IRAQ 201: SNAPSHOT OF IRAQ'S REGIONAL DIPLOMATIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BAGHDAD 000733 SIPDIS PLEASE PASS TO AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE HILL E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ GCC SUBJECT: IRAQ 201: SNAPSHOT OF IRAQ'S REGIONAL DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT REF: A. BAGHDAD 630 ¶B. BAGHDAD 575 ¶C. BAGHDAD 532 Classified By: PMIN Robert Ford for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). (U) This one in a series of messages intended to provide background for policy-makers on Iraq. -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Ref A provided a broad overview of Iraq's diplomatic relations with its neighbors and a proposed U.S. strategy for consolidating Iraq's regional reintegration. Ref B analyzed Iraqi-Iranian relations. This cable aims to complement those messages by providing a snapshot of practical efforts that have been undertaken over the past several months to strengthen Iraq's engagement with its neighbors. This cable also reports on the status of new Arab embassies in Baghdad and how internal GOI deficiencies (the weak position of the MFA vis-a-vis other GOI bodies and its sour relationship with the Prime Minister's Office) make progress slower than it otherwise could be. End Summary. -------------- -------------- Iraq's Regional Reintegration: A Long-standing Policy Goal -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Since the fall of the Saddam regime, U.S. strategy has sought to help reintegrate Iraq into its neighborhood, strengthen its bilateral ties with key Arab countries, encourage those countries to take a more active role in supporting Iraq's development as a stable, peaceful neighbor, and anchor Iraq firmly in the camp of Arab moderates. While many of these countries had voiced support in the abstract for these goals, concrete steps were few and far between. Sunni Arab states' anxiety about the nature and intentions of Iraq's new Shi'a-led government and its relations with Iran compounded very real security concerns about reestablishing a diplomatic presence in Baghdad -- concerns rooted in tragic events including the August 2003 bombing of the Jordanian Embassy and the July 2005 kidnapping and murder of the Egyptian Ambassador. -------------- 2008 - Concrete Steps at Last -------------- ¶3. (C) A virtuous cycle of engagement began in late Spring ¶2008. The June 5 visit of UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayid initiated a string of high-level visits to Baghdad from Iraq's neighbors. Then in September/October, key Arab states (UAE, Jordan, Bahrain, Kuwait and Syria) returned Ambassadors to Iraq. The GOI reciprocated by naming Ambassadors to Saudi Arabia, Syria, Qatar, Turkey, Lebanon and Bahrain (albeit with a delay until early 2009 before they were dispatched to their posts) but has not yet named Ambassadors to Egypt, UAE or Kuwait. At present, all of the new Arab embassies in Baghdad continue to operate temporarily and in a very limited fashion from the Rasheed Hotel in the International Zone (IZ) (except for Syria which has an operating embassy in the Red Zone). They hope to begin moving into permanent, secure quarters in the IZ later this Spring when renovation work on their assigned properties in the Diplomatic Zone adjacent to the U.S. Embassy are complete. ¶4. (U) Para 9 presents a detailed country-by-country summary of Iraq's engagement with its neighbors. -------------- GOI Internal Deficiencies Make Things More Difficult Than They Have to Be -------------- ¶5. (C) The decisions of Arab states to dispatch high level official delegations, send Ambassadors and reopen embassies in Baghdad signaled a new level of confidence in Iraq's future, as well as an understanding that a stable Iraq is a Qfuture, as well as an understanding that a stable Iraq is a key counterweight to Iranian influence in the region. Visits by Arab VIPs have become, if not commonplace, then at least no longer remarkable and a gauge of how far we have come in a relatively short period of time. That said, there is also a sense of frustration -- by many of these countries, as well as by us -- that the GOI has not taken full advantage of these overtures. The fact that Iraq has yet to name ambassadors to the UAE, Kuwait or Egypt, is a case in point. Similarly, new Arab diplomatic missions in Baghdad report regular difficulty in getting answers and/or timely BAGHDAD 00000733 002 OF 005 assistance from the Iraqi MFA as they work to stand up their embassies. ¶6. (C) In part, these are problems of capacity, training and resources at the MFA. The circle of competent officials in the Foreign Ministry who have the confidence of, and are empowered by Foreign Minister Zebari is very small. The dedicated MFA team working directly with the new Arab embassies is even smaller. In October, as the full brunt of the increased number of visits and Arab Embassies was at its peak, Ambassador Crocker stressed to Foreign Minister Zebari the urgent need for MFA to beef up its resources in this regard. Zebari promised that he was implementing such a plan, although until now it appears that very limited progress has been made. ¶7. (C) More troubling, however, has been the dysfunctional relationship between Zebari and Prime Minister Maliki. Their inability to agree on key Iraqi diplomatic assignments has left many key Iraqi ambassadorships vacant for an inexcusable length of time. (Note: The Ambassador, DCM and other emboffs have repeatedly raised the need to appoint key ambassadors with Maliki, his Chief of Staff and MFA officials including Zebari. End note.) Similarly, the battle between the Prime Minister's Office and the MFA for control of various IZ properties (until recently held by the U.S.) led to confusion and delay in designating these properties for new Arab (and other country) embassies. In each case, internal GOI friction caused delays in steps that should have been -- relatively speaking -- straightforward, and slowed progress in developing these bilateral relationships to a level where they could focus on more substantive issues. ¶8. (C) That said, as we look ahead to the coming months, Baghdad will see the opening of several real, bricks-and-mortar Arab embassies (UAE, Jordan, Bahrain, Kuwait, and possibly Egypt) staffed with permanent diplomats. At that point, hopefully, the focus of their (and our) efforts will not be simply on reestablishing their presence in Iraq, but on the important goals of promoting productive relationships across the full range of issues that make up a healthy bilateral relationship. -------------- Country by Country - Where Things Stand -------------- ¶9. (C) A summary of key events/aspects of Iraq's engagement with its neighbors follows: UAE --- -- June 5: UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayid visits Baghdad, the highest ranking Sunni Arab official to do so since the fall of Saddam. -- July 6-7: PM Maliki visits Abu Dhabi, during which the UAE announces cancellation of Iraq's $7 billion debt and the appointment of Ambassador Abdullah al-Shehhi as UAE Ambassador to Iraq. -- July 17-19: UAE hosts the Friends of Iraq meeting in Abu Dhabi. -- September 4: Ambassador Al-Shehhi travels to Baghdad and presents his credentials during an initial five-day visit. -- October 3: UAE Crown Prince Muhammad bin Zayid, along with the UAE's Interior, Defense and Foreign Ministers visit Baghdad. -- December 2: Ambassador al-Shehhi hosts a large UAE National Day reception at the Rasheed Hotel. Since September, Ambassador Al-Shehhi and a small embassy team have worked out of the Rasheed. Renovation work is underway on two villas immediately adjacent the NEC that, when ready later in the Spring, will house their new embassy. Despite the UAE's role in catalyzing the return of other Arab countries to Baghdad, the GOI has still not agreed internally on who will be Iraq's Ambassador in Abu Dhabi. We have Qon who will be Iraq's Ambassador in Abu Dhabi. We have repeatedly stressed to the Prime Minister's Office and the MFA the need to resolve this quickly and fill this gap. Jordan -------------- -- June 12-13: Prime Minister Maliki visits Amman. -- August 11: King Abdullah visits Baghdad, becoming the BAGHDAD 00000733 003 OF 005 first Arab Head of State to do so since the fall of Saddam. -- September 14: three Jordanian diplomats arrive in Baghdad to reestablish Jordan's diplomatic presence and begin work on renovating an IZ property that will become the Jordanian embassy. -- October 15: Jordanian Ambassador Nayef Fantoul al-Zeidan arrives in Baghdad for a week-long visit and presents credentials. Ambassador Al-Zeidan has not been back to Baghdad since this initial October visit and will only return when the permanent Embassy facility is ready for occupancy). Jordan's diplomatic team (lead by a Charge) currently operates out of the Rasheed. They believe they will be able to move into their permanent IZ quarters in late April/early May. Embassy Amman has reported the possibility that Jordanian PM Dhababi will lead a delegation to Baghdad in the coming weeks. In a recent conversation, the Jordanian Charge indicated that a Ministerial visit may be pushed back to coincide with Jordan's May 25 National Day. Turkey -------------- -- July 10: Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan visits Baghdad and meets with GOI leadership. -- December 24: PM Maliki visits Ankara, with much discussion focused on economic, energy, and water issues. During that meeting, Turkish President Gul rebutted GOI criticisms that GoT Special Envoy Ozcelik had been interfering in internal Iraqi affairs, particularly as it related to U.S.-Iraqi negotiations on a bilateral security agreement. March 14-15: President Talabani travels to Ankara for official visit. March 22-23: President Gul to visit President Talabani and PM Maliki in Baghdad. Note: Septel will cove the Iraqi-Turkish relationship as seen from Baghdad in more detail. Bahrain -------------- -- September 2-4: Bahraini technical team makes initial visit to view possible IZ properties for the Bahraini Embassy. -- October 7: Bahraini Ambassador Salah Ali al Malki arrives for initial visit to Baghdad -- October 16: Ambassador Malki presents credentials -- October 18: Bahraini Foreign Minister Sheikh Khalid makes a one-day visit to Baghdad to meet with GOI leaders. Since November, Ambassador Malki his made several visits to Baghdad, most recently in late February to attend the Kuwaiti National Day reception. He continues to operate out of the Rasheed when he is in Baghdad as renovation work is proceeding slowly at the IZ property to be the Bahraini Embassy. Kuwait -------------- -- October 21: Kuwaiti Ambassador Ali al-Mou'min arrives in Baghdad for initial one-week visit, becoming the first Kuwaiti Ambassador in Baghdad since Saddam's invasion. He presents credentials the following day. -- November 10: A personal representative of the Amir of Kuwait arrives in Baghdad with Ambassador al-Mou'min to Baghdad to personally deliver an invitation to the January 19-20 Arab League Economic Summit it Kuwait to President Talabani. -- November - February: Ambassador al-Mou'min makes several visits to Baghdad seeking to gain GOI agreement on the lease terms of an IZ property for the future Kuwaiti Embassy. Issue is still not resolved. -- January 19-20: President Talabani leads Iraqi delegation to the Arab League Economic Summit in Kuwait. In bilateral discussions on the margins of the Summit, there is agreement that the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister will lead a delegation to Baghdad shortly to discuss all outstanding issues between the BAGHDAD 00000733 004 OF 005 two countries. Initial reports that the long-running Kuwait Airways case had been settled prove to be premature. -- February 25: Ambassador Al-Mou'min hosts well-attended Kuwaiti National Day celebration at the Rasheed Hotel, the first time Kuwait has held an event in Baghdad since Saddam's 1990 invasion. -- February 26: Kuwaiti Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed al Sabah visits Baghdad -- the highest level Kuwaiti official to do so since Saddam's invasion (Ref C). The two sides agree to form a senior level joint commission to deal with all outstanding bilateral issues that would meet initially in Baghdad, perhaps by the end of March. Despite the progress above, the GOI has yet to name an Ambassador to Kuwait. Embassy Baghdad continues to press the Prime Minister's Office and MFA to resolve this issue quickly and send an Ambassador as an important gesture of good will. Egypt -------------- -- October 5: Egyptian Foreign Minister Abul Gheit visits Baghdad and Sulimaniyeh for meetings with Prime Minister Maliki, President Talabani, Foreign Minister Zebari and other GOI officials. While in Baghdad, Abul Gheit also visits IZ villas that MFA has identified to be the site of the future Egyptian Embassy and announces Egypt's intention to reopen an Embassy in Baghdad. Both GOI and GOE officials report the visit as a success. Mid-March: Iraqi delegation led by Deputy Foreign Minister Abbawi visits Cairo for talks on strengthening the bilateral relationship, including steps needed to reopen an Egyptian embassy in Baghdad . Egyptian delegation expected to visit Baghdad soon to follow-up. These discussions follow several visits to Baghdad by Egyptian technical teams. At present, Egypt has yet to name an ambassador to Iraq nor reestablish a diplomatic presence in Baghdad, and Iraq has not named an Ambassador to Cairo (currently represented at Charge level). -------------- Arab League -------------- -- August: Senior Egyptian Diplomat Hani Khallaf named Arab League Ambassador to Iraq, filling a vacancy from 2007 when former Arab League Ambassador Lemani resigned. -- March 16-19: Arab League Secretary General Amr Mousa visits Baghdad for meetings with GOI leaderships and key Iraqi political figures. March 17: Foreign Minister Zebari publicly announces that Iraq will request to host the Spring 2010 Arab League Summit Syria -------------- -- September 16: The SARG names Nawaf Fares, then Governor of Quneitra Province, as its first Ambassador to Iraq, ending two decades of bilateral estrangement. -- September 28: The GOI names Ambassador Ala'a Jowadi, the head of the MFA's Arab Department, as Ambassador to Syria. This represents an upgrading of representation from the Charge level. -- October 16: Ambassador Fares presents credentials to President Talabani and takes up his post. -- January 28: Iraqi Ambassador Jowadi arrives in Damascus and presents credentials to President Asad on February 16. Syrian-Iraqi relations were strained in November following the events at the Syrian border town of Abu Kamal regarding the Abu Ghadiyya network. While initial press reports indicated Syria would withdraw its Ambassador, this proved untrue and Syrian Ambassador Fares remained in Baghdad throughout. Lebanon -------------- -- July 17: Lebanese Parliamentary bloc leader Sa'ad Hariri BAGHDAD 00000733 005 OF 005 visits Baghdad and Najaf; meets with GOI leadership as well as Ayatollah Sistani. -- August 20: Lebanese Prime Minister Siniora visits Baghdad for meetings with GOI leadership. -- September 28: Iraq names Omar al-Barzanji as Ambassador to Lebanon, to replace Ambassador Jawad al-Hairi who died July 12, 2008, of a heart attack. -- January 29: Ambassador al-Barzanji arrives in Beirut to take up his post. Lebanon continues to be represented at the Charge level in Baghdad. Saudi Arabia -------------- -- September 28: The GOI names Ghanem al-Jumaili, its Ambassador in Tokyo, as Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, upgrading Iraq's diplomatic representation in Riyadh from the level of Charge. -- Late January: Saudi Arabia grants Agrement to Ambassador al-Jumaili who is expected to take up his post shortly. Progress in improving Iraqi-Saudi ties has been slow owing to Saudi King Abdullah's continuing suspicions about the nature of the Maliki government and its ties to Iran. Qatar -------------- -- September 28: Iraq names Jawad al-Hindawi as Ambassador to Qatar. This represents an upgrading of representation from the Charge level. -- February 4: Ambassador al-Hindawi arrives in Doha to take up his post. -- February 8: KRG President Massoud Barzani visits Doha. President Talabani will lead the Iraqi delegation to the March 30 Arab League Summit in Doha. Also, UNAMI has informed us that the Qatari First Lady may visit Iraq in early May for a cultural/educational visit, possibly tied to a UNESCO initiative. BUTENIS