PRT DIYALA: POTENTIAL NEW PC ALLIANCES CROSSING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000845 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2019 TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ SUBJECT: PRT DIYALA: POTENTIAL NEW PC ALLIANCES CROSSING ETHNIC/SECTARIAN LINES REF: A. BAGHDAD 49 ¶B. BAGHDAD 64 ¶C. BAGHDAD 242 ¶D. BAGHDAD 712 Classified By: PRT Diyala Leader George White for reasons 1.4 (a) and ( d). (U) This is a PRT Diyala reporting cable. ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Coalition negotiations in Diyala province remain fluid and inconclusive. After weeks of behind-the-scenes talks, two major blocs are forming; both cross traditional ethnic and sectarian divisions. The first bloc is comprised of the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP)-dominated Tawafuq coalition and the Kurdish Alliance (KA). The second consists of Saleh Al Mutlaq's Sunni Arab Iraqi National Project (INP),Ayad Allawi's secular Iraqi National List (INL),and two of the three the Shi'a parties. The two wild cards in these negotiations are potential splits from the Kurdish and Shi'a coalitions. The Shi'a parties in Diyala have complained about the fairness of the elections and have threatened to boycott the new PC. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Major parties and coalitions in Diyala province continue their negotiations over the composition of the new provincial government. The negotiations are primarily taking place among party leaders at the national level -- in many cases, the new PC members are not directly involved in the talks. Indeed, the national INP has even created a special committee to handle the negotiations. Others, such as the Shi'a parties, have told the PRT that they intend to adhere to whatever decisions are taken in Baghdad by their negotiating teams. However, new PC member Abdallah al-Jabouri, the leader of the Diyala branch of the INL, claims to be independent from Allawi's national INL in Baghdad and to be conducting his own negotiations at the provincial level. ¶3. (C) The new Diyala PC will have 29 seats, thus requiring 15-seats for a majority. According to Abdallah, the INP (six seats) and the INL (three seats) have formed a bloc. This bloc's nine seats in the new PC would give it parity with Tawafuq (also nine seats). The INP-INL bloc is negotiating aggressively to carve out a majority. It has made overtures to the Shi'a parties as well as to the KDP. PRT contacts confirm that, while Maliki's State of Law (SoL--two seats) and Jaafari's National Reform Trend (NRT--one seat) have sided with the INP-INL bloc, the Al Hakims' Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI--two seats) has not, thus far. ¶4. (C) The INP-INL bloc has opened talks with Masoud Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in hopes of playing on KDP discontent and splitting the unity of the KA. The KDP is dissatisfied with its single PC seat, while the Talabani-led Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) has three. (NOTE: The KA has six total seats; the additional two Kurdish seats are held by small socialist and communist parties. END NOTE). The bloc is also focusing on the personal desires of Assistant Governor Emad (KDP),who has made it clear that he wants to be Deputy Governor. Should the INP-INL alliance lure ISCI and the KDP to their bloc, they would just achieve the required 15-seat majority in the new PC (INP 6, INL 3, SL 2, ISCI 2, NRT 1, KDP 1). ¶5. (C) Tawafuq, with its nine seats, is counting on the support of a unified KA to obtain a majority and is luring it with the offer of the PC Chairmanship for a PUK Kurd. According to current PC Chairman Ibrahim Bajelan (Kurd-PUK), Tawafuq is also attempting to split the Shi'a parties by entering into secret negotiations with ISCI. (COMMENT: The PRT suspects that Tawafuq fears a KDP defection to the rival bloc. Thus, they are attempting to gain the support of ISCI Qbloc. Thus, they are attempting to gain the support of ISCI to replace the potential single-seat loss this would entail. END COMMENT). ¶6. (C) While the Kurds are attempting to appear unified publicly, in private both the PUK and KDP are conducting independent negotiations with the two blocs. Assistant Governor Emad confirmed that the PUK has entered into separate talks with Tawafuq, and emphasizes that the KDP has not yet agreed to join the Tawafuq-KA bloc. On the contrary, the KDP is contemplating joining the rival INP-INL bloc. Moreover, should it become clear that the INP-INL bloc would gain the majority, the PUK would be under tremendous pressure to follow suit. ¶7. (C) In recent meetings with the PRT, Shi'a party representatives complained about irregularities with the provincial elections; they expressed many of these concerns in advance of the election (ref A). They reject the election results as tainted and have threatened to boycott the new PC. BAGHDAD 00000845 002 OF 002 They are also threatening to use all means available to hinder the work of the provincial government. Specifically, they mentioned a possible work slow-down by the Shi'a members of the Governance Center staff. Since almost all of the office chiefs and most of their staff belong to outgoing Shi'a governor Ra'ad Tamimi's tribe, a slowdown by the Shi'a staff would have considerable impact on the functioning of the provincial government. These threats notwithstanding, the Shi'a are at the same time actively engaged in negotiations with the INP-INL bloc. COMMENT: We predict that if they can be part of a governing coalition without Tawafuq or the KA, the Shi'a parties will participate in the new PC. END COMMENT. ¶8. (C) COMMENT: The conflicting stories we hear of national involvement, local dealmaking, and counterintuitive alliances highlight the intense and still highly fluid nature of PC negotiations. It is hard to imagine the KDP defecting from the KA, since Kurdish organizational unity is so strong at a national level; it is likely that the entire KA will ally with Tawafuq or INP-INL as one unit. ISCI is obviously working both sides in order to extract maximum concessions--more prominent positions within the new provincial government. Two major issues will discourage it from entering into an agreement with the Tawafuq-KA bloc however. First, Tawafuq and ISCI have conflicting goals in many areas, primarily regarding relations with Iran. Second, the national leadership of ISCI may not want to break from the Shi'a ranks to align with the IIP with national elections coming in late 2009/early 2010. END COMMENT. BUTENIS