POTENTIAL ISSUES WITH KRG ELECTIONS: USG SHOULD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000787 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2019 TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ SUBJECT: POTENTIAL ISSUES WITH KRG ELECTIONS: USG SHOULD CALL FOR OPEN LISTS AND A CREDIBLE AND LEGITIMATE POLL REF: A. BAGHDAD 514 ¶B. BAGHDAD 642 Classified By: CDA Patricia Butenis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Elections for the 111-member Kurdish parliament are planned for May 19. These elections are not likely to be a potential flashpoint in Kurd-Arab tensions. That said, the Kurdish elections are important to U.S. interests. How they are conducted, both in terms of meeting (or not) international norms and what administrative role the central government will play, will factor into Iraq's overall political dynamic. Moreover, the leadership in Iraqi Kurdistan is struggling to maintain its traditional power. It needs to start finding and developing future leaders, and these elections are a means to that end. This cable conveys Embassy's policy approach three issues: elections timing, open or closed lists, and which bureaucratic entity administers the elections. Embassy will underscore to Kurdish leaders that the U.S. will not endorse the KRG parliamentary elections as entirely credible and legitimate unless they in fact meet international norms. Building genuine democracy in Iraqi Kurdistan will be a long process and we should begin laying markers now. At the same time, our advocacy for good elections must be calibrated with our efforts with the Kurds in other important areas such as settling Kirkuk/Article 23, Article 140, and reducing Kurd-Arab tensions to avoid a national civil war. End Summary. -------------- Background/State of Play -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The last Kurdish National Assembly (KNA) elections, held in 2005, were administered by the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI),the precursor to the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) in Baghdad. KRG Parliamentary elections are governed by the 1992 Election Law (amended in 1994, 1998, and 2004). Elections are by closed list. A new amendment currently under consideration in the KNA would: -- raise the quota for women from 25 to 30%; -- lower the minimum age for candidates from 30 to 25; and -- establish minority set-aside seats: five for Turcoman, five for Christians, and one for Armenians. ¶3. (SBU) As reported ref B, on March 1, KRG President Barzani returned the draft Election Law amendment to the KNA with the request that the law also provide for the establishment of a Kurdistan electoral office to administer elections in the KRG; adopt language that would limit electoral lists that are not associated with a political party; allow for Kurds outside the country to vote; and stipulate that the Kurdistan High Judicial Council rather than a federal judicial entity would have responsibility for resolving electoral complaints. The KNA is reviewing the President's comments. (Note: Barzani will be out of the country until March 31. End note.) -------------- KRG Parliamentary Elections: What We Want -------------- ¶4. (C) We have an interest in the Kurdish regional elections. As we have reported (see ref A for example),the old-guard Kurdish leadership here is facing real pressures for change as it tries to maintain power. It needs to find and begin grooming new leaders. Moreover, Iraqi Arabs perceive that we have a special relationship with the Iraqi Kurds. If Iraqi Arabs perceive that we wink at Kurdish anti-democratic practices we will have more difficulties convincing Iraqi Arabs to improve upon their efforts to build a more transparent and accountable system in the rest of Iraq. Qa more transparent and accountable system in the rest of Iraq. ¶5. (C) Therefore, unless instructed otherwise, Embassy officials, in their conversations with Kurdish leaders, will underscore that the U.S. will not endorse the KRG parliamentary elections as credible and legitimate unless they meet international norms. The ideal elections would be open list and overseen by an independent, technically capable body. There would be a neutral mechanism to monitor ballot security, and domestic and international observers would monitor not only voting on election day, but the campaign period to certify that political parties representing a broad spectrum of candidates were able to freely express a broad range of views and compete equally. -------------- Policy Issue #1: Timing -------------- BAGHDAD 00000787 002 OF 003 ¶6. (C) As noted in reftel B, the May 19 date may slip to late 2009 or early 2010; they might even be held concurrently with national parliamentary elections. The voters list has to be updated. Candidates need to be registered and vetted and political entity lists confirmed. Ballots need to be designed and printed. Polling centers need to be located and staff trained. Security arrangements need to be made. The 1992 Election Law requires a 60-day lead period between passage of an amendment to the Elections Law and the holding of elections. IHEC regulations require 90 days. The KNA's term ends on June 19. If the elections are delayed beyond June 19, there would need to be an amendment to extend the parliament's mandate until election day. ¶7. (C) Unless instructed otherwise, Embassy will urge the KRG leadership to hold the parliamentary elections as soon as practical according to national and regional laws and regulations. The timing of the elections is a matter for the KRG to resolve. UNAMI, which has the international lead on elections assistance, shares this view. A postponement -- as long as it is not indefinite. -- would not adversely affect U.S. interests. -------------- Policy Issue #2: Open or Closed List? -------------- ¶8. (C) Although stipulated in the KRG election law, the decision to use a closed, combined KDP/PUK candidate list has provoked negative press commentary and continues to be contested by the Islamic parties Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) and Kurdistan Islamic Group (KIG) which have submitted a separate bill to the KNA to change the election process to an open list format. However, KRG leadership sees closed lists as essential to maintaining the PUK/KDP 1998 Washington Agreement that ended the KDP-PUK civil war, establishing a joint list with a 50-50 split of PUK-KDP seats in the Kurdish National Assembly. Many Kurdish leaders argue that the KDP or the PUK would outscore its rival and thus alter the carefully negotiated balance between the two parties, risking a resumption of KDP-PUK fighting. ¶9. (C) Unless instructed otherwise, Embassy will call a closed list KRG parliamentary election what it would be: neither very transparent nor especially democratic. We would be hypocritical to demand open lists for provincial and national elections and look the other way on KRG elections. We will caution the Kurdish leadership that they will face criticism from the USG and the international community if they have a combined PUK-KDP closed list. That an open list could lead to renewed KDP-PUK fighting should not be readily or casually dismissed. It is possible. For the parties' leadership, the risk of renewed internecine fighting outweighs the embarrassment of international and U.S. criticism. We will recognize and even be understanding of their dilemma, but we will urge them to find ways to settle their political competition transparently and peacefully and to recognize the need to develop future leaders. We need not approve of any election process they put forward and thus we will lay down a clear marker that we would criticize a closed-list election process. -------------- -------------- Policy Issue #3: Who Should Manage Elections in the KRG? -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) There is a debate between the KRG and IHEC as to which should supervise KRG elections. President Barzani has indicated that the KRG, as an autonomous region, should Qindicated that the KRG, as an autonomous region, should supervise its own elections, not Baghdad. For that reason, he wants the Kurdish Regional Technical Committee for Elections, and not IHEC, to supervise the elections. The IHEC Board of Commissioners, led by Chairman Faraj Al-Haydari (a Kurd),has argued that IHEC has the authority, credibility, and technical capacity to supervise KRG elections. During the first week of March, IHEC presented its points to the Legal Committee of the Kurdish National Assembly, and they report that there is agreement at the legal and technical level. However, Barzani has not yet accepted the proposal. Based on previous Kurdish electoral skullduggery, there is merit in having a non-KRG entity supervise to ensure legitimate and credible elections. IHEC, with assistance from its International Electoral Assistance Team (IEAT) technical advisors, has already prepared an operational plan for the KRG parliamentary elections, including a budget of USD 37.4 million. IHEC is ready to work with the Kurdistan Regional Elections Office (KREO) in Erbil, and each of the Governorate Electoral Offices (GEOs) in the three provinces. IHEC began to work with these regional entities when they administered IDP voting during the provincial elections in January. BAGHDAD 00000787 003 OF 003 ¶11. (C) According to Iraq's Constitution Article 110, elections are not a federal government authority. All powers not stipulated as exclusive to or shared by the GOI, are under the authority of the region(s) or provinces. In our view, the KRG does not have a legal reason to accept IHEC's supervision of KRG elections. However for technical and budgetary reasons, and for increased credibility, IHEC is the best choice for supervising elections in the KRG. ¶12. (C) Unless instructed otherwise, Embassy will urge the KRG accept IHEC's proposal to supervise the KRG elections. If KRG decides against IHEC's proposal, we should encourage the KRG to take advantage of its invitation to have IEAT (UNAMI plus the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, USAID's implementing partner on technical assistance for IHEC) support for the election. -------------- Kurdish Elections and Other U.S. Interests -------------- ¶13. (C) We can anticipate some strong resistance from Massoud Barzani, Jalal Talabani and other Kurdish leaders when we lay down markers about their elections. We can expect to be pressing the Kurds on other issues, such as settling Kirkuk/Article 23, disputed territories and Article 140, and reducing Kurd-Arab tensions to avoid a national civil war. Our advocacy for good elections must be calibrated with these other efforts with the Kurds. BUTENIS