DIWANIYAH: COALITION-BUILDING REMAINS STYMIED,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000799 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2019 TAGS: PGOV IZ SUBJECT: DIWANIYAH: COALITION-BUILDING REMAINS STYMIED, EXPECTATIONS FOR NEXT PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT HIGH REF: BAGHDAD 520 Classified By: PRT Team Leader Michael Klecheski for reasons 1.4 (b) an d (d). This is a PRT Diwaniyah reporting cable. ¶1. (C) Summary: Impatience appears to be growing that Diwaniyah's new Provincial Council (PC) has not been seated. The composition of the eventual ruling coalition and the identity of the new governor remain highly uncertain due to a lack of clear signals from Baghdad, coupled with continued infighting within the winning State of Law election list. While this transition period has in no way paralyzed the current provincial government, it has left directors-general cautious about new initiatives. On the good side, civil society activists remain hopeful that the new provincial authorities, whoever they turn out to be, will prove easier to deal with than the incumbents. End Summary. Impatience That PC Not Yet Seated -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Over the past week, we have seen mounting signs of impatience that the new PC has yet to be seated. This is most evident in the provincial media, which are quoting the complaints of a growing number of politicians of various stripes that the election results have yet to be certified. Previously, politicians both in public and private had criticized the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) for allowing fraud; several blamed Diwaniyah's Governorate Electorate Office (GEO) for acting in the interests of ISCI, which they claimed controls that office. Now these charges have largely been replaced by attacks on IHEC for its failure to certify the election results. ¶3. (C) In a March 19 meeting with BG Smith, our brigade colleagues and the PRT, outgoing Governor Khudari (ISCI) suggested that he was eager to begin a smooth transition. While he was not required immediately to call the new PC into session once the results have been certified, Khudari said he would act quickly, calling a session within no more than a few days of certification. A Tough Slog on Coalition-Building -------------- ¶4. (C) Despite the sense of urgency to get down to work, it remains highly unclear which forces will unite into a ruling coalition and who will be chosen as PC chairman and governor. Governor Khudari reported that negotiations among the parties are proving difficult, although there is a broad commitment to include as many of them as possible in the ruling coalition (with the exception of ISCI). Ex-Prime Minister Ja'afari's National Reform Trend (three seats),Ayad Allawi's Iraqi National List (three),the Sadrist Tayar al-Ahrar (two),Fadhilah (two),and the local Islamic Loyalty Party (two) are all still discussing possible alliances with State of Law/Da'wa, which holds 11 of the 28 seats. Sheikh Hussein Sha'alan, a CoR member who is arguably the province's most influential and politically informed sheikh, told us on March 21 that no decision had been made on coalition-building or executive positions. This indecision is the result of serious infighting within the State of Law list, which won the most votes in the election, and from a lack of definitive guidance from the Prime Minister's office in Baghdad. None of the various components making up State of Law is backing off from seeking the governorship, we were told. ¶5. (C) Several contacts have speculated that the governorship will ultimately go to Da'wa Central (Islamic Da'wa),primarily because PM Maliki wants "his own man" running the province ahead of national elections in December. If Maliki's faction of Da'wa gets the governorship, Q If Maliki's faction of Da'wa gets the governorship, provincial party head Salim Hussein Alwan and deputy party head Fadel Mawat -- who is also chief of the Tribal Support Council -- are still considered the two leading candidates (reftel). In Sheikh Sha'alan's view, Mawat, though a favorite of many sheikhs, has a shady past that makes his selection unlikely. ¶6. (C) Talk of choosing an independent as the next governor still persists, though it has subsided somewhat. Among the independents mentioned is retired General Abdulameer Obais, who fled Iraq in 1991, returning a few years ago to become a successful businessman. Taking the initiative to meet with us, perhaps in hope of gaining some implied support from the PRT, Obais claimed having been told by Maliki that an independent governor would be best for the province. Obais told us he believes he can gain the governorship, and that he would focus on attracting investors, and on reconstruction and anti-corruption measures as priorities of his BAGHDAD 00000799 002 OF 002 administration. We have no way of judging if Obais has much chance of becoming governor, although we have heard other sources mention him as a possibility; several sheikhs with whom we spoke clearly dislike him, describing him as an untrustworthy opportunist. Challenges of the Transition -------------- ¶7. (C) The current transition period has in no way paralyzed the incumbent provincial administration, but it has had a negative effect. Khudari, though well aware that his time in office is drawing to a close, remains relatively active and engaged. One of his chief deputies, who had hoped to stay on in the next administration, also remains engaged but has sent out feelers for employment in Baghdad. We have seen the most impact on ministerial directors-general, at least some of whom are uncertain of keeping their jobs and obviously fearful of taking any steps that might invoke the ire of the next administration. ¶8. (C) For the PRT, this has been most evident in our inability to hold a session of the Agricultural Advisory Council; though Governor Khudari finally approved its establishment shortly before the election, the relevant DGs have indicated they want to hold off on getting it under way until they get approval from the next governor. Meanwhile, we hear rumors that the DG of Agriculture is among several who, being seen as closely tied to ISCI, may be replaced when a new governor assumes office. Hopefulness among Independent Activists -------------- ¶9. (C) For civil society activists with whom we have met over the past few weeks, the prospect of a new governor and PC to replace the incumbents remains highly encouraging, even if the pace of choosing them is discouragingly slow. In several meetings, we heard the same reprise: that the current ISCI government obstructed the growth of independent civil society and that the new provincial administration, whoever ends up heading it, can only be an improvement. Our interlocutors identified several people within the next PC who have proven themselves progressive on human rights and women's issues. Women activists said that two of the next PC's six women would prove important allies; while there might be some attempts to marginalize them because they were women, neither of the two would allow that to happen. Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) The delay in seating the new PC has not marred the image of electoral democracy in the province, but it has begun to elicit growing impatience and suspicion that the election was conducted badly and/or that the outcome may yet be manipulated by Baghdad. This could be exacerbated if the new PC, once it is seated, starts off by wrangling about the selection of a governor rather than selecting someone and quickly turning to activity seen as directly addressing such issues as essential services and the water shortage. End comment. BUTENIS