SHIA PARTIES FACE ISSUE-BASED FISSURES BEFORE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000083 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2029 TAGS: PGOV PINS KISL IZ SUBJECT: SHIA PARTIES FACE ISSUE-BASED FISSURES BEFORE PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS REF: A. BAGHDAD 003773 ¶B. BAGHDAD 000011 ¶C. GMP20081108641001 ¶D. 08 BAGHDAD3881 ¶E. 08 BAGHDAD 003023 ¶F. 08 BAGHDAD 3744 ¶G. 08 BAGHDAD 003870 ¶H. 08 BAGHDAD 002875 ¶I. 08 BAGHDAD 3791 Classified By: PMIN Robert S. Ford for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Shia political parties, especially ISCI and Da'wa, are engaged in ideological and policy-based battles among themselves that might foreshadow a permanent split of the Shia electoral alliance at the national level, according to numerous meetings with our Shia contacts in Baghdad. These battles are partially fueled by intra-Shia competition for the January 31 provincial elections, but also reflect potentially lasting fissures over issues like the proper use of security forces, the assertiveness of the Prime Minister's Office, economic privileges derived from government office, ideological guidance from Najaf, and the federal balance between center and province. Some observers think the split between the Shia Islamists is likely to grow, driven by rivalries in the Shia provincial governments. Already we are seeing instances of the Shia Islamist parties abandoning sectarian solidarity in favor of cross ethnic/sectarian alliances centered around issues. If sustained, that would be a very positive devel opment for Iraqi democracy. End Summary. -------------- -------------- Fellow Shia Recoiling at an Assertive Prime Minister -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) officials have regularly complained to Poloffs about Prime Minister Maliki's insular governing style and aggressive use of national security forces. Maliki, meanwhile, is campaigning for his "State of Law" electoral coalition largely on his record of providing security to areas formerly intimidated by militias. In meetings with Ambassador Crocker, ISCI Vice President Adil Abd al-Mahdi has repeatedly criticized Maliki for failing to consult with the Presidency Council and warned against a "strong man" as prime minister. In early December, Ammar al-Hakim, the son and likely successor to ISCI Chairman Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, asserted to PMIN that Maliki had used the pretext of going after terrorists to intimidate the Kurds during the Khanaqin standoff earlier in the year. Ammar said the Iraqi Army should merely "train, be professional, and remain in their barracks," rather than be used to solve local disputes. -------------- Some Shia Looking In -------------- ¶3. (C) Numerous Shia contacts outside of the dominant ISCI and Da'wa parties have repeatedly complained to Poloffs of being unfairly locked-out of power. In addition to wanting a stronger policy voice, these Shia officials seek an ability to distribute jobs and contracts to gain loyalists, an especially important perk given the anemic state of Iraq's private sector. For the Shia jockeying for government positions, this appears to be a zero-sum game. ¶4. (C) Falih al-Fayyad, a member of former Prime Minister Ibrahim Jafari's Reform Trend, complained to Poloff in December that the major political blocs do not consult with smaller ones like his own. Maliki's Da'wa in particular relied on a tight inner-circle, he said. Shia independent Qasim Daoud repeatedly complained about Prime Minister Maliki during meetings at his home with Poloffs, and said he was looking forward to working with ISCI to prevent Maliki from consolidating his "dictatorship." Qconsolidating his "dictatorship." ¶5. (C) Sadrist MPs have become remarkably marginalized. In meeting with Poloffs, many Shia MPs have been dismissive of their Sadrists colleagues, calling them "brutes" and "children" for protesting COR votes by yelling and pounding on tables. Fadilah has struggled for relevancy since it left the Maliki government in March 2007 because Maliki refused to give its opportunist members key cabinet positions. During the debate on the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement in parliament, MPs told Poloffs Fadilah had attempted to trade its support for the agreement for ministerial positions. The day before BAGHDAD 00000083 002 OF 003 the COR vote on the agreement, Fadilah bloc leader Hasan al-Shammeri asked PMIN for three armored cars and the release of a former Fadilah local official. In a meeting with Poloffs in December, Fadilah advisor Abbas al-Yaqubi said Fadilah is not a competitive party because it lacks a funding stream like Da'wa and ISCI, who he claimed receive support from Iran. (Note: Yaqubi was certainly seeking U.S. assistance. End note.) -------------- Becoming Less Tethered to Najaf -------------- ¶6. (C) The marja'iya (the clerical establishment) in Najaf, especially Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, remains a potent guide and source of unity for many Shia politicians at the national level. However, some Iraqi leaders are becoming less tethered to the marja'iya because of an increased confidence in taking major policy decisions on their own and Sistani's tacit approval of intra-Shia competition during provincial elections. In addition, Shia may split - at least temporarily - over who will replace the ailing SISTANI (ref B). ¶8. (C) During the negotiations and debate about the security agreement, Shia politicians took great care to keep the marja'iya informed. In meetings with Poloffs, however, prominent Da'wa MPs and close Maliki advisers Haidar al-Abadi and Hassan al-Sunayd seemingly shrugged off Sistani's public demand for a "national consensus" in parliament. While Sunni MPs wavered on whether to support the agreement, Abadi and Sunayd separately told Poloffs they were willing to push ahead on SoFA ratification despite Najaf's warning to include the Sunnis. Sistani's representative in Karbala days after the agreement passed called for a referendum (ref A). Even so, a few days later in a meeting with the Ambassador, Maliki did not appear eager to hold a public vote. ¶9. (C) SISTANI and the other marja'iya have stated they will not favor specific parties or candidates during the upcoming provincial elections, which has given ISCI and Da'wa cover to form competing coalitions nationwide. Our contacts, however, tell us SISTANI had asked for a unified Shia list in mixed ethno-sectarian provinces but Da'wa and ISCI failed to reach a compromise on seat allocation. Shia parliamentarian Qasim Daoud in December told Poloffs his Solidarity Party will follow Sistani's guidance by running with ISCI's coalition in Diyala, but ISCI and Da'wa are split there because their intra-Shia competition trumped Sistani's guidance. -------------- Federalism Divides Shia -------------- ¶10. (C) The distribution of power between the center and provinces has re-emerged as a salient divide among Shia politicians in Baghdad. Maliki in early November publically said he wishes to revisit federalism in favor of a stronger center (ref C). Ridha Taqi, the head of political relations for ISCI, days later told PMIN that Maliki's speech "attacked the constitution" and that federalism has become a sensitive topic between senior ISCI leaders and Maliki. Haitham al-Husseini, a senior adviser to Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, wondered why Maliki criticized the constitution given his role in drafting it. Da'wa MP Haidar al-Abadi told Poloffs that Maliki's speech merely reflected discussions that were occurring behind closed doors. (Note: Federalism is being addressed in one of the five close-hold inter-party committees established in the fall, ref D. End Note.) ¶11. (C) The most public recent example of the federalism dispute is the controversy about Maliki's Tribal Support Qdispute is the controversy about Maliki's Tribal Support Councils (refs E, F),although other disputes are likely to Emerge too. As stipulated in the Law of Governorate Councils (aka the Provincial Powers Law),after the January 31 elections, provinces will gain enhanced authority over appointing local officials and over local security, a likely source of friction between an increasingly assertive central government and southern provinces in which ISCI currently is strong. The upcoming budget fight in the COR might pit Da'wa against ISCI. An ISCI MP who sits on the Finance Committee in December complained to Poloffs that the budget proposed by the Maliki government unfairly cuts funding to the provinces. ¶12. (C) Shia also lack a common vision about regions formation. Ridha Taqi and Haitham Husseini both told Poloffs that Iraq is not ready for the formation of (political) regions, citing specifically the Fadilah-sponsored initiative in Basra (ref G). Ammar al-Hakim, however, told PMIN in December that ISCI still favors regions formation, but that BAGHDAD 00000083 003 OF 003 they should not be based along sectarian lines. Maliki's Da'wa and the Sadrists remain opposed to regions formation, although neither have offered strong public critiques of Fadilah's efforts. -------------- Comment: A Permanent Split? -------------- ¶13. (C) As Da'wa and ISCI compete head-on in provincial elections (ref H),Sadrists contemplate their political future, and "liberals" like former prime ministers Ayad Allawi (Iraqi National List) and Ibrahim al-Jafari (Reform Trend) seek their niche among Iraqis disaffected by the religious parties, we may see a permanent split among Shia parties based on ideology and policy priorities. If true, this could open Iraq's political scene for cross-sectarian electoral alliances (ref I). The Sadrists and Fadilah already have forged an informal alliance in the COR with some Sunni parties joined by elements of Ayed Allawi's secularist Iraqi National List that also feel locked-out of power -- the so-called Parliament Coordination Group, or the July 22 Bloc. ISCI's cooperation with the Kurdish Alliance on federalism and power-sharing has become a pillar of politics in Baghdad. In the fall, ISCI, the Kurds, and the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) pressured Maliki's Da'wa to form the five party committees to address the most contentious disputes. ¶14. (C) How provincial governments are formed after elections will test whether this intra-Shia split is permanent. Raja al-Khalili, an advisor to ISCI Vice President Mahdi, told Poloff in November and January that the ongoing tension between ISCI and Da'wa might prevent the two from forming governing coalitions in the provinces after the January 31 election. Khalili predicted there will be no unified Shia banner in national elections. ¶15. (C) The COR must pass legislation to determine the rules for the next round of national elections, planned for late 2009 or early 2010. The 2005 national elections system favored large coalitions that appealed to sectarian identities. This, along with the Iraqi Constitution that charges the largest bloc in the COR with forming a government, gave the Shia incentives to run under a unified banner so to ensure a Shia prime minister. A question that some political thinkers here (Shia and others) will wonder if the Shia Islamists' split endures well into 2009 is whether one could imagine national lists that combine Kurdish and/or Sunni Arab parties running for parliament. CROCKER