In August 2008, when Maliki moved IA into Khanaqin, BAGHDAD 00000859 003 OF 003 an area secured by the Peshmerga, Barzani considered Maliki's unilateral maneuver a personal betrayal of their friendship. Masoud recalled a time which Maliki lived for two years with the Barzanis fighting Saddam. He earned his warrior name - Kak Jawad (Brother Jawad) - and was considered a dear friend. U.S. intervention defused the situation and prevented a military confrontation. But now that the trust has been broken, Barzani believes Maliki is just getting started and Khanaqin is the first step towards taking Kirkuk and even Erbil. U.S. prodding made a reluctant Barzani travel to Baghdad in November and extend the olive branch, establishing the 5 Party Committee talks as a mechanism to resolve regional/central government issues. Unfortunately, this process ran out of steam during the ratification of the US-Iraq Security Agreement. ¶9. (C) Maliki's move to establish tribal councils in disputed areas using PMO funds, to replace Kurdish IA commanders with Arabs, his plan to move IA troops to the northern side of the disputed city of Kirkuk, has Barzani feeling isolated and under siege. The Kurds are nervous. Combined with a stalled oil legislation, Dawa's success in the provincial elections, and perceived USG indifference to their concerns, Barzani has deep suspicions of Maliki's true intentions. We have highlighted to Barzani that the front line of defending Kurdish interests and autonomy is not Kirkuk or Khanaqin but rather Baghdad. We have urged him to engage more, both with KRG officials visiting Baghdad to find political allies on various issues and in Barzani himself occasionally lobbying in the capital. Barzani, however, hasn't done much to follow up with Iraqi officials in Baghdad, leaving this to Talabani and DPM Saleh. ¶10. (C) As we work to prevent an armed confrontation between Iraqi security forces and Kurdish regional security forces in the North, we also have to foster communication and political discussions between Erbil and Baghdad. This does not mean bringing Barzani to Baghdad promptly. All our contacts in Baghdad caution that a visit must be properly prepared so that Maliki and Barzani have productive discussions. The meeting between Maliki and Nechirvan Barzani last week was a step towards establishing better communication but we have far to go before Baghdad and Erbil start serious discussions about the issues that divide them. BUTENIS