IRAQ 201: SHI'A POLITICAL LANDSCAPE COLORED BY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000731 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2029 TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ SUBJECT: IRAQ 201: SHI'A POLITICAL LANDSCAPE COLORED BY INTERNAL RIVALRY REF: A. BAGHDAD 000387 ¶B. BAGHDAD 000588 ¶C. BAGHDAD 000401 ¶D. BAGHDAD 000570 Classified By: PMIN Robert Ford for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. This cable outlines Iraq's primary Shi'a parties and the major events Shi'a actors will likely face before national elections, planned for late 2009 or early ¶2010. Prime Minister Maliki's Da'wa party, and the other Shi'a who won seats during the January 31 provincial elections now face the challenges of governing effectively and transferring their provincial success to national elections. Da'wa's principal Shi'a rival, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI),must now look at how to preserve its partnership with the Kurds and the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP),while adjusting its image among Shi'a voters. All sides have largely accepted the election results and since mid-2008 have halted anti-state violence. The major events in Shi'a politics this year will be the seating of new provincial governments, intra-Shi'a battles in parliament, Sadrists reconciliation talks, and coalition formation for national elections. End summary. -------------- The Primary Shi'a Parties -------------- ¶2. (C) The results of the January 31 provincial elections offers a snapshot of the Shi'a political landscape (ref A): Da'wa, Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI),and the Sadrists remain the top-tier Shi'a trends, coming in first through third in Shi'a dominated areas. The second-tier parties -- Reform Trend, Iraqi National List, and Fadhila -- will struggle to gain prominence but could muster enough support to play kingmaker through coalition-building at the local or national level. ¶3. (C) DA'WA -- through the "State of Law" Coalition (Note: this was the name used by the Da'wa coalition in the provincial elections. End Note) -- includes Da'wa Tanzim and various independents: Successful largely due to Prime Minister Maliki's popularity (ref B),Da'wa will attempt to capitalize on its newfound dominance in southern provincial councils and Baghdad to transform itself from a party drawing primarily from the urban elite into a well-organized national party with a broader support base. Da'wa began in the 1950s as an intellectual movement and later became a clandestine body populated by the professional class that resisted Saddam Hussein's regime through hit-and-run style attacks. Da'wa was founded by Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Baqr al-Sadr, one of Iraq most influential clerics of the 20th century and a great uncle to Muqtada al-Sadr. In 1999, Da'wa split from Da'wa Tanzim to protest the latter's close links to the Iranian government. Since 2003, the two have found common ground, although local competition persists. ¶4. (C) ISCI was founded in 1982 as an exile group by Mohammad Baqr al-Hakim, who was assassinated in a horrific car bomb attack at the sacred Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf in August 2003. Mohamed Baqr was the brother of ISCI's current leader, Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim who is himself now dying of cancer. ISCI is in fact a broad front that includes the "Shahid al-Mihrab" (Martyr of the Pulpit) coalition of the Badr Organization, Iraqi Hezbollah, and Sayyid al-Shuhada (Lord of the Martyrs). (Note: The Solidarity Bloc affiliates closely with ISCI but is considered an independent party. End Note). ISCI's religious credentials and strong organizational apparatus -- which include political entities, former militia, and social service and religious networks -- helped it come in second in provincial elections, a showing that displeased ISCI which Qprovincial elections, a showing that displeased ISCI which had finished more strongly than Da'wa in 2005 elections. ISCI's challenges this year will be to utilize its national-level cooperation with the Kurds and the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP),while rebuilding support among Shi'a Arabs who have turned toward the more nationalist Maliki (ref C). It also will likely have to transition leadership of the front from Abdel Aziz al-Hakim to his son Ammar. ¶5. (C) SADRISTS through the "Tayar al-Ahrar" (Independent Liberals Trend) list: guided by the absentee but influential Muqtada al-Sadr, the Sadrists finished a close third to ISCI in provincial elections, winning seats in every Shi'a-majority province despite their apparently disorganized and poorly funded effort. The Sadrists appeal to the Shi'a urban poor, displaced, and those stridently opposed to the U.S. presence. Their challenge before national elections will be to separate themselves from the unpopular violence and criminality of the Jaysh al-Mahdi and Sadrists' poor management of public institutions when they were running central government ministries. BAGHDAD 00000731 002 OF 003 ¶6. (C) REFORM TREND: Led by Former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jafari, a former Da'wa member, the Reform Trend is a second-tier party that won a handful of seats in nine provinces. It has two seats in the national parliament. The Reform Trend has attempted to demonstrate its independence from PM Maliki but is considering moving toward Da'wa in the new provincial councils. ¶7. (C) IRAQI NATIONAL LIST: Led by Former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, INL is another second-tier party which gained its strongest support in central Sunni-Shi'a mixed provinces, but also won seats in several southern provinces. Always seeking to build bridges between Shi'a and Sunni, Allawi's domineering leadership style and frequent absence from Iraq make it difficult for him to find lasting allies. Most, but not all of the INL members in the national parliament are secular Shia but so far they have not been able to develop a strong appeal among Iraqi voters. ¶8. (C) FADHILA (Virtue) Party: Fadhila suffered a major defeat in provincial elections, especially in its former stronghold of Basrah, largely due to its poor management of the province's governorship. Fadhila was created in 2003 as a Sadrist offshoot by Muhammad al-Yaqubi, a former student of Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, Muqtada's father. Since then, Fadhila has taken a strong anti-Iran line. To revive its dying cause, Fadhila probably will have to merge itself with another Shi'a party. In our experience, the Fadhila parliamentarians operate in a particularly non-ideological fashion but angle for and haggle over ministerial and sub-minister seats and special benefits for their members like badges more than any other bloc in the parliament. -------------- - Major Events in Shi'a Politics before National Elections -------------- - ¶9. (C) Intra-Shi'a rivalries over policies, power and the identity of the Iraqi state persist. These tensions, however, are unlikely to result in significant political paralysis or backtracking on accommodation before national elections. That said, this year we expect the following important events, each laden with pitfalls: Seating of Provincial Councils -------------- ¶10. (C) Seating of new provincial councils, selection of provincial leadership: The peaceful handover of provincial government positions from ISCI to Da'wa between mid-March and early April would demonstrate that Shi'a parties accept elections as a means to resolve disputes and view Iraq's political system as legitimate. Almost all Shi'a parties have publicly labeled the elections fair and credible, with the exception of the election in Diyala, where Da'wa and Reform Trend politicians have told Poloffs that Kurdish parties manipulated votes to the Shi'a's detriment. (Comment: UNAMI here also acknowledges serious election fraud committed by Kurdish parties in Diyala. End Comment.) ISCI complained that Maliki unfairly swayed the election in the south but say they do not plan to protest. Fights in Parliament -------------- ¶11. (C) Fights in parliament over Maliki, national elections laws, and the Security Agreement (SA) referendum: Shi'a parties are likely to take opposing viewpoints over key issues in parliament before national elections. ISCI regularly joins with the Sunni IIP and Kurdish Alliance -- a group of about 125 MPs -- to oppose what they call PM Maliki's monopolization of power, unfair use of governing bodies for electoral gain, and aggressive use of security forces against Sunni and Kurdish rivals. ISCI is likely to Qforces against Sunni and Kurdish rivals. ISCI is likely to continue this battle over political parties and national elections bills -- laws that will influence how political parties are financed and how ballots are designed, votes counted, and seats allocated in parliament. In a high-impact scenario, ISCI and its allies could seek to initiate a no-confidence vote against Maliki. However, disagreement about a replacement, the potential blowback for unseating a popular prime minister, and hope that national elections will provide a natural end to the Maliki government are likely to dissuade ISCI from pushing its anti-Maliki strategy that far. ¶12. (C) Sadrist MPs, who loudly opposed the SA in parliament, might insist on a referendum on the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement if they judge highlighting their anti-U.S. credentials would benefit them before elections. (Note: The SA passed parliament with a requirement to hold a national BAGHDAD 00000731 003 OF 003 referendum on the agreement before July 30, 2009. It is uncertain whether this vote will actually take place on schedule or at all. End Note.) One danger is that Sadrists, in conjunction with those attempting to embarrass Maliki, force a referendum to be held concurrently with the national election, making the U.S.-Iraq relationship a prominent election issue. Maliki-Sadrist Reconciliation -------------- ¶13. (C) Outcome of Maliki-Sadrist reconciliation talks: Maliki and his advisors are holding multi-track reconciliation talks with Sadrists over detainee releases, general amnesty of Sadrist-affiliated militias, and, at the local level, alliances on provincial councils. If these talks are successful, more Sadrists are likely to accept the political process. In return for more splinter elements of the Sadrist Jaysh al-Mahdi militia laying down arms, Maliki might become less inclined to target Shi'a militia. Formation of Electoral Coalitions -------------- ¶14. (C) National election coalition formation, fate of the UIA: If Da'wa and ISCI are unable to reunite for national elections, Da'wa might redouble its efforts to ally with the Sadrists and Sunni Arab nationalists parties (like the newly christened National Project, ref D),a partnership that could force Maliki to accommodate both anti-U.S. and anti-Kurd sentiments. ISCI and Da'wa are more likely to gloss over their differences if Shi'a-Sunni sectarian tensions rise, Grand Ayatollah Sistani urges Shi'a political unity, or if the two parties successfully negotiate a power-sharing arrangement before the election. BUTENIS